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Health insurance for the working population of the United States is largely provided 
through employers primarily because of favorable income tax treatments and employment laws 
that encourage employers, large or small, to provide health insurance to their employees. In fact, 
a recent survey shows that employer-sponsored insurance covers over 50% of the non-elderly 
population of the United States, 57% of firms offered health benefits to employees, and 63% of 
workers accepted the coverage. This dissertation addresses several interesting questions raised 
by this situation.  First, why do some firms offer health insurance to their employees whereas 
others do not?  Second, what determines the number of health insurance plans offered among 
employers who do offer health insurance? Third, how do employers’ decisions concerning how 
many health insurance plans to offer influence the take-up decisions by employees and, therefore, 
variations in the extent and quality of health insurance coverage across industries and 
occupations? To provide at least a partial answer to these questions, this dissertation 
hypothesizes that employer-sponsored health insurance may affect worker productivity and, as a 
result, the different types of health insurance policies offered by employers and taken up by their 
workers. It then empirically investigates whether and how it does so. 
The first part of the dissertation addresses this issue from a theoretical perspective by 
investigating how employers decide the types and costs of the health insurance plans they offer, 
and their workers decisions whether to take up those plans. Following the existing literature, I 
examine these issues assuming that each worker’s demand for health insurance (and health status) 
is unobserved by the firm, that health insurance plans are priced competitively, and that workers 
do not move between employers. The contribution of the theory presented here is to add into 
 
 
this environment the assumption that a worker’s productivity is altered by the provision of 
employer-sponsored health insurance. The dissertation also explores certain variants of this 
theoretical model to investigate workers’ take-up decisions by modifying the framework so that 
workers can choose to remain uninsured.  
The second part of the dissertation tests whether and how employer-sponsored health 
insurance affects worker productivity in the real world by conducting an empirical analysis using 
data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). It does so by using a variable measuring 
health-related absenteeism at the workplace due to sickness as a proxy for productivity and 
investigating the relationship between this productivity proxy variable and a variable indicating 
whether a worker is insured through his or her employer. To purge this relationship of the 
endogeneity effects that may result from selection, the dissertation utilizes employment-related 
spousal variables as instruments for the potentially endogenous employer-sponsored health 
insurance variable. The resulting (negative) estimates suggest that employer-health insurance 
may enhance worker productivity by reducing health-related absenteeism.  
The hypothesis that health insurance improves worker productivity helps explain why 
firms are willing to offer health insurance to their employees and bear part of the premium costs. 
The dissertation makes several contributions in the field of health economics. First, the 
dissertation brings about the novel idea that health insurance may affect productivity. Second, it 
theoretically examines the take-up decisions of workers by allowing them to remain uninsured. 
Third, the dissertation studies the firms’ optimal decisions and equilibrium conditions when 
workers require reservation wages. Fourth, it finds a statistically significant empirical relationship 
between a proxy for worker productivity (days missed for health reasons) and employer-
sponsored health insurance.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Encouraged by favorable tax treatment and employment law, employers provide health 
insurance for most of the working population in the United States. According to a survey 
conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation (Kaiser) and the Health Research & Educational Trust 
(HRET), employer-sponsored insurance covers over half of the non-elderly population of the 
United States, or 147 million people. In 2015, about 57% of firms offered health benefits to at 
least some of their employees, and 63% of workers were covered at those firms. Of the firms that 
offered health benefits, about 17% ended up offering a single plan type. However, more than 50% 
of covered workers were in firms that offered more than one plan type. Statistics from this same 
survey also show that over 80% of the small firms (with fewer than 200 employees) end up with 
a single type of plan, whereas about 60% of large firms (with at least 200 employees) offer two or 
more types. In addition, descriptive statistics using data from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) show that firms’ (individual) health insurance offer rates and take-up rates differ across 
industries for a given occupation. For example, 64% of the workers engaged in service occupations 
within the manufacturing industry were offered health insurance plans, and 88% of those who 
were offered insurance plans ended up with a plan. In contrast, the corresponding figures for this 
same occupation group within the transportation and utilities industry are 72% and 86%, 
respectively. Offer rates and take-up rates also differ across occupational groups within an 
industry. For example, in the wholesale and retail trade industry, 59% of service workers were 
offered health insurance and 69% took up the offers; the corresponding figures for the production, 
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transportation, material moving occupation group, in contrast, are 70% and 80%. While such 
cross-occupation and cross-industry variations in insurance offer rates (and take-up rates) may be 
attributable to other unobserved factors, variations in productivity across occupations provide 
potential explanations. These variations do not seem to disappear even after individual 
characteristics such as age, sex and health status have been controlled for. While such evidence 
may not lead to confirmative conclusions, it suggests that offer rates and take-up rates for 
employer-provided health insurance are not fully explained by tax or employment policies.   
These stylized facts raise several questions. First, why do some firms offer health 
insurance to their employees while others do not?  Second, what determines the number of 
health insurance plans offered among employers who do offer health insurance? Third, how do 
employers’ decisions concerning how many health insurance plans to offer influence the take-up 
decisions by employees and, therefore, variations in the extent and quality of health insurance 
coverage across industries and occupations? The tax-deductibility of health insurance may be an 
explanation for why firms offer insurance (Miller 2005), but does not answer the other questions 
raised above. The dissertation attempts to provide at least a partial answer by investigating the 
connections between the provision of health insurance and worker productivity.     
How can health insurance affect worker productivity? Prior research provides some 
explanations. Health can be viewed as a form of human capital (Mushkin 1962; Becker 1964; Fuchs 
1966; Grossman 1972) and health care is a special form of investment in human capital. With 
health insurance plans, health care can be made easily accessible when it is needed. Thus, health 
and therefore human capital would be affected. When a worker internalizes the benefits from an 
insurance plan, he either recovers or enhances his health, and thus his productivity (Grossman 
1972). David Bloom and David Canning (2003) argue (and present empirical evidence to show) 
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that health as human capital affects worker productivity through both direct and indirect 
mechanisms. Schulte and Vainio (2010) suggest that improving health enhances workforce well-
being, thus increasing productivity. In addition, as O'Brien (2003) argues, good health insurance 
plans are associated with good jobs, and having a good job enhances a worker’s well-being, 
morale and productivity. Furthermore, improving worker rights (in the general sense) enhances 
productivity (Buchele and Christiansen (1995)). The implication is that offering a health insurance 
plan to a worker can mean one of the rights of the worker is respected, and thus his productivity 
may be improved. Aizawa and Fang (2013) imply that over time, health insurance can generate a 
positive effect on worker productivity. 
If health insurance does alter worker productivity, then how would this influence firms’ 
behavior? The theory part of this dissertation intends to answer this question. To this end, this 
dissertation assumes that health insurance alters worker productivity but does not presume 
whether the impact is positive or negative. So it allows for the possibility that health insurance 
reduces the productive power of a worker. The dissertation presents several models to investigate 
how the firm’s decisions and thus equilibrium outcomes are affected when health insurance has 
an impact on productivity. The first two models are largely built within the framework of Miller 
(2005), where the firm offers two health insurance plans (one basic and the other more generous) 
to its workers who are then induced to choose either of the two plans. One such model assumes 
that workers would become more (less) productive if they are enrolled in the more generous plan 
than they would if they are enrolled in the basic one, but their productive power is the same when 
they are covered under any given plan. The other assumes that productivity changes with the 
proportion of workers enrolled in any given plan. The analysis shows that it is not the productivity 
level that changes the equilibrium pattern of employer-sponsored coverage, but the difference in 
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the productivity between workers who choose the more generous plan and those who choose 
the basic plan.  I find, for example, that the firm tends to pool its workers into the more generous 
plan (high-end pooling equilibrium) if the productivity differential is positive and large. If the 
productivity differential is small or even negative, on the other hand, the firm is likely to pool its 
workers into the basic plan (low-end pooling equilibrium). Otherwise, the firm would separate its 
workers into the two plans, leading to a separating equilibrium.  
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the framework where workers are all insured 
may be overly-restrictive and unrealistic. To allow for the possibility that some workers may be 
uninsured, this dissertation removes the restriction that all workers are insured and assumes that 
workers may or may not (be induced to) take up the insurance policy offered by their employers 
or unions. This leads to the so-called take-up models. For simplicity, the model in this dissertation 
assumes that only one plan is offered. Findings similar to those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph are obtained regarding the impact of productivity on firms’ decisions and therefore the 
equilibrium outcomes. However, there is a difference now: a pooling equilibrium means either all 
workers are insured or all are uninsured. Correspondingly, a separating equilibrium means some 
workers are insured but others are not. 
The descriptive evidence presented in the first two paragraphs of this chapter suggests 
that the productivity-enhancing effect of health insurance may play a role in the firm’s decision 
to offer insurance. The second part of the dissertation examines whether and how health 
insurance affects worker productivity in the real world, by estimating a model in which 
absenteeism at the workplace (a proxy for (negative) productivity) is determined in part by 
whether an individual was insured through his or her employer or union. If employer-provided 
health insurance improves worker’s health, as O'Brien (2003) hypothesizes, then absenteeism 
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would decrease and, as a consequence, productivity may rise. The ordinary least square 
regression result for the explanatory variable is positive. However, because of selection issues on 
the labor market, the through-firm insurance status variable may be endogenous, thus biasing the 
OLS estimator. After the through-firm insurance status variable is instrumented using relevant 
employment-related spousal variables, the estimates become negative. This result is consistent 
with the claim that health insurance affects productivity positively, as health insurance reduces 
absenteeism. Moreover, the empirical study finds no gender effects: the effects of health 
insurance on married men (husbands) do not significantly differ from its effects on married 
women (wives) in terms of the number of days they would miss work due to sickness or for other 
reasons. 
The contributions of the dissertation are four-fold. First, it introduces worker productivity 
into the models, and as a consequence, the models yield meaningful implications that differ from 
those of previous work. Prior studies on related subjects, including Miller (2005), do not 
adequately address the issue of whether and/or how health insurance alters worker productivity. 
Second, it analyzes the situations where workers are allowed to remain uninsured so that the 
take-up decisions of workers can be examined theoretically. Third, the dissertation goes one step 
further to study the firms’ optimal decisions and equilibrium conditions when workers face credit 
and liquidity constraints and thus require reservation wages. These modifications result in more 
empirically relevant and testable predictions than previous research. Fourth, it empirically 
analyzes the relationship between worker productivity proxy and employer-sponsored health 
insurance and finds meaningful results that no previous work has obtained. 
The body of the dissertation consists of two parts, a theory part (Part II) and an empirics 
part (Part III). The theory part has three chapters: Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4. Chapter 2 
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reviews previous theoretical work on employer-sponsored health insurance, and discusses in 
some detail the model by Miller (2003) who sets up the general theoretical framework that is 
used in Chapters 3 and 4. At the end of the chapter, some limitations of Miller’s model are 
discussed and the modifications and extensions to be made in Chapters 3 and 4 briefly described. 
Chapter 3 presents the variable-productivity models. Specifically, the study presented in the 
Chapter 3 relaxes the (implicit) restriction that health insurance plans do not alter worker 
productivity and explores how the productivity effect of health insurance may influence the firm’s 
decisions and thus the equilibrium outcomes. The impact on productivity is modeled in two ways: 
1) each worker’s productivity changes depending on the particular plan they enroll in, and 2) the 
productivity of workers depends on the proportions of workers enrolled in a particular plan. Then 
a third model is examined by modifying Miller’s important assumption that all workers are insured 
in either a “moderate” or a “generous” plan.  Chapter 4 presents an alternative one-plan model 
where the health insurance affects worker productivity and workers require a reservation wage.  
The empirical part consists of three chapters. Chapter 5 presents the data used for the 
empirics. First, I describe the process for selecting the sample and how I construct the main 
variables of interest. Then I present and discuss high level summary statistics. Finally, I consider 
several potential instruments for health insurance status and present preliminary evidence of the 
strength of each of the instruments. In Chapter 6, I validate the instruments by estimating a wage 
regression equation where the dependent variable is the logarithm of hourly wage. The key 
explanatory variable of interest is a binary indicator for having health insurance from one’s own 
employer or union. Following Olson (2002), health insurance should reduce one’s wage, but 
because of endogeneity concerns, I instrument for health insurance status using the instruments 
described in chapter 5.  Chapter 7 presents the empirical analysis of the models regressing the 
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variable measuring absenteeism on the binary variable indicating whether or not the worker was 
insured through the firm. In this chapter, I test whether health insurance has an effect on 
productivity, which I proxy with absenteeism (days missed work due to illness). I use that same 
setup as in chapter 6, but now estimate models where the dependent variable is either the 
number of days a person missed work due to one’s own sickness or the number of days a person 
missed work for other reasons; the latter of the two models is in the spirit of a falsification test. 
The last chapter, Chapter 8, restates some of the general framework of Miler’s 
environment, its limitations, and the modifications made in the dissertation. It then summarizes 
the major conclusions and findings.  The appendixes list proofs, alternative models, tables, and 
figures. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter begins the discussion of how employers decide to sponsor health insurance 
coverage for their employees. The theoretical analysis of this issue is conducted within the general 
environment examined by Miller (2005). In this chapter, I lay out the basics of the Miller model 
and review his important results. I then extend the analysis to cases where the health coverage 
sponsored by the employer improves the worker’s productivity (Chapter 3) and to cases where 
an employer might decide not to sponsor health insurance for any of its workers (Chapter 4). 
In Miller’s model, an employer offers two health plans to its workers—a basic plan 
(referred to as the moderate plan) and a higher cost plan that provides employees with preferred 
or more complete coverage (the generous plan). Workers value the two plans differently because 
of differences in their own health status and expected health care costs. Employees who choose 
the generous plan contribute to its higher cost by accepting a lower wage than the wage they 
would receive with the moderate plan. Because workers value the two insurance policies 
differently, the employer can determine the proportion and the type of workers who choose each 
of the plans by varying the wage offered with the generous plan. Moreover, because payments of 
health insurance premiums by employers are not treated as taxable income for the employees, 
the employer can change the total compensation (wages plus employer insurance contributions) 
it pays to its employees by altering the wage offered with the generous plan. Within this 
framework, Miller’s model shows how the pattern of health insurance coverage among workers 
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can be explained by the decisions employers make along these two margins to minimize costs (or 
maximize profits). 
The benchmark model would be the one under full information, the case where the firm 
knows the expected health insurance cost or the riskiness of its workers and can discriminate 
among its workers when offering compensation packages. However, the model is analyzed under 
asymmetric information only, because the full information case is straightforward and does not 
require elaboration. When no discrimination is allowed, full information is equivalent to 
asymmetric information because the firm cannot utilize the available information. Thus, there is 
no difference between asymmetric information and the full information case where 
discrimination is not allowed.  
Miller’s environment is highly stylized, but captures key elements of a large segment of 
the labor market. The second section of the chapter lays out the structure and assumptions that 
define Miller’s framework.  I then summarize and explain the equilibrium and Miller’s key results 
within this environment. In Section 2.3, I discuss the conditions for all potential equilibria and the 
corresponding distribution of rents, and point out some of its key limitations. The last section lays 
out extensions of the Miller framework.   
2.2. Miller’s Framework 
Miller’s model involves three decision-makers: the insurance company1, the employer, 
and the workers. The insurance company does not directly sell insurance policies to workers, but 
rather contracts with the firm which then offers the two policies to its workers. The firm does so 
                                                          
1 Equivalently, the employer can be thought of as a risk-neutral, self-insured firm that sells insurance to its 
workers, and so the insurance company is not needed. 
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by offering packages comprised of a wage and one of the two health insurance plans. Workers 
then make a choice between the two compensation packages.  
Miller’s assumptions about the labor market simplify the analysis considerably. To begin 
with, workers are assumed to be identical except for differences in expected health care costs. 
This means, in particular, that workers are equally productive and that they have the same 
preferences over wage income and the two health plans. The firm, meanwhile, is assumed to 
employ a fixed number of workers and that this labor pool is described by a fixed distribution of 
health care costs. One interpretation of these assumptions is that workers have no mobility, but 
two further assumptions ensure that the firm does not act as a monopsonist in the labor market. 
First, the firm must employ and provide health insurance to all its employees, meaning that it 
must offer at least one wage-insurance plan package that is acceptable to its workers with the 
lowest expected health insurance costs. Second, the firm can offer only two wage-policy offers—
one for the moderate and one for the generous plan. The firm cannot, therefore, use multiple 
wage-plan offers to learn about, or take advantage of, the expected health care costs of individual 
workers. This implies that the firm operates under asymmetric information in that it knows the 
distribution of the expected health insurance costs across its workers but does not know the 
expected health cost of any given individual worker. This informational assumption is natural in 
the context of employer-sponsored health insurance because generally employers may not be 
legally allowed to discriminate among its workers based on their health statuses.   
Miller makes three assumptions about the insurance market. First, the insurance 
company is assumed to be risk-neutral. Second, the insurance company is assumed to know the 
distribution of the risk types of the workers and the true expected health care cost of each type 
of workers, though it may not know the risk type of any individual worker. Each worker knows his 
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own type.  Third, the health insurance market is assumed to be in perfect competition2. Perfect 
competition, coupled with the risk neutrality assumption about insurance companies, implies that 
every insurance company makes a zero expected profit on each insurance policy that it sells; this 
means that every insurance policy an insurance company sells on the market has to be actuarially 
fair. Hence, when the insurance market is in equilibrium, no insurance company can make a 
positive profit on any particular insurance policy because, if it did, another insurance company 
would target workers by offering an otherwise identical policy but at a slightly lower price; this 
process will continue until no positive expected profit can be made.  
An equilibrium in Miller’s model is said to have been reached if the insurance market is in 
equilibrium and the firm maximizes its profit (or minimizes its cost), given all its workers accept 
one of the compensation packages offered by the firm. While the theory involves three decision-
makers, its primary focus will be placed on the interaction between the firm and its workers and 
the equilibrium outcomes. Given the assumptions, there would be three possible equilibrium 
outcomes: 1) a separating equilibrium, where some workers are enrolled in the moderate plan 
and all others in the generous plan; 2) a (low-end) pooling equilibrium, where all workers are 
enrolled in the moderate plan; and 3) a (high-end) pooling equilibrium, where all workers are 
enrolled in the generous plan. However, Miller imposes such additional restrictions that only 
allow a separating equilibrium as defined in 1). 
2.2.1. The Worker’s Problem 
The firm offers two health insurance plans. For each plan, the firm offers a wage, so the 
total compensation package consists of a health insurance plan and a wage at a level appropriate 
                                                          
2 Alternatively, similar results can be derived under Bertrand price competition. 
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for that plan. Every worker receives one and only one health insurance plan, so no one is left 
uninsured but no one is enrolled in both plans either. Let 𝑚 denote the moderate plan and 𝑤𝑚 
denote the wage paid to a worker if the worker is enrolled in the moderate plan; let 𝑔 denote the 
generous plan and 𝑤𝑔denote the wage paid to a worker if the worker is enrolled in the generous 
plan. For the convenience of exposition, call the set (𝑤𝑚,𝑚) the moderate offer and (𝑤𝑔, 𝑔) the 
generous offer. 
The (indirect) utility a worker derives from the compensation package is the sum of his 
wage and the utility he derives from the health insurance plan he is enrolled in. The utility that a 
worker derives from his health insurance plan is simply its dollar-value benefit. Each worker is 
assumed to receive some plan so no one is left uninsured (and no one is enrolled in both either).  
 Let 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾] be a continuum and denote the type or the expected health insurance cost 
of a worker, where 𝛾 > 0. Hence worker’s utility function can be written as follows: 
  𝑢(𝑤𝑖 , c) = 𝑤𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖(𝑐) 
where i = m, 𝑔. Note that 𝑐 is the expected cost associated with health status so 𝑣𝑖(𝑐) can be 
interpreted as (and is!) certainty equivalent utility derived by enrolling in a health insurance plan 
(hence there is no risk premium). 
Let 𝑚(𝑐) denote the dollar-valued benefit derived by a worker of type 𝑐 who is enrolled 
in the moderate plan, where 𝑚(𝑐)  is strictly increasing (𝑚′(𝑐) > 0   for 𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝛾 )). Let 𝑔(𝑐) 
denote the additional benefit a worker receives when he is enrolled in the generous plan, where 
𝑔(𝑐) is strictly increasing (𝑔′(𝑐) > 0 for 𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝛾)) and strictly convex (𝑔′′(𝑐) > 0 for 𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝛾)), 
with 𝑔(0) = 0. Thus, 𝑣𝑚(𝑐) = 𝑚(𝑐) and 𝑣𝑔(𝑐) = 𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐).  
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Therefore, the total utility a worker derives from the compensation package is  𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐) 
if he is enrolled in the moderate plan and is 𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐) if he is enrolled in the generous 
plan. All workers are assumed to have (after-tax) reservation utility 𝑢, which is independent of 
their types. The reservation utility (𝑢) of the workers and how they evaluate each of the plans, 
i.e., the functions 𝑚(𝑐) and 𝑔(𝑐), are known to the firm. 
Assume from now on as a convention that if one type of worker is indifferent between the 
generous plan and the moderate one and if there is at least another type of worker who strictly 
prefer the generous plan, that type of worker will choose the generous plan, otherwise he chooses 
the moderate one. Hence a worker with 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾] prefers the generous plan to the moderate one 
if and only if 𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐) and 𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐) ≥ 𝑢, with 𝑔(0) = 0 and 
𝑔′(𝑐) > 0. The first inequality implies 𝑔(𝑐) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔if some workers prefer and enroll in the 
generous plan. The continuity assumption on 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾] implies that, if some workers prefer and 
enroll in the generous plan, then there exists a 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾], denoted as cg, such that 
 𝑔(cg) = 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔                                                                                                                  (2.2.1) 
 cg represents the lowest-cost workers who choose the generous plan. Thus, workers with 
expected health insurance cost 𝑐 ∈ [0, cg)  elect the moderate plan and receive a wage 𝑤𝑚 , 
whereas workers with expected health insurance cost 𝑐 ∈ [cg, 𝛾] choose the generous plan and 
receive a wage 𝑤𝑔. 
In principle, the employer can induce its employees to choose which plan by adjusting 
either of the two wages. However, it is technically convenient to assume that the wage associated 
with the moderate plan is fixed and only the wage associated with the generous plan requires 
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adjusting3. Given this assumption, the employer can optimally set the wage associated with the 
moderate plan in such a way that the total benefits from the compensation package are at least 
as great as the reservation utility of the lowest-cost workers, i.e., 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) = 𝑢. This ensures 
that no one would left uninsured as required.  
2.2.2. The Firm’s Problem 
A worker’s health insurance costs the firm 𝛼𝑐  for the moderate plan and 𝑐  for the 
generous plan, where 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) and 𝑐 is the worker’s expected health cost. As pointed out in 
Miller (2005), the consensus in the literature is that 𝛼 is somewhere between 0.8 and 0.9 in the 
case where the moderate plan is an HMO and the generous plan is a PPO. For the generous plan, 
the firm bears the entire expected health insurance cost.  
The government levies a tax at a rate 𝑡 (0 < 𝑡 < 1). As a worker cares only about his net 
wage and the health insurance plan he receives, and a worker’s contribution to health insurance 
made through his firm can be made tax deductible (Gruber, 2000), each dollar a worker must 
contribute for the moderate plan reduces his net after-tax wage by 1 − 𝑡 dollars. In order to 
compensate the worker, a wage of one dollar costs the firm 1/(1 − 𝑡) dollars.  
Perfect competition in the insurance market implies that the health insurance policy is 
actuarially fair, and thus the health insurance premium equals the expected health care cost. 
Because information is asymmetric, the firm does not know the expected health care cost of any 
given worker; however, it knows the distribution of the expected health care costs. Let F(c) 
represent this distribution and f(c) the corresponding density. Given that workers with expected 
health insurance cost 𝑐 ∈ [0, cg)  elect the moderate plan and workers with expected health 
                                                          
3 Making this assumption does not affect the equilibrium outcomes in any way. 
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insurance cost 𝑐 ∈ [cg, 𝛾] receive the generous plan, the firm’s cost of the moderate and generous 
plans are ∫ (
wm
1−t
+ αc) f(c)dc 
cg
0
 and ∫ (
wg
1−t
+ c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
, respectively. 
Miller (2005) does not explicitly talk about the firm’s revenue, but the way he treats the 
firm’s objective function implies that he assumes the firm’s revenue is fixed or the production 
function exhibits constant returns to scale and the labor supply curve is perfectly elastic, for he 
states that the objective of the firm is to minimize its expected cost. Given the equivalency 
between cost minimization and profit maximization when the firm’s revenue is assumed to be 
fixed, there is no difference between two approaches. However, for consistency, profit 
maximization rather than cost minimization will be used throughout the dissertation. The firm’s 
problem is therefore to maximize its profit given that the workers accept its offers.  
 Given the assumptions and the treatments described above, the firm’s problem can be 
equivalently written as    
 max
 0 ≤wg,0≤wm
−∫ (
wm
1−t
+ αc) f(c)dc − ∫ (
wg
1−t
+ c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
                                         (2.2.2) 
s.t.: 
𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) ≥ 𝑢 
𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(cg) + 𝑔(cg) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(cg) 
where the objective function is the average (per worker) profit. The first constraint is the 
participation constraint, and the second is the incentive-compatibility constraint, which is 
necessary only if at least some workers enroll in the generous plan. Profit maximization requires 
the participation constraint to be binding, i.e.,  𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) = 𝑢 or 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0). 
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 Because 𝑢  and 𝑚(0)  are both constants, 𝑤𝑚  must also be a constant. Non-
discriminatory policy requires an equal wage for all workers who receive the same health 
insurance plan. Hence every worker who receives the moderate health insurance plan receives 
wage 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0). The incentive-compatibility constraint can be simplified as 𝑔(cg) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 −
𝑤𝑔. In the preceding section, it was shown that there exists such a cg ∈ [0, 𝛾] that 𝑔(cg) = 𝑤𝑚 −
𝑤𝑔. Because 𝑤𝑚  is fixed, choosing wm and wgis equivalent to choosing g(cg), and because by 
assumption, g(cg) is a monotonic function of cg, choosing g(cg) is equivalent to choosing cg. 
Assuming that the solutions are interior, the firm’s problem becomes  
 max
cg∈[0,γ]
 − ∫ (
wm
1−t
+ αc) f(c)dc − ∫ (
wm−g(cg)
1−t
+ c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
                                    (2.2.3) 
 Expanding terms and substituting 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0) yields the following expression 
 max
cg∈[0,γ] 
 −
𝑢−𝑚(0)
1−t
− α∫ cf(c)dc − ∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cg
+ 
g(cg)
1−t
∫ f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
                           (2.2.4) 
 The first term represents the pre-tax wage if all workers elect the moderate plan, the 
second term is the expected health care cost of enrolling in the moderate plan, the third term is 
the expected health care cost of workers who choose the generous coverage, and the last term 
represents the wage savings that would be obtained if workers take the generous plan.   
2.2.3. Equilibrium  
 Differentiating the firm’s objective function with respect to cg  yields the first order 
conditions, which can be written as 
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((1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
)𝑓(cg
∗) +
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) {
≤ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 0,        
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 0 < cg
∗ < 𝛾
≥ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 𝛾         
,               (2.3.1) 
where 𝑔(cg
∗) = wm −wg . Equation (2.3.1) is the equivalent of Equation (7) in Miller (2005). 
Note again that Miller (2005) defines the firm’s problem as cost-minimization whereas I re-define 
it, equivalently, as profit-maximization so the signs on the left-hand side of (7) in Miller (2005) are 
the opposite of the signs in (2.3.1) and the inequalities are reversed. The term −
𝑔(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
 can be 
interpreted as pre-tax wage savings resulting from the marginal worker enrolling in the generous 
plan rather than in the moderate plan. (1 − 𝛼)cg
∗  represents the (pre-tax) expected health 
insurance cost the firm has to pay for the marginal worker enrolled in the generous plan rather 
than in the moderate one. This is positive because the generous plan requires the firm to pay the 
full cost rather than a part of it.  𝑓(cg
∗) is the density (proportion) of marginal workers. The last 
term 
𝑔′(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗))  in the equation is the reduction in pre-tax wage savings that results from 
an infinitesimal rise in cg
∗ because all workers who were already enrolled in the generous plan 
would have to be paid a little higher wage. Note that the left-hand of the first order condition 
represents the pre-tax marginal net profit from enrolling workers with a cost of cg
∗  and so a 
negative cost is a profit. 
As Miller (2005) shows, if cg
∗ = 0 , the first term equals zero because 𝑔(0) = 0  by 
assumption; then the first order condition becomes 
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(0)) ≤ 0; but because 𝐹(0) = 0, 
the first order would not hold unless  
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
≤ 0, which contradicts the assumption that 
𝑔′(𝑐)
1−𝑡
 is 
positive for all 𝑐, including 𝑐 = 0. Hence, it must be true that cg
∗ > 0. This says that the profit-
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maximizing firm would enroll at least some workers in the moderate plan. Hence no high-end 
pooling equilibrium can exist where all workers are enrolled in the generous plan. 
To better understand the first order condition, let’s suppose an interior solution so that 
the above first order condition holds with equality. Then it can be written as 
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
𝑓(cg
∗) =
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) + (1 − 𝛼)cg
∗𝑓(cg
∗) 
 The term on the left-hand side represents the surcharge for the generous plan (relative 
to the moderate plan). This surcharge is numerically equal to the wage savings. The terms on the 
right-hand side represent the marginal cost of enrolling marginal workers with expected health 
cost at the cut-off level.  
The first order condition is necessary but may not sufficient for the problem to have a 
unique solution. The second order condition for a global maximum can be satisfied with the 
specifications of g(c) and a variety of distributions about the expected health cost c.  
 If cg
∗ = 𝛾 , then the second term is zero because 𝐹(𝛾) = 1 . This implies 𝑔(𝛾) ≤ (1 −
𝑡)(1 − 𝛼)𝛾.  This says that no worker values the generous plan more than its incremental cost. 
This implies it would not be socially desirable to offer the generous plan to any worker.  On the 
other hand, if 
𝑔(𝛾)
1−𝑡
> (1 − 𝛼)γ, then the left-hand side is positive, contradicting the first order 
condition that it is non-negative. Thus cg
∗ = 𝛾 cannot be an optimal solution. Hence cg
∗ < 𝛾. This 
result states that the firm would enroll at least some workers in the generous plan as long as these 
workers are willing to pay for it. If this assumption is relaxed, it is possible that cg
∗ = 𝛾. That is, the 
profit-maximizing firm may enroll all its workers in the moderate plan. Therefore, a pooling 
equilibrium where all workers are enrolled in the moderate plan is possible. 
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When the equilibrium is separating, the zero-cost (lowest-cost) workers receive the 
moderate plan and earn the reservation utility, but all other workers receive more than their 
reservation utility (workers enrolled in the generous plan receive greater benefits than those 
enrolled in the moderate plan). In the pooling equilibrium, the firm extracts no rent as all rents 
accrue to workers other than the zero-cost (lowest-cost) ones, but the zero-cost workers have no 
risk and cannot yield rents.  
2.2.4. Miller’s Discussion of Equilibrium and Efficiency  
 Before examining the firm’s problem under asymmetric information (when workers’ 
types are unobservable to the firm), Miller (2005) first discusses the socially optimal allocation of 
plans to workers (935-936): 
Before considering the employer’s decision, we first characterize the socially optimal allocation of 
workers to plans. The incremental cost of enrolling a type-c worker in the generous plan is (1 − 𝛼)c, 
and the incremental benefit is g(c). Hence, the surplus-maximizing allocation of workers to plans is 
for a type-c worker to elect generous coverage if and only if g(𝑐) ≥ (1 − 𝛼).  
To focus in the interesting case where each plan is efficiently provided to some workers, we assume 
that: 
 
 
g′(0) < (1 −  α) and g(γ)  >  (1 −  α)γ                                            (1) 
 
 
which implies that there exists a unique worker type 𝑐𝐸 ∈ (0, γ) such that: 
 
 
g(𝑐𝐸) = (1 −  α)𝑐𝐸                                   (2) 
 
 
That is, for type 𝑐𝐸 the marginal benefit from the generous plan just equal its marginal cost. 
Under the efficient allocation, workers of type 0 ≤ 𝑐 < 𝑐𝐸 receive the moderate plan and workers 
of type 𝑐𝐸 ≤ 𝑐 ≤ γ  receive the generous plan, where without loss of generality we adopt the 
convention that workers indifferent between the two plans choose the generous one. 
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When discussing efficiency, Miller (2005) assumes an interior solution exists. Given that, 
there still two sources of inefficiency in the equilibrium in the Miller model. The first is the tax 
distortion, which increases the number of agents getting the generous plan (936-937) 
Under full information, the cost-minimizing employer chooses a type-specific wage for each 
worker so that the worker earns exactly his reservation utility from employment.... the employer 
prefers that the type-c worker receive generous coverage whenever 
 
 
g(𝑐)  ≥  (1 −  𝑡)(1 −  𝛼)𝑐                                                     (3) 
 
 
Let 𝑐𝐹 be the lowest-cost employee for which the employer prefers generous coverage to moderate, 
i.e., 𝑐𝐹 satisfies (3) with equality. Comparing (3) with (2) shows that 𝑐𝐹 < 𝑐𝐸. That is, with full 
information the employer gives generous coverage to some employees for whom the incremental 
benefit is less than its incremental cost. The reason for this is that, due to the tax advantage afforded 
employer-provided health benefits, the employer’s cost of providing generous coverage is less than 
the true cost. Hence, 𝑐𝐹 can also be thought of as the cut-off point for the tax-preferred socially 
optimal allocation of workers to plans, i.e., treating the employer’s tax-preferred cost as the true cost 
of care. 
 
 
The introduction of tax leads to the so-called tax-preferred socially optimal cut-off level 
of worker type c, which is lower than what is socially optimal. The second source of inefficiency 
in the equilibrium in the Miller model is informational asymmetry. After presenting the model, 
Miller talks about inefficiency resulting from informational asymmetry. 
In the full information case, the entire benefit of treating the employer’s expenditure on health 
insurance as non-taxable accrues to the employer….If the employer either does not know workers’ 
types or is unable to act upon this knowledge, then its compensation plan will consist of a choice 
between moderate coverage and a higher wage or generous coverage and a lower wage. Thus, the 
difference in the wages can be thought of as the surcharge imposed on those who choose the 
generous plan. The employer’s task is then to choose wages for workers electing each health plan 
(i.e., the surcharge) in order to minimize the expected compensation cost of its workers, subject to 
the constraints that each worker receives at least his reservation utility and chooses the health plan 
that maximizes his net benefit from employment. 
 
To gain further insight into the employer’s problem, it is useful to rewrite (7) (which is equivalent 
to Equation (2.3.1) presented earlier) as (for an interior solution (942): 
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g(cg
∗) (1 +
1
ε
) = (1 −  𝑡)(1 −  𝛼)cg
∗                                (10) 
 
 
where  is the elasticity of demand (willingness to pay) for the generous plan, 
= −[𝑓(𝑐g
∗)/g′(𝑐g
∗)] × [g(𝑐g
∗)/ (1 − 𝐹(𝑐g
∗))]. The left-hand side of (10) is the monopolist’s 
marginal revenue. 
 
Comparing (10) with (3) establishes that fewer workers receive generous coverage under private 
information than under full information, i.e., cg
∗ > 𝑐𝐹. Extending the monopoly analogy, in the full 
information case, the employer is a perfectly price discriminating monopolist, reducing the wage of 
each worker who receives generous coverage by his willingness to pay for it. Because of this, the 
employer has an incentive to offer generous coverage to all workers who value generous coverage 
more than its (tax-subsidized) incremental cost. When the monopolist cannot price discriminate, it 
charges a price above the competitive price. The result is that fewer workers receive generous 
coverage. 
 
Expression (10) is useful in thinking about how the preferential tax treatment afforded employer-
provided health benefits impacts employer policy and through it employee welfare. Even when there 
is no tax advantage to providing health benefits, the employer still has an incentive to act as a 
monopolist, which results in the employer enrolling fewer workers in the generous plan than is 
socially optimal. That is, if t = 0, cg
∗ > 𝑐𝐸. Relative to this benchmark, making employer-provided 
health benefits tax advantaged decreases the firm’s marginal cost of providing generous coverage 
to more workers, and therefore induces the employer to charge less for the generous plan and provide 
generous coverage to more workers. Thus, while the employer’s monopoly power leads it to charge 
a high price for generous coverage and enroll too few workers (from a social perspective) in the 
generous plan, the tax deductibility of employer-provided health insurance reduces this distortion. 
Indeed, it is straightforward to show that there exists a tax rate that induces socially optimal sorting. 
 
 
Miller’s analysis shows that, relative to the tax-preferred socially optimal level, 
informational asymmetry reduces the number of workers receiving the generous plan (937); when 
there is no tax, it reduces the number of workers receiving the generous plan (937) relative to the 
social optimum.  
The discussion of efficiency by Miller is primarily about the allocation of workers to plans. 
He does not talk too much about efficiency in the distribution of rents (if any) between the firm 
and its employees. The discussion of efficiency in the next section will be on rents distribution 
rather on the allocation of workers to plans. However, allocation of workers types will be briefed 
in later chapters where productivity is introduced. The following discussion is not presented in 
Miller (2005).  
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2.3. Discussions 
In his analysis, Miller examines only the separating equilibrium, where some workers are 
enrolled in the generous plan and others in the moderate plan. Miller’s model, however, can 
support pooling as well as separating equilibria. For example, if the pre-tax wage savings for the 
worker with the highest expected health costs from the generous plan is less than its additional 
premium, then the firm will induce all its workers to choose the moderate plan. I refer to the 
resulting equilibrium as low-end pooling. In the asymmetric information case as presented here, 
all workers receive the same wage which is equal to the reservation utility minus the health 
benefit of the moderate plan for the lowest-cost workers. In this low-end equilibrium, all workers 
except for the lowest-cost ones receive rents and the firm extracts no rents. It is the pooling of 
different types of workers in a single plan that causes rents to accrue to workers. 
If the pre-tax wage savings generated by enrolling the highest-cost workers in the 
generous plan exceeds the corresponding additional premium cost, then at least some type of 
workers will be enrolled in the generous plan. If enrolling the lowest-cost workers in the generous 
plan involves pre-tax transfers from the lowest-cost to higher-cost workers, then the firm will 
leave the lowest-cost workers in the moderate plan and enroll others in the generous one. This 
outcome constitutes a separating equilibrium. The specific separating equilibrium depends on the 
parameters of the model. In every separating equilibrium, the firm pays an additional benefit 
beyond the wage associated with the generous plan to workers with costs higher than the cost of 
the marginal workers and none receives that additional part. As an illustration, start with the low-
end pooling equilibrium and think of moving the highest-cost workers into the generous plan. 
Then the wage associated with the generous plan has to be raised so that the marginal workers 
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become indifferent between the generous and the moderate plans. But by the non-discriminatory 
policy (or asymmetric information), not just the marginal workers but also all higher-cost workers 
must be paid a higher wage. The excess wage paid to the higher-cost workers is something 
additional relative to the full information case where the firm pays the higher wage only to the 
marginal workers. The additional part that the firm has to pay under asymmetric information is 
the cost of information distortion (or the cost of non-discriminatory policy distortion). As we move 
down the line until (but not including) the point that represents the lowest-cost workers, different 
separating equilibria with more and more workers enrolled in the generous plan will be obtained, 
and every such equilibrium involves an extra cost as described above. Thus, in any separating 
equilibrium, the after-tax benefit of the marginal workers will be greater than the cost of the 
generous plan. In this case, all except the lowest-cost ones receive rents, but the firm does not.  
2.3.1. Graphical Presentation of the Miller Model: A Closer Look at Equilibrium and Efficiency 
The graphical analysis, including all figures, is not included in Miller (2005), but it is useful 
because it provides a convenient unifying framework for illustrating comparative statics and 
different models. Specifically, it is intended to serve two purposes: 1) to illustrate the conditions 
under which separating versus pooling equilibrium occurs, and 2) as a useful framework to 
examine the impact of productivity in Chapter 3.  
Figure 2.1 shows the full information case without taxation. As shown in the figure, the 
curve for (1 −  α)𝑐  is an upward sloping straight line, which captures the premium cost of enrolling 
workers in the generous plan  in excess of the premium cost of enrolling workers in the moderate 
plan (henceforth the excess premium cost curve). The curve for 𝑔(𝑐) captures both the benefit of 
the generous plan in excess of the benefit of the moderate one (henceforth the excess benefit curve), 
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which is increasing and convex in expected health care cost. Note that the excess benefit curve 
passes through the origin. A sensible excess benefit function has to pass through the origin, or in 
other words, the zero-cost workers should not value health insurance positively because they do 
not face any health risk; nor should such a function have negative values because the generous 
plan is not worse than the moderate plan for any workers.  
The two curves intersect each other at both the origin and point A. But in this case, only 
point A represents the social optimum because the other point does not satisfy condition (2) in 
Miller (shown earlier). Point A as illustrated occurs between the origin (where 𝑐 = 0) and the 
terminal (where 𝑐 = 100). In this case, it is socially optimal to separate workers into two the 
health plans (separating social optimum). It should be pointed out that Figure 2.1 only shows one 
possible socially optimal condition; there are two other possibilities: 1) The excess benefit curve 
𝑔(𝑐) is above the excess premium cost curve (1 −  α)𝑐 for all c except at the origin, where the 
two curves intersect; 2) the excess benefit curve 𝑔(𝑐) is below the excess premium cost curve 
(1 −  α)𝑐 for all c except at the origin, through which both curves pass. In the case of 1), the social 
optimum occurs at the origin and so it is socially desirable for the firm to pool all workers in the 
generous plan. In the case of 2), the social optimum occurs at the terminal and hence it is socially 
desirable to pool all workers in the moderate plan. 
The excess benefit of the generous plan versus its excess premium may affect social 
optimality. For example, if the excess benefit is lower than the excess premium cost for all workers 
(except for the lowest-cost ones), then the resulting social optimum would be low-end pooling. If 
the excess benefit of the generous plan is higher than the corresponding excess premium cost for 
some workers but lower than the excess premium for all others, the social optimum is separating, 
where workers with expected health costs higher than the cut-off level would prefer the generous 
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plan and those with expected health care costs below this level prefer the moderate plan. 
Otherwise, the resulting social optimum would be high-end pooling. 
Figure 2.1.     Full Information Case without Taxation 
 
 The analysis presented above requires the excess benefit function to be convex. Strict 
convexity is a desirable property, because it is consistent with the usual assumption made in 
economics textbook that individuals are risk-averse, but it is not sufficient for a desired social 
optimum to exist, wherein workers with lower costs desire the moderate plan and those with 
higher costs desire the generous plan. Another property of the excess benefit function is its 
monotonicity, which is implied. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the impact of taxation on equilibrium and efficiency. The 𝑔(𝑐)/(1 −
𝑡)  (where 0 < 𝑡 < 1 ) curve represents the pre-tax excess benefit; it intersects the excess 
premium cost curve at B, which is to the left of A. This means that taxation causes the firm to 
cover more workers under the generous plan than socially desired and, as a result, some workers 
become over-insured relative to the socially optimal allocation. This implies that the firm will 
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become less motivated to enroll workers in the generous plan when the tax rate drops. Therefore, 
if the tax rate decreases toward zero, then B will moves toward A; when the rate is equal to zero, 
B will coincide with A. Hence, the social optimal tax rate under full information is zero. If the social 
optimum occurs at the terminal, the analysis and results will be essentially the same. 
If, however, the social optimum happens at the origin, the introduction of taxation will 
not change the allocation relative to the socially optimum because the introduction of tax will 
move the excess benefit curve further leftward and away from the excess premium cost curve so 
the intersection still occurs at the origin.   
Figure 2.2.     Impact of Taxation on Equilibrium and Efficiency 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the impact of informational asymmetry on equilibrium. The curve 
that is shown in Figure 2.3 but not in Figure 2.2 is ℎ(𝑐), which represents {
  g(c)
1−t
 −  
g′(c)
1−t
(1−F(c))
f(c)
 }, 
and captures both the benefit of the generous plan in excess of the benefit of the moderate one and 
the effect of informational asymmetry. The effect of informational asymmetry is negative, so it 
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moves the curve down and away from the origin4. It intersects the excess premium cost curve at 
point C, which is located between A and B. This means that the firm allocates fewer workers to 
the generous plan than the tax-preferred socially optimal level but more than what is socially 
optimal. Because informational asymmetry tilts the pre-tax excess benefit curve leftward from B 
to C, it reduces the distortion induced by taxation. Thus, under asymmetric information, there 
exists a positive tax rate that can induce socially optimal sorting. This can be illustrated by 
gradually reducing the tax rate; as the tax rate decreases, the pre-tax excess benefit curve will tilt 
right-downward so B and C will move closer and closer to A; C will reach A (before B does) when 
the tax rate drops to a certain level. The tax rate that makes C arrive at A is the rate that induces 
socially optimal sorting.  
Figure 2.3.      Impact of Informational Asymmetry on Equilibrium 
 
                                                          
4 If the derivative of the excess benefit function for the generous plan is zero, i.e.,𝑔′(c) = 0, then ℎ(𝑐) =
𝑔(c)
1−𝑡
; then this curve passes through the origin. 
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Note that the intersection point C corresponds to the first order condition for an interior 
solution under asymmetric information, so it represents a separating equilibrium under 
asymmetric information, where the types to the left of C are enrolled in the moderate plan and 
those to the right of C are covered under the generous plan. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the curve for ℎ(𝑐) does not intersect the curve for (1 −  α)𝑐 
(unless the derivative of the excess benefit function of the generous plan is zero or negative for 
the lowest-cost workers, but assuming that this derivative is zero or negative seems strange and 
quite unreasonable), so the pooling equilibrium where all workers are covered under the 
generous plan (henceforth high-end pooling equilibrium) cannot exist. 
The above analysis implies that taxation can change the likelihood of a specific type of 
equilibrium in addition to causing over-insurance in a particular equilibrium. Specifically, it may 
increase the likelihood of a high-end pooling but decrease the likelihood of a low-end pooling 
equilibrium. In particular, if the equilibrium is separating in the case where there is no taxation, 
the introduction of taxes may turn it into a high-end pooling equilibrium if the impact of the 
taxation is large enough. However, the introduction of taxes cannot turn a separating equilibrium 
into a low-end pooling one because taxation encourages the firm to move workers away from the 
moderate plan and toward the generous one, not the other way round. If the no-taxation 
equilibrium is pooling at the low end, then introducing taxes may change it into a separating 
equilibrium; but if the no-taxation equilibrium is pooling at the high end, then the introduction of 
taxes cannot change it because taxation drives the equilibrium further away from separating.   
The analysis of taxes generates several empirical predictions. First, firms become more 
willing and thus more likely to offer health insurance. Hence, the proportion of firms that offers 
health insurance to their workers is greater when health insurance premium paid by the 
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employers is tax-deductible than when it is not. In other words, a higher proportion of firms 
offering health insurance should be observed in cases where the premium cost is tax-deductible. 
Second, firms would become more willing and so more likely to share the insurance premium 
costs if health insurance cost is tax-deductible than if it is not. As a consequence, the (individual) 
health insurance take-up rate or the portion of workers enrolled in employer-provided health 
insurance plans is likely to be higher when the premium costs are tax-deductible than when they 
are not, holding everything else the same.  
Informational asymmetry, on the other hand, has an opposite effect. It discourages the 
firm to enroll its employees in the generous plan because the firm has to pay an extra cost (the 
information rent). In addition, the asymmetry of information may change the likelihood of a 
pooling equilibrium. For example, it can increase the likelihood of the low-end pooling equilibrium 
(note that the low-end pooling equilibrium can exist in Miller’s framework if one restrictive 
assumption is relaxed) and decrease the likelihood of a high-end pooling one (it actually makes a 
high-end pooling equilibrium impossible under any reasonable circumstances).  
The empirical prediction generated by the analysis of informational asymmetry is that 
firms become less willing and less likely to offer health insurance and to share health insurance 
costs because informational asymmetry causes them to bear an additional burden. As result, the 
health insurance offer rates and take-up rates are likely to be lower in situations where the issue 
of informational asymmetry is more serious.   
2.4. A Look Ahead to the Extensions of the Miller Model 
The Miller framework seems to be a reasonable approximation to the real world 
situations. For example, there are several well-known influences that restrict worker mobility 
30 
 
even if they do not indicate complete immobility. Labor market frictions, more often than not, 
hinder worker mobility. Looking for a job requires a lot of time and energy. The interviewing 
process is costly and may be painful. Moving from one place to another to take a job is costly too. 
The new job may require starting from scratch, leaving a (sunk) cost unrecoverable; in addition, 
there is a risk that the new job or the new firm may ultimately turn out to be worse. Hence this 
assumption captures the major characteristics of the real-world job market. The assumption that 
all workers are insured also reflects to certain extent the reality, since in the United States, over 
half of the workers are insured.  The one-dimensional worker heterogeneity assumption captures 
and summarizes the primary characteristics of workers and leads to models that yield suggestive 
equilibrium outcomes. 
Despite its advantages, the Miller’s framework has a number of limitations. These 
limitations primarily arise from the restrictive assumptions the models presented in this chapter 
rest on. First, the worker immobility assumption does not adequately capture the reality, because 
in the real world, workers are more or less mobile across firms and industries. It is not quite clear 
what the equilibrium outcomes if this assumption fails to hold without making further 
assumptions. It can be imagined that the firm’s workforce may be replaced in part or in its entirety, 
depending on how the wage-health benefit package is structured, how good each of the two parts 
comprising the compensation package is, and what other firms are offering. Also, the assumption 
that all workers are offered health insurance and accept the offers is not realistic, because 
empirically many firms end up offering no insurance and many workers may remain uninsured. 
Furthermore, Miller’s model rests upon additional several restrictive assumptions, including an 
increasing and convex excess benefit function, identical preferences, perfect competition on the 
health insurance market, fixed distribution of workers’ expected health costs, fixed worker 
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productivity, coverage of all workers, and no liquidity constraints for workers. While these 
assumptions hold in some cases, there are situations they do not.  
To overcome some of the limitations of the Miller model, some of these assumptions will 
be relaxed or otherwise modified in the next two chapters. Additionally, workers may also face 
liquidity constraints so that they require certain levels of wages.  However, all other assumptions 
for the Miller model will remain unchanged.  
In Chapter 3, the Miller model will be extended to include situations where worker 
productivity alters with the health insurance plans under which workers are covered. The two-
plan models presented in this chapter are truly extensions or generalizations of the Miller model 
in that they incorporate the fixed worker productivity assumption underlying the Miler model as 
a special case. However, because altering productivity only affects the firm’s profit function and 
has nothing to do with the workers, the worker’s problem is not impacted.  
Assuming variable worker productivity, as presented in Chapter 3, has two noticeable 
consequences. First, a pooling equilibrium would be possible even in the case where it is not under 
the fixed productivity assumption as in Miller. Second, in the case of a separating equilibrium, 
more (or fewer) workers would be enrolled in the generous health insurance plan if the generous 
plan boosts (reduces) productivity relative to the moderate one. However, the distribution of 
rents between the firm and the workers remains the same qualitatively in any equilibrium as in 
the fixed productivity case, except that the firm may share the increased (decreased) productivity 
with its workers. Chapter 3 also covers another situation where the firm is assumed to offer only 
one health insurance plan and workers may choose to either accept or reject the plan and thus 
remain uninsured.  
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Chapter 4 explores an alternative model where workers may face credit or liquidity 
constraints. When workers face such constraints, those who elect to be uninsured (if any) may 
require a wage that is at least as high as their reservation wage, which is above their reservation 
utility. If this is the case, then in all possible equilibria, workers receive rents. The firm, however, 
may or may not extract rents, depending on the type of the equilibrium, as well as on whether 
the average benefit of the insurance plan the uninsured workers would obtain if they chose to be 
enrolled in that plan exceeds their reservation wage.  
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CHAPTER III  
MODELS IN WHICH HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECTS WORKER PRODUCTIVITY 
 
  
3.1. Introduction 
The Miller model briefed in Chapter 2 implicitly assumes that the firm’s productivity does 
not vary with the insurance coverage workers elect. The models to be presented in this chapter 
make a critical change to this assumption by allowing worker productivity to alter with the 
workers’ choices of health insurance plans. Although the study primarily deals with health 
insurance, the implications of the model results may be applicable to other employer-sponsored 
wellness programs that potentially affect productivity. Except for this modification, the general 
framework and all other assumptions used in the Miller model will remain unchanged, including 
the assumptions of an increasing and convex health insurance excess benefit function, identical 
workers’ preferences, a perfectly competitive health insurance market, and a firm that operates 
under asymmetric information regarding the expected health care cost of individual workers.   
Three models are presented in this chapter. The first two retain Miller’s assumptions that 
the firm offers workers a basic plan (the moderate) and a more generous (the generous) and that 
these must be structured so that all workers choose to be enrolled in one of them. Within this 
framework, I assume that each worker’s productivity differs depending on which plan is chosen 
and examine how these productivity differentials across plans alter the likelihood of a pooling 
versus separating equilibrium and affect the equilibrium cutoff levels of the expected health care 
cost for a separating equilibrium. The third model examines how the productivity effects of health 
insurance influence a worker’s decision on whether to enroll in insurance or to become uninsured. 
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To focus on this issue, I assume that the employer offers workers only one insurance policy and 
explore how the productivity effects of health insurance change the number of workers who 
accept or reject the conditions under which the employer offers the policy.  Although many firms 
in the United States offer workers more than one plan as Miller assumes, many others offer only 
one. By examining this environment, it is possible to focus on the important issue of how the 
productivity impact of health insurance influences which workers remain uninsured. 
In all three models, health insurance is assumed to alter worker productivity in one way 
or the other.  In the first, I assume that productivity shifts across plans but remains fixed for any 
given plan, regardless of how many workers or how large the proportion of workers is enrolled in 
that plan. This implies that per worker productivity may vary across plans but is equal across all 
workers who are enrolled in the same plan. In the second framework, I assume that productivity 
of all workers covered with insurance varies with the proportion of workers covered under the 
plan; as more workers move from one plan to the other, the two productivity levels diverge. I 
examine both frameworks because they capture different mechanisms through which health 
insurance could affect productivity depending on the nature of the tasks or functions workers 
need to perform at a job.  
An important way that jobs differ from one another is the extent to which worker 
productivity depends on interdependence. For example, tasks that are complementary may have 
higher degrees of interdependence than others. Accomplishing interdependent tasks requires a 
high degree of cooperation and/or mutual interaction. On the other hand, cooperation and/or 
mutual interaction is not as important for tasks that are largely separate and independent. In 
professions where tasks or functions are interdependent and so cooperation is required, the 
productivity of one worker also affects the productivity of another. For example, if a worker has 
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to use as input for his task the output generated by an upper-stream worker, then the worker in 
the downstream cannot finish his task until the upper-stream worker has completed his. However, 
if interdependence among tasks or functions is weak or nonexistent, then the productivity of one 
individual worker has little or no impact on the productivity of another. 
Thus, if workers are in professions where tasks or functions are interdependent, then 
when health insurance affects the productivity of one worker, it may also affect the productivity 
of another. As a consequence, health insurance has two effects on the overall productivity. First, 
it changes the productivity of each individual worker; second, it indirectly (through some 
mechanism) changes the productivity of other workers as well. This second effect may arise out 
of the interaction between workers. The more workers are covered, the more likely or the 
stronger the health insurance is to affect the productivity of other workers. Hence in such 
professions (or industries), productivity varies with the proportion of workers enrolled in a health 
insurance plan. Industries where interdependent tasks or functions may prevail include (but are 
not limited to) construction, transportation, and manufacturing and occupations of such nature 
include production, transportation and construction.  
If workers are doing independent jobs that do not require much cooperation, the 
productivity of one worker has little impact on the productivity of another worker and thus the 
health insurance of one worker does not affect the productivity of another. Therefore, the 
productivity may shift with health insurance plans as it affects the individual productivity only and 
does not depends on how many workers are covered under a particular health insurance policy. 
Industries where there is little or no interdependence among tasks or functions include (but are 
not limited to) financial service, leisure and hospitality, and professional and business services. 
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Such occupations may include (but are not limited to) management, sales, and service operation. 
In these industries or occupations, there are no spillover effects among workers. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in 
which productivity alters with the health insurance plans only, covering the worker’s problem, the 
firm’s problem, and the equilibrium. Section 3 briefs an alternative model where the productivity 
varies with the proportion of workers covered under the generous plan. Section 4 introduces and 
analyzes a one-plan model. Section 5 presents a discussion of the models. Section 6 concludes the 
chapter. 
3.2. A Model where Productivity Changes across Health Insurance Plans  
The model presented in this section assumes that worker productivity shifts across the 
two health insurance plans but is fixed within a given plan. Hence, there are (potentially) only two 
levels of worker productivity, each a constant for either of the two plans. It is possible that the 
same health insurance plan may affect different workers, and thus their productivity differently. 
The model presented in this section, however, focuses only on a single, plan-specific productivity 
impact. There are two reasons for making such a simple assumption. First, this assumption 
captures the primary aspects of the impact of health insurance on productivity. In terms of 
productivity impact, the difference between the types of plans should be more important than 
the difference across types of workers, given that they are otherwise identical. Second, this 
assumption simplifies the analysis considerably.  I refer to this case as a plan-shifting productivity 
model and expect it to be most applicable in professions or jobs where only the productivity of 
individual workers is affected by health insurance coverage and there is no spillover effect among 
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workers. Such professions or jobs may include those that require physical or mental strengths (or 
both) or that encourage independence and creativity.  
3.2.1. The Worker’s Problem 
Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that productivity differentials have no direct 
impact on a worker’s utility, but on the other hand, the worker is affected by how productivity 
differences change the wage-insurance plan combinations offered by the employer. The worker 
then evaluates these packages in the same way as in Chapter 2: the utility a worker obtains from 
the moderate plan is  𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐) and the utility a worker obtains from the generous plan is 𝑤𝑔 +
𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐). Workers would accept employment at the firm if and only if either 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐) > u 
or 𝑤𝑔 +m(c) + 𝑔(𝑐) > u for c ∈ [0, γ], and they would elect the generous one if and only if 
𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐) + 𝑔(𝑐) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 +m(c).  
3.2.2. The Firm’s Problem 
As stated at the beginning of this section, worker productivity varies across the two plans 
but is equal for all workers covered under the same plan. So, let 𝑒𝑘 denote the productivity of a 
worker who has chosen plan 𝑘, where 𝑘 ∈ {𝑚, 𝑔}. The expected profit the firm obtains from the 
worker enrolled in the moderate plan is ∫ (em −
wm
1−t
− c) f(c)dc
cg
0
 and the expected profit it 
receives from the worker enrolled in the generous plan is ∫ (eg −
wg
1−t
− c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
, given the 
distributional assumption about the expected health care cost of the workers.  
 The introduction of worker productivity does not change the way individual workers make 
choices of the health insurance plan relative to the Miller case. Hence, the participation constraint, 
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as well as the incentive-compatibility constraint, remains the same. The firm’s problem can 
therefore be expressed as   
max
 0 ≤wg,0≤wm
∫ (em −
wm
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc + ∫ (eg −
wg
1 − t
− c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
                 (3.2.1) 
s.t.: 
𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) ≥ 𝑢 
wg +m(cg) + g(cg) ≥ wm +m(cg) 
where, again, the first is the individual rationality or participation constraint and the second the 
incentive-compatibility constraint. As in the Miller case, profit maximization requires both 
constraints to be binding, so 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0), which is a constant, and g(cg) = wm −wg  for 
cg ∈ [0, γ]. Moreover, choosing g(cg) is equivalent to choosing cg. Therefore, the firm’s problem 
can be re-expressed as 
max
cg∈[0,γ] 
 ∫ (em −
𝑤𝑚
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc + ∫ (eg −
𝑤𝑚 − g(cg)
1 − t
− c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
         (3.2.2) 
The above expression can be further re-written as 
max
cg∈[0,γ]
 ∫ (eg − c)f(c)dc
γ
0
−
𝑤𝑚
1 − t
+ ∫ ((1 − α)c − (eg − em) f(c)dc
cg
0
+
g(cg)
1 − t
∫ f(c)dc
γ
cg
                                                                                                                    (3.2.3) 
where the first two terms are constants, which do not affect the firm’s optimal decisions. Define 
𝛿 = 𝑒𝑔 − 𝑒𝑚 . This is the productivity differential between the two types of plans. It is this 
differential that separates this model from Miller’s.  
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3.2.3. Equilibrium 
Differentiating the profit function with respect to cg yields the first order conditions as 
follows. 
(−𝛿 + (1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
)𝑓(cg
∗) +
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) {
< 0, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 0,        
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 0 < cg
∗ < 𝛾
> 0, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 𝛾         
,    (3.2.4) 
where 𝛿 = 𝑒𝑔 − 𝑒𝑚. The optimal choice of cgis determined implicitly by the first order conditions. 
Productivity indeed affects the firm’s optimal choice as it appears in the first order conditions. 
This is in a contrast with the Miller (2005) model in which productivity is implicitly assumed to be 
the same for both plans; in that case, productivity differential δ is zero, which is a special case of 
this model.   
The left-hand side is the net profit. Suppose the first order condition holds with equality, 
i.e., there is an interior solution. Then the term (−𝛿) captures the productivity loss as a result of 
shifting those individuals who used to be enrolled in the generous plan to the moderate plan. All 
other terms have the same interpretations as in the Miller case. The first part on the left hand 
side of the first order conditions, (−𝛿 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑐𝑔 −
𝑔(𝑐𝑔)
1−𝑡
) 𝑓(𝑐𝑔), captures the total benefit of 
shifting marginal workers from the generous plan to the moderate one.  
3.2.3.1.   Analysis of the First Order Conditions 
 If 0 < cg
∗ < 𝛾 , then the first order condition holds with equality, and because by 
assumption, f(cg
∗) ≠ 0, it can be written as 
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𝛿 = (1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
+
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗))
f(cg
∗)
                                                                (3.2.5) 
If 𝛿 > 0, and if the firm’s problem has a unique interior solution so that the second order 
conditions for a maximum are satisfied, then cg
∗ < cg
M∗, where cg
M∗ is the (unique) interior solution 
in Miller’s model presented in Chapter 2. This states that the firm induces more workers to elect 
the generous plan than if worker productivity is fixed. 
To help interpret (3.2.5), define ℎ(𝑐) =
f(c)
1−𝐹(𝑐)
. The term 1 − 𝐹(𝑐) is (analogous to) the 
survival probability. The survival probability measures the proportion of workers who would be 
enrolled in the generous plan as the cut-off level varies.  f(c) is the event density. Hence ℎ(𝑐) is 
hazard function or hazard rate and 
(1−𝐹(cg
∗ ))
f(cg
∗ )
 the inverse hazard rate. Monotonicity requires 
𝑑
𝑑cg
∗ (
(1−𝐹(cg
∗ ))
f(cg
∗ )
) ≤ 0.  
If cg
∗ = 0, then the first order condition can be written as  (−𝛿)𝑓(0) +
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(0)) <
0. Note that 𝐹(0) = 0. By assumption, 𝑓(0) > 0. Hence 
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
1
𝑓(0)
< 𝛿. Because the left-hand side 
is by assumption positive, this condition holds only if 𝛿 > 0. If 𝛿 is positive, i.e., the generous plan 
has a larger effect on worker productivity than does the moderate one, then it is possible (but not 
necessary) that this condition holds. Thus, this condition is more likely to hold if 𝛿 is large, 𝑔′(0) 
is small, 𝑓(0) is large, and/or the tax rate 𝑡 is small.  
Thus, it is possible for this model to have a pooling equilibrium where the firm enrolls all 
workers in the generous plan (high-end pooling equilibrium) if the generous plan has a larger 
positive effect on worker productivity than does the moderate one. In contrast, there is no high-
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end pooling in the Miller model under any (reasonable) circumstances! If the left-hand side of the 
first order condition is less than zero, i.e.,  
(−𝛿 + (1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
)𝑓(cg
∗) +
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) < 0 
then by complementary slackness, cg
∗ = 0. Hence 
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
1
𝑓(0)
< 𝛿. 
Therefore, this condition is necessary but not sufficient for cg
∗ = 0. This states that the 
profit-maximizing firm would enroll all its workers in the generous plan only if 
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
1
𝑓(0)
< 𝛿. If, on 
the other hand, 𝛿 ≤
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
1
𝑓(0)
, i.e., if the generous plan does not have enough impact on worker 
productivity relative to the moderate one, then the profit-maximizing firm would enroll at least 
some workers in the moderate plan. Furthermore, if the generous plan has a smaller effect on 
worker productivity than the moderate one so that the productivity differential is negative, the 
firm would be more likely in this model than in Miller (2005) to enroll at least some workers in 
the moderate plan.    
If cg
∗ = 𝛾 , then the second term would be zero since 𝐹(𝛾) = 1 , and the first order 
condition becomes (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 −
𝑔(𝛾)
1−𝑡
> 𝛿.  If 𝛿 is positive, then this condition is less likely to hold 
than is the corresponding condition in Miller (2005). Thus, the model under study is less likely to 
have a pooling equilibrium where the firm would enroll all its workers in the moderate plan (low-
end pooling). However, if the productivity differential is negative so the right-hand side of the 
above condition is negative, then this condition is more likely to hold and thus the firm is more 
likely to pool its workers in the moderate plan than in the Miller case.  
The following proposition summarizes the results. 
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Proposition 3.1. A separating equilibrium is characterized by  𝛿 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑐𝑔
∗ −
𝑔(𝑐𝑔
∗)
1−𝑡
+
𝑔′(𝑐𝑔
∗)
1−𝑡
(1−𝐹(𝑐𝑔
∗))
𝑓(𝑐𝑔
∗)
, whereas a pooling equilibrium is characterized by either  𝛿 < (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 −
𝑔(𝛾)
1−𝑡
 or 
𝛿 >
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
1
𝑓(0)
. In particular, a low-end pooling equilibrium requires𝛿 < (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 −
𝑔(𝛾)
1−𝑡
, whereas 
a high-end pooling equilibrium requires 𝛿 >
𝑔′(0)
1−𝑡
1
𝑓(0)
. 
Proof. These are the first order conditions derived above. The analysis above proves the 
proposition. Note that the first order conditions are necessary but not sufficient for a maximum 
(and thus an equilibrium) to exist. 
How does a change in the productivity differential affect the optimal cut-off level? The 
following proposition summarizes a result that answers this question. 
Proposition 3.2. If 𝑐𝑔
∗ ∈ (0, 𝛾) is an interior solution to (3.2.4), then 
𝜕𝑐𝑔
∗
𝜕𝛿
< 0.  
Intuitively, this lemma states that if the generous (moderate) plan boosts productivity 
more than the moderate one, then the firm would enroll more workers in the generous plan.  
Proof5. If cg
∗ ∈ (0, γ) is a solution to (3.2.4), then 𝛿 = (1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
+
𝑔′(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
(1−𝐹(cg
∗ ))
𝑓(cg
∗ )
; taking  
cg
∗ as a function of 𝛿 and differentiating both sides with respect to 𝛿 yields 
1 = (1 − 𝛼)
∂cg
∗
∂δ
−
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
∂cg
∗
∂δ
+
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗))
𝑓(cg
∗)
∂cg
∗
∂δ
+
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(2 −
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) f ′(cg
∗)
(𝑓(cg
∗))
2 )
∂cg
∗
∂δ
 
 
                                                          
5 This proof can be simplified by using the implicit function theorem and the fact that the second order 
condition is negative. 
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Collecting and shifting terms yields  
∂cg
∗
∂δ
= [(1 − α) +
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗))
𝑓(cg
∗)
−
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(2 −
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) f ′(cg
∗)
(𝑓(cg
∗))
2 )]
−1
< 0 
This expression is negative because the term in the bracket is the second order condition 
(SOC) for a maximum, and cg
∗ is a solution implies this SOC for a maximum is satisfied. Intuitively, 
this result says that, if the firm finds it optimal to separate its workers into the two health 
insurance plans, then it would be in the firm’s best interest to change the optimal cut-off level in 
the opposite direction when the productivity differential experiences a small change. 
Proposition 3.2 implies 
𝜕𝑔(cg
∗ )
∂δ
= 𝑔′(cg
∗)
∂cg
∗
∂δ
< 0, because g′(cg
∗) > 0. This says that if the 
productivity differential somehow experiences a small change, the wage differential (recall that 
g(cg) = wm −wg ) would have to change in the opposite direction: a rising (declining) 
productivity differential would therefore widen (shrink) the wage differential whereas a deceasing 
productivity differential would shrink the wage differential.  Furthermore, Proposition 3.2 also 
implies 
𝜕wg
∗
∂δ
= −𝑔′(cg
∗)
∂cg
∗
∂δ
> 0, because g(cg
∗) = wm −wg
∗ so g′(cg
∗)
∂cg
∗
∂δ
= −
𝜕wg
∗
∂δ
 as wm is fixed. 
This states that if the productivity differential widens (narrows), the firm would increase the wage 
paid to workers who would be enrolled in the generous plan.  
The first order conditions can be re-expressed as 
((1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
)𝑓(cg
∗) +
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) {
< 𝛿, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 0,        
= 𝛿, 𝑖𝑓 0 < cg
∗ < 𝛾 
> 𝛿, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 𝛾         
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If 𝛿 > 0, then cg
∗ < cg
M∗, where cg
M∗ is the cut-off level in the Miller case; this implies more 
workers will enroll in the generous plan when workers covered under the generous plan are more 
productive than they would if they were covered under the moderate plan.   
The impact of the (positive) productivity differential on the cutoff level and thus 
equilibrium is illustrated in the following figures. 
 Figure 3.1. Equilibrium in the Case where Insurance Does Not Affect Productivity  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the case where there is no productivity effect. The (1 − α)c line and the 
ℎ(c) curve are the same as in the Miller case; the former, again, captures the premium cost of 
enrolling workers in the generous plan  in excess of the premium cost of enrolling workers in the 
moderate plan, and the latter represents {
  g(c)
1−t
 −  
g′(c)
1−t
(1−F(c))
f(c)
 }, capturing both the benefit of 
the generous plan in excess of the benefit of the moderate one and the impact of informational 
asymmetry. As in the Miller case, the asymmetry of information shifts down the excess benefit 
curve for the generous plan from the origin to a point on the negative part of the vertical axis and 
so its intercept with the vertical axis is negative. The (1 − α)c line and the ℎ(c) curve intersect 
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each other at C, which is located between the origin and the terminal point. Hence, it represents 
a separating equilibrium, where workers of types located to the left of C are enrolled in the 
moderate plan and workers of types located to the right of C are covered under the generous plan. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates a case where the productivity differential is positive. The line 
(1 − 𝛼)c  and the curve for ℎ(c)  are the same as shown in the Figure 3.1. The curve  𝑝(c) 
represents { ℎ(𝑐) + δ } or {
  𝑔(𝑐)
1−𝑡
 −  
𝑔′(c)
1−𝑡
(1−𝐹(c))
𝑓(c)
+ δ }, where δ  is a positive productivity 
differential. This positive δ shifts the curve ℎ(𝑐) upward to become curve 𝑝(c). As a consequence, 
the intersection point is shifted leftward to D. Thus, the optimal cutoff level cg
∗ for a separating 
equilibrium is lowered and more workers are enrolled in the generous plan than without such a 
productivity effect.  
 Figure 3.2. Impact of A Constant Productivity Differential on Equilibrium 
 
The intersection point C as illustrated in the figures is close to the terminal point, but this 
does not need to be the case, because it is quite possible that the ℎ(c) curve intersects the 
(1 − 𝛼)c line at a point close to the origin. Then, if the productivity effect is large enough, the 
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𝑝(c) curve may intersect the (1 − 𝛼)c line at the origin. In this case, the resulting equilibrium is 
high-end pooling. If, on the other hand, the 𝑝(c) curve intersects the (1 − 𝛼)c line at the terminal 
point (where c = γ = 100), then the 𝑝(c) curve would intersect the (1 − 𝛼)c line at an interior 
point, and the resulting equilibrium is separating. Hence, the productivity effect makes a high-end 
pooling equilibrium more likely and a low-end pooling one less likely than in the no-productivity 
effect case.  
In the analysis above, the productivity differential δ is assumed to positive. While it may 
not be realistic to think that the generous plan has a smaller productivity effect than the moderate 
plan so the productivity differential is negative, I assume this is possible for the sake of analysis. 
If the productivity differential δ is negative, the direction of the shift stated above would be 
reversed, and so the optimal cutoff level cg
∗ would rise, thereby reducing the number of workers 
enrolled in the generous plan. Moreover, the conclusions regarding the likelihood of a pooling 
equilibrium should be reversed as well: a negative productivity effect makes a low-end pooling 
equilibrium more likely and a high-end pooling equilibrium less likely.  
3.3. An Alternative Variable-Productivity Model  
The model presented in the preceding section assumes that worker productivity varies 
across the health insurance plans but remains the same for any given plan. This section deals with 
a case where worker productivity changes with the proportion of workers enrolled in a particular 
plan. This may happen in a profession or job that requires interaction and emphasizes cooperation 
among workers. For example, a particularly desirable health insurance plan may somehow help 
boost morale or, through a causal chain, ultimately reduce absenteeism and thus interruption to 
a job or a production line, thereby smoothing cooperation, alleviating the burden of coordination, 
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and increasing per worker output. In such cases, it makes sense to assume that the productivity 
of workers varies with the proportion of them covered under the desirable health insurance plan. 
This model can be interpreted as one where health insurance alters team productivity and the 
overall productivity rises (drops) faster than does the proportion of workers enrolled in a plan.  To 
simplify the analysis here, I assume that the productivity for one of the plans (the moderate one) 
is fixed. Thus, only the productivity associated with the other plan (the generous one) changes as 
the proportion of workers enrolled in the generous plan changes.   
3.3.1. The Worker’s Problem 
When the way in which productivity varies with the health insurance plans is changed, 
only the firm’s decisions are affected and so the worker’s problem remains the same as presented 
in the preceding section.   
3.3.2. The Firm’s Problem 
As mentioned earlier, the productivity of workers enrolled in the moderate plan is 
assumed to be fixed and normalized to zero for simplicity, whereas the productivity of workers 
covered under the generous plan is assumed to be a function of the proportion of workers 
enrolled in the plan. Let δ(ρg) denote that productivity and assume that 𝛿(0) = 0. That is, if 
nobody is enrolled in the generous plan, then the plan does not generate a productivity 
differential. Hence, if 𝛿(ρg
∗) > 0, then δ′(ρg
∗) > 0; if 𝛿(ρg
∗) < 0, then δ′(ρg
∗) < 0; if 𝛿(ρg
∗) = 0, 
δ′(ρg
∗) = 0 . The converse also holds. For example, if δ′(ρg
∗) > 0 , then 𝛿(ρg
∗) > 0 . All other 
assumptions remain unchanged. Thus, by definition, 
ρg = ∫ f(c)dc 
γ
cg
= 1 − 𝐹(cg)                                                                                                (3.3.1) 
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The firm’s problem can be written as   
max
cg∈[0,γ] 
 ∫ (0 −
wm
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc + ∫ (δ(ρg)  −
wg
1 − t
− c) f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
                  (3.3.2) 
Expanding and shifting terms yields the following   
max
cg∈[0,γ] 
 −
wm
1 − t
− α∫ cf(c)dc − ∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cg
+ (δ(1 − 𝐹(cg) ) +
g(cg)
1 − t
)∫ f(c)dc
γ
cg
cg
0
 (3.3.3) 
As in the previous case, the domain is closed and bounded. Thus it has a maximum. 
3.3.3. Equilibrium 
 Differentiating the function with respect to cg yields the first order condition: 
((1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
− δ(ρg
∗)) 𝑓(cg
∗) + (
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1−𝑡
− δ′(ρg
∗)𝑓(cg
∗)) (1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) {
≤ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 0,        
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 0 < cg
∗ < 𝛾  
≥ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 𝛾         
  
where ρg
∗ = 1 − 𝐹(cg
∗) . Shifting terms and dividing both sides by 𝑓(cg
∗)  ( 𝑓(cg
∗) ≠ 0  by 
assumption) yields the following first order conditions (FOC) 
(1 − 𝛼)cg
∗ −
𝑔(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
+
𝑔′(cg
∗)
1 − 𝑡
(1 − 𝐹(cg
∗))
𝑓(cg
∗)
{
 
 
 
 ≤ 𝛿(ρg
∗) + δ′(ρg
∗) (1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) , 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 0,        
= δ(ρg
∗) + δ′(ρg
∗) (1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) , 𝑖𝑓 0 < cg
∗ < 𝛾
≥ 𝛿(ρg
∗) + δ′(ρg
∗) (1 − 𝐹(cg
∗)) , 𝑖𝑓 cg
∗ = 𝛾         
  
This FOC differs from the FOC for the model analyzed in Section 3.2 in that the terms on 
the right-hand side of this one contain an additional term, δ′(ρg
∗), which can be less than, equal 
to, or greater than zero. Suppose δ′(ρg
∗) > 0. Then  𝛿(ρg
∗) > 0, and thus 𝛿(ρg
∗) + δ′(ρg
∗) (1 −
49 
 
𝐹(cg
∗)) > 0. Then again, cg
∗ < cg
M∗, where cg
M∗ is the cut-off level in the Miller case. This means 
that the firm would enroll more workers in the generous plan when workers enrolled in the 
generous plan are more productive than they would if they were covered under the moderate 
plan.   
Figure 3.3. Impact of A Variable Productivity Differential on Equilibrium 
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of the productivity differential in this case. The curves for 
(1 − α)c  and ℎ(c) remain the same as in Figure 3.2. Curve 𝑞(c) here is similar to 𝑝(c) in Figure 
3.2, and represents {
  𝑔(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
 −  
𝑔′(cg
∗ )
1−𝑡
(1−𝐹(cg
∗ ))
𝑓(cg
∗ )
+ 𝛿(ρg
∗) + δ′(ρg
∗) (1 − 𝐹(cg
∗))}, where δ′(ρg
∗) is 
assumed to be positive and therefore 𝛿(ρg
∗)  is also positive. Thus, the overall impact of the 
shifting part consisting of these two terms is positive. Hence the productivity differential causes 
an upward shift, so curve q(c) is above curve ℎ(c), thereby shifting leftward the point where the 
two curves intersect each other. As a consequence, the productivity effect reduces the optimal 
cut-off level cg
∗, as illustrated in the figure. 
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The difference between Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 is that the distance between the ℎ(c) 
and 𝑝(c) curves in Figure 3.2 is the same everywhere because the parameter 𝛿 for the 𝑝(c) curve 
in Figure 3.2 is a constant, whereas the distance between the ℎ(c) and 𝑞(c) curves in Figure 3.3 
change with cgbecause 𝛿(ρg
∗)and δ′(ρg
∗)ρg incorporated in the 𝑞(c) curve in Figure 3.3 each vary 
with cg6 . However, the similarities the between the two models by far outweigh their 
discrepancies. They have similar implications for equilibrium outcomes; both have more workers 
enrolled in the generous plan than the Miller model if the generous insurance coverage enables 
workers to be more productive than does the moderate coverage. 
The empirical predictions generated by the analysis of the productivity effects of health 
insurance using each of the two models depend upon whether such productivity effects 
(differentials) are positive or negative. Suppose the productivity effect is positive. Then firms 
would become more willing and more likely to offer health insurance and to share the costs of 
health insurance with their employees. Therefore, the empirical health insurance offer rates and 
take-up rates tend to be high for industries where the productivity effects are positive and low 
for industries where the productivity effects are negative or there are no such effects, everything 
else held the same. In cases where multiple insurance plans are offered and taken up, the offer 
rates and take-up rates for each type of health insurance plans in industries where each type of 
plans has a positive productivity effect relative to an inferior type should be higher than those for 
a comparable type in industries where none of the health insurance plans has a positive 
productivity impact. Although not necessarily true, high offer rates and/or high take-up rates 
                                                          
6 For the curve shown in Figure 3.3, the productivity differential 𝛿(ρg
∗) is assumed to take this form: 
𝛿(ρg) = δ0 + √ρg, where ρg = 1 − 𝐹(cg) and δ0 ≥ 0. It can be proven that 𝛿(ρg
∗) + δ′(ρg
∗)ρg decreases 
as cg rises (See Appendix). Thus, the distance between ℎ(c) and 𝑝(c) curves shrinks as cg rises. 
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should in general imply positive productivity effects. The empirical predictions of the two models 
are very similar. 
3.4. Productivity Impacts and the Take-up Rate  
This section studies a model where the firm offers only one health insurance policy to its 
workers, but still offers two compensation packages, one comprising a wage and the health 
insurance plan, and the other a wage only. Workers may take up the plan or turn it down. If a 
worker takes it up, the firm would share the expected health insurance cost with him by bearing 
a fixed portion of it, just as it would in the models presented earlier. If the worker chooses to 
reject the insurance offer, he may still be hired but will receive a wage-only compensation package; 
this contrasts the assumption made in the two-plan model that accepting an offer means 
accepting both an insurance plan and the wage. However, this model is the same as the one 
presented in Section 3.2 in all other aspects.  
3.4.1. The Worker’s Problem 
Let wm  denote the wage associated with the insurance policy and wu  the wage that 
would be paid to workers who remain uninsured. As before, let 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾]  denote the type or the 
expected health insurance cost of a worker, where 𝛾 > 0.   
The health insurance provides a benefit to the enrollee. Let 𝑚(c) denote the dollar-
valued benefit a worker of type c would receive from the health insurance plan if he opts to enroll 
in the plan, where 𝑚(𝑐) is strictly increasing (𝑚′(𝑐) > 0  for 𝑐 ∈ (0, 𝛾)). The total (indirect) utility 
a worker receives from the compensation package offered by the firm equals the sum of a wage 
and the benefit from the insurance if the worker is insured and equals the wage if he is uninsured. 
Thus, if a worker is insured, the total utility he would receive from the compensation package is 
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wm +m(cm). Otherwise, his total utility is wu, the wage without insurance. Again, all workers 
are assumed to have (after-tax) reservation utility 𝑢, which is independent of their types.  
A worker would accept employment with the firm if and only if wu ≥ u or wm +m(c) ≥
u for 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾]. A worker would choose to be insured if and only if wm +m(c) ≥ wu and wm +
m(c) ≥ u. The wage paid to workers who choose to be insured must be such that for the lowest-
cost workers who are insured, wm +m(0) ≥ wu and wm +m(0) ≥ u. Moreover, for the lowest-
cost ones who opt to be insured, it must be true that 𝑚(cm) = 𝑤𝑢 −𝑤𝑚. Thus, workers with 
expected health care cost 𝑐 ∈ [0, cm) elect to be uninsured and receive a wage 𝑤𝑢 , whereas 
workers with expected health cost 𝑐 ∈ [cm, 𝛾] opt to be insured and receive a wage 𝑤𝑚.  
3.4.2. The Firm’s Problem 
 The pretax cost that a worker would incur to the firm equals the pretax wage the firm 
pays to its workers, i.e.,  
wu 
1−t
, if the worker chooses to remain uninsured and equals the pre-tax 
wage (which may be different from the wage paid to uninsured workers) plus the share of the 
expected health insurance expense that the firm bears if the workers elect to be insured, i.e.,  
wm
1−t
+ αc.  
Productivity differs between insured and uninsured workers. Assume for simplicity that 
the difference in the their productivity is a constant. Now suppose that a worker’s productivity is 
𝑒 if he is uninsured, and his productivity is 𝑒 + δ if the worker is insured. The profit the firm 
obtains from each insured worker is ∫ (e + δ −
wm
1−t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
 and the profit from each 
uninsured worker is ∫ (e −
wu
1−t
) f(c)dc
cm
0
, given the distributional assumption about the expected 
health care cost or the type of workers as described in Section 3.2. The firm’s objective is to 
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maximize its profit given that workers accept its offers. Hence, the firm’s problem can be 
expressed as  
max
 0 ≤wm,0≤wu
∫ (e −
wu
1 − t
) f(c)dc + ∫ (e + δ −
wm
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
cm
0
                   (3.4.1) 
s.t.:  
wu ≥ u 
wm +m(cm) ≥ wu 
The first is the participation constraint and the second the incentive-compatibility 
constraint. The two constraints do not need to hold simultaneously. In fact, the first constraint 
does not need to hold if the firm wants all its workers to be insured. If some workers opt to be 
insured and others choose to remain uninsured, then both constraints may hold.  Optimality 
requires that wu = u for the uninsured workers and that the lowest-cost workers who are insured 
are indifferent between insured and uninsured. So wu = wm +m(cm), or m(cm) = wu −wm =
u −wm. Because wu is constant, choosing wu and wmis therefore equivalent to choosing m(cm). 
Furthermore, by assumption, m(cm) is a monotonic function of cm . Thus, choosing m(cm) is 
equivalent to choosing cm. Therefore, the firm’s problem can be expressed as  
max
cm∈[0,γ] 
 ∫ (e −
wu
1 − t
) f(c)dc + ∫ (e + δ −
wm
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
cm
0
                        (3.4.2) 
Expanding the expression and collecting terms leads to the following expression 
max
cm∈[0,γ] 
 e −
u
1 − t
+ δ∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
− α∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
+
m(cm)
1 − t
∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
                       (3.4.3) 
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The term e −
u
1−t
 is the total productivity net of the total wage cost if all workers remain 
uninsured, the second term is the additional profit generated by insured workers, the third term 
is the expected health insurance cost the firm has to pay for those workers who are insured, and 
the last term is the wage savings from insured workers. 
3.4.3. Equilibrium 
Differentiating the profit function with respect to cm  yields the first order conditions, 
which can be written as 
(−δ + αcm
∗ −
m(cm
∗ )
1 − t
) f(cm
∗ ) +
m′(cm
∗ )
1 − t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )) {
≤ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cm
∗ = 0,        
= 0, if 0 < cm
∗ < 𝛾
≥ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cm
∗ = γ         
 
Note that the constant vanishes after differentiation. This expression is very similar to the 
first order conditions for the two-plan model presented in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3. 
Interpretations of the terms are also similar and so no elaboration is necessary.  
If the insurance plan does not have any effect or even has an adverse effect on worker productivity, 
then δ ≤ 0. Then it is not optimal to insure all workers, or cm
∗ = 0, because in this case, the left-
hand side would be positive, contradicting the first order condition that it is negative. If δ = 0, 
then cm
∗ < 𝛾 as long as αγ <
m(γ)
1−t
, for otherwise the first order condition would be violated. 
If δ > αγ −
m(γ)
1−t
, then it is not optimal to leave all workers to remain uninsured, i.e.,  
cm
∗ = γ, because then the last term would vanish. However, since the term – δ + αγ −
m(γ)
1−t
< 0, 
the left-hand would be less than zero, contradicting the first order condition that it is non-negative. 
Hence, δ > 𝛼𝛾 −
m(γ)
1−t
 implies cm
∗ < 𝛾. This states that as long as the productivity differential is 
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greater than the difference between cost savings and the foregone wage savings, then the firm 
should insure at least workers toward the high-cost end.   
Conversely, cm
∗ < 𝛾  does not imply δ > 𝛼𝛾 −
m(γ)
1−t
, because cm
∗ < 𝛾  implies either  
m′(cm
∗ )
1−t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )) ≤ δ or (αcm
∗ −
m(cm
∗ )
1−t
) f(cm
∗ ) +
m′(cm
∗ )
1−t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )) = δ. In the former case, it 
is possible that δ ≤ αγ −
m(γ)
1−t
, whereas in the latter case, cm
∗  can be such that (αcm
∗ −
m(cm
∗ )
1−t
) f(cm
∗ ) +
m′(cm
∗ )
1−t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )) ≤ αγ −
m(γ)
1−t
, so δ ≤ αγ −
m(γ)
1−t
.  
 If the productivity differential is positive, or alternatively, insurance boosts worker 
productivity, then it may be optimal to insure all workers, because if cm
∗ = 0 , then 
m′(cm
∗ )
1−t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )) ≤ δ , but since δ > 0 , the condition can hold for some cm
∗ . Thus, the 
productivity enhancing effect of health insurance makes it more likely for the firm to insure its 
workers than if health insurance does not affect productivity.  
 This can be called a take-up model because workers may choose to either take up the 
insurance plan or not to do so. It is similar to and can be treated as a special case of the two-plan 
model where the value of the moderate plan is set to zero. However, the there is an important 
difference, which involves the reservation utility of workers: the reservation utility is the same for 
all workers in this model, whereas in the two-plan model, the moderate plan plays the role of 
relaxing the equal reservation utility restriction: the higher valuation of the moderate plan to the 
high-cost workers means that the high-cost workers have a lower reservation utility than the low-
cost workers. Another difference between this one-plan and the two-plan models lies in the 
distribution of information rents: workers stay on the low-end (uninsured) receive no rents, 
whereas in the two-plan case, workers who remain on the low-end receive information rents. 
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3.5. Discussions  
 The first variable productivity models make the assumption that productivity varies with 
different plans but is equal across individual workers enrolled in the same plan. A potential 
argument against this assumption is that if workers are different in terms of their expected health 
care costs, the benefits each worker would obtain from the health insurance plan should also be 
different and therefore the effects of the plan on productivity should be different as well. The 
justification for equal productivity impact for a given plan is that the productivity impact is purely 
a result of enrolling in a health insurance plan and that the characteristics of individual workers 
or the benefits they obtain from the plan are not quantitatively relevant. The assumption 
underlying the alternative model where productivity varies with the proportion of workers 
enrolled in the generous plan seems to be more natural, but relative to the Miller model, the 
results derived from this model are directionally the same as those derived from the other model. 
 The two-plan models assume all workers are offered health insurance and accept the 
offers. This assumption may not be realistic, because in the real world, many firms end up with 
offering no insurance and many workers may end up with no insurance coverage either, though 
it is not quite clear whether this is because the firm did not offer any insurance plan or because 
none has been taken up. This limitation makes the two-plan models unsuited for empirical 
analysis. The one-plan model overcomes the limitation.  
3.6. Conclusions  
 The variable-productivity models can potentially have both pooling (high-end) and 
separating equilibria even if other assumptions remain the same as in the Miller model; in contrast, 
Miller’s model only allows for a separating equilibrium, given its assumptions. When the 
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productivity differential is positive, the high-end pooling equilibrium is possible, but the low-end 
equilibrium is less likely to exist than in the Miller case. When the productivity differential is 
negative, the opposite is true. For the separating equilibrium, a positive productivity differential 
incentivizes the firm to induce more workers into the generous plan, whereas a negative 
productivity differential encourages the firm to do the opposite. The case where the productivity 
differential is zero is equivalent to the Miller case. 
 When the (generous) health insurance plan boosts productivity more than does the 
moderate plan (or no plan), the existence of a high-end pooling equilibrium (where all workers 
are covered under the (generous) health insurance plan) does not require that the marginal cost 
(transfer cost) of enrolling the zero-cost workers in the (generous plan) be zero, because the 
productivity enhancement effect of enrolling workers in the (generous) health insurance plan may 
add to the incentive for the firm. As long as the (generous) health insurance plan boosts worker 
productivity relative to the moderate plan (or no-plan) to such an extent that the productivity 
differential between the two plans exceeds the marginal cost of enrolling the zero-cost workers 
in the (generous) plan, regardless of whether this marginal cost is zero or positive, the firm would 
find it profitable to enroll all workers in the (generous) plan. In other words, a zero marginal cost 
of enrolling the zero-cost workers in the generous plan is not a necessary condition for the model 
to have the high-end pooling equilibrium. This feature differentiates the models studied in this 
chapter from Miller’s, where the marginal cost of enrolling the zero-cost workers in the generous 
plan has to be zero in order for a high-end pooling equilibrium to exist. Whether a low-end pooling 
(where workers are all enrolled in the moderate plan in the case of the two-plan model or are all 
insured in the case of the one-plan model) may exist depends upon whether health insurance 
savings from the moderate plan outweighs its additional wage cost plus the additional 
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productivity foregone as a result of shifting workers from the (generous) plan to the moderate 
one (no-plan).  
 If information is symmetric or if discrimination is not allowed, all workers except for the 
lowest-cost ones receive rents, but the firm does not, as in the Miller case. This is because, in any 
equilibrium, the participation constraint is binding only for the lowest-cost workers. Whether the 
productivity differential quantitatively affects the distribution of benefits (rents) among workers 
depends on the type of the equilibrium that would be obtained without such a productivity 
differential. In the case where the equilibrium is separating when health insurance does not affect 
worker productivity, the distribution of benefits to workers is changed by the productivity effect 
relative to the no-productivity effect case, as the firm shares the productivity differential (if any) 
with its workers, be it positive or negative. In the case where the equilibrium is high-end pooling 
when health insurance has no productivity impact, the distribution of rents would not be changed 
by a positive productivity differential relative to the no-productivity case, because other 
incentives such as the tax-deductibility of health insurance are already enough to motivate the 
firm to cover all workers under the generous plan. As a result, the firm would receive all the 
increased productivity benefits. However, if the productivity differential is negative, the 
distribution of (information) rents may be altered by a negative productivity differential, because 
the negative productivity differential may change the high-end pooling equilibrium in the no-
productivity case to a separating one, in which case the negative productivity differential would 
be shared between the firm and the workers. In the case where the equilibrium would be low-
end pooling, the distribution of rents may or may not be changed either, depending on whether 
the productivity effect is large enough to alter the conditions to such an extent that the low-end 
pooling equilibrium in the no-productivity case would be changed to a separating one. 
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 The variable-productivity models studied in its various forms has addressed the potential 
issue that Miller’s fails to address. However, these models do not accommodate situations where 
people face credit or liquidity constraints or where the firm possibly affects the choice of a worker 
by using a mechanism other than through manipulating the wage associated with a particular 
health insurance plan. Another important issue with the take-up model presented in Section 3.4 
is the assumption that all workers have the same reservation utility. The consequence is that 
uninsured workers have to live at their reservation utility only and have no buffer against potential 
adverse shocks. This is undesirable because workers with different health risks are assumed to 
live at the same minimum level. The next chapter will present a model to address these issues.  
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CHAPTER IV 
AN ALTERNATIVE ONE-PLAN MODEL 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 The models presented in the preceding chapters, including the one-plan model, are based 
on an implicit assumption that people are indifferent between wage benefits and benefits gained 
through health insurance, as long as the two types of benefits are quantitatively the same. As a 
consequence of assuming workers are indifferent between the two types of benefits, the firm can 
“trade” wage for health insurance cost. While this assumption is appropriate in many cases, it fails 
to consider situations where people may view these two types of benefits differently and prefer 
one type to the other. For example, people may have other needs that require cash payments 
and so may prefer wage to health insurance, at least to some extent.  
 There are possibly several reasons why people prefer wage to health insurance to come 
extent. First, the benefits gained through health insurance are individual-specific, so even the 
same health insurance plan has different values to different people. Second, a health insurance 
plan cannot be divided into several smaller ones. Third, health insurance may not be (legally) 
transferred from one person to another once it has been offered to and accepted by an individual. 
Even without the third property, the first two properties, individual-specific valuation and 
indivisibility, already makes health insurance plan a hard-to-trade commodity. The non-
transferability property of health insurance leads to its non-convertibility: once purchased, health 
insurance cannot be converted back into cash or cash equivalent. Wage, on the other hand, is 
itself cash or cash equivalent or can easily be converted into the same, and thus can be used to 
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meet individual’s any other needs. The non-transferability and therefore non-convertibility of 
health insurance plan makes it less preferred for some people or to some extent. 
 When a person faces credit or liquidity constraints, the individual may not be able to pay 
for their other, alternative needs if, in the context of Miller’s model, the worker is paid at the bare 
minimum level, which is the reservation utility at the most. While there might be multiple ways 
to address the issue associated with or arising out of credit or liquidity constraints, this study does 
this by postulating that, in order to improve his or her ability to pay for alternatives in life and 
overcome the difficulty when facing such constraints, the person requires a level of wage that is 
above the bare minimum utility, rather than simply requires a satisfactory total compensation 
package, because the health insurance benefit cannot be used to address the issue arising out of 
credit or liquidity constraints.  
 This chapter will present a simple, one-plan framework to study the issue raised above. 
The one-plan models provide a convenient way to attain the same goal as would any other form 
of models such as two-plan models. By comparison, a two-plan model would complicate the 
analysis but would not offer much additional benefits. An additional advantage of the one-plan 
model to be presented in this chapter is that, by assuming workers require reservation wages, 
this model can bypass the sort of pitfall faced by the model presented in Section 3.4 that 
uninsured workers live at the bare minimum level. 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and analyzes the 
model. Section 3 concludes the chapter.  
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4.2. The Model 
 This section presents a model that assumes workers require reservation wages. Workers 
require reservation wages because they may face credit or liquidity constraints so health benefits 
cannot be used as substitutes for wages. When workers face credit or liquidity constraints, the 
workers who choose to be uninsured (if any) may require a wage that is at least as high as their 
reservation wage which is above their reservation utility. 
 For analytical purposes, the roles the reservation wages play are similar to those of the 
reservation utility. Hence, the reservation wages are not important in and of themselves. What 
makes them critical to this model is the difference between the two reservation wages. For 
example, if the difference is zero, or equivalently, the two reservation wages are equal, then the 
equilibrium outcomes are entirely driven by wage differentials, and thus there would be no 
difference between this model and the one-plan model analyzed in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3.   
4.2.1. The Worker’s Problem 
 As in the preceding sections, assume workers are of continuous types. Moreover, if a 
worker is insured, he would receive a total benefit equal to  wm +𝑚(c ); otherwise, he only 
receives wage wu . All other assumptions and notations remain the same as in the preceding 
chapter, whichever are applicable, unless otherwise noted.  
 Workers have to be compensated sufficiently in order for them to join the firm. This 
means the compensation level not only has to be at least as large as their reservation utility, but 
also should be at least at high as their required (reservation) wages, depending on which package 
they would receive from the firm. Suppose a worker has to be paid a reservation wage at wl̅̅ ̅ if he 
chooses to be insured, otherwise, he would have to be paid a wage at least equal to wh̅̅ ̅̅ . As 
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mentioned at the beginning of this section, these reservation wages are assumed to be above 
their reservation utility. Thus, workers would accept employment with the firm if and only if wu ≥
wh̅̅ ̅̅ ≥ u or wm ≥ wl̅̅ ̅ ≥ u. They would choose to be insured if and only if wm +m(cm) ≥ u and 
wm +m(cm) ≥ wu. 
4.2.2. The Firm’s Problem 
 The firm offers two packages, one comprising a wage which is not lower than the 
reservation at the lower bound and a health insurance plan, and the other consisting of only a 
wage, which is at least as high as the reservation wage at the upper bound. In principle, the firm 
may adjust the levels of the two wages, but for practical purpose, it may optimally fix one wage 
at the upper bound of the reservation wage and change the other wage to achieve an optimal 
level of insurance rate.     
 Let  α denote the fixed proportion of the expected health insurance cost to be borne by 
the firm. So the cost that the firm would need to assume is αc if a worker of type 𝑐 chooses to be 
insured, and the portion of the expected health insurance cost worker would need to bear is 1 −
α.   
 Productivity is assumed to alter with the insurance status of workers. If a worker is 
uninsured, his productivity would be 𝑒, but if the worker is insured, his productivity would be 𝑒 +
δ. Given the same distributional assumption about the worker types (or workers’ expected health 
care cost) presented in earlier, the profit from each uninsured worker is ∫ (e −
wu
1−t
) f(c)dc
cm
0
 and 
the profit the firm obtains from insured worker is ∫ (e + δ −
wm
1−t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
. Given all the 
assumptions, the firm’s problem can be expressed as follows.  
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𝐦𝐚𝐱
wm,wu
∫ (e −
wu
1 − t
) f(c)dc + ∫ (e + δ −
wm
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
cm
0
 
s.t.: 
wu ≥ wh̅̅ ̅̅ > wl̅̅ ̅ ≥ u 
wm ≥ wl̅̅ ̅ 
wm +m(cm) ≥ u 
wm +m(cm) ≥ wu 
 Again, the layout of the constraints is just for convenience or for aesthetics reasons. Some 
of the constraints may be redundant and even if they are not redundant they do not need to hold 
altogether. The first inequality in the first chain of constraints represents the participation 
constraint for workers who would opt to be insured. This constraint says that if a worker is 
uninsured, he would have to be paid a wage at least as high as the required reservation wage wh̅̅ ̅̅ , 
which is greater than the reservation utility. The relationship between the two levels of 
reservation wages against the reservation utility holds by assumption. The second constraint 
restricts the level of wage that would have to be paid to workers who take up the insurance policy. 
The third is the participation constraint for any worker to accept the wage-insurance package, but 
a quick examination reveals that this is not necessary because it is implied by the first and the 
fourth combined; the fourth is the incentive compatibility constraint: the total benefit from the 
wage-insurance package has to be at as good as the wage-only package that would be offered to 
workers who choose to be uninsured. Optimality requires that the first constraint be binding, that 
is, wu = wh̅̅ ̅̅ . Thus, the firm’s problem can be re-written as 
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𝐦𝐚𝐱
wm
 e −
wh̅̅ ̅̅
1 − t
∫ f(c)dc + δ∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
−∫ (
wm
1 − t
+ αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
cm
0
 
s.t.:  
wm ≥ wl̅̅ ̅ ≥ u 
wm +m(cm) ≥ u 
wm +m(c) ≥ wh̅̅ ̅̅ > wl̅̅ ̅ 
 By continuity of the wage wm, at least one of the two constraints has to be binding for 
some c ∈ [0, γ] at the optimum, for otherwise the firm can lower the wage by a small amount; as 
long as neither of the two is binding, this process can continue. Which of the two constraints 
would be binding depends on  wl̅̅ ̅ relative to wh̅̅ ̅̅ , and the health insurance benefit function m(c). 
By continuity of wm and c, there exists wm (and c ) that can make the second constraint binding, 
so wm +m(cm) = wh̅̅ ̅̅ . The constraint on cm is determined by the condition that m(cm) ≤ wh̅̅ ̅̅ −
wl̅̅ ̅ because wm ≥ wl̅̅ ̅. Therefore, the restriction on the wage paid to the insured workers can be 
equivalently imposed on  m(cm), and finally equivalently on cm, because m(c) is monotonic in c. 
Since 𝑐 = m−1(c), where m−1(c)  is the inverse function of 𝑐 ; in addition, c ∈ [0, γ] . Hence, 
0 ≤ cm ≤ min(𝛾,𝑚
−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅)). 
 On the other hand, m(cm) is bounded from below by the second constraint, that is, wm +
m(cm) ≥ u for any wm. The minimum level of wm is determined by the constraint wm ≥ wl̅̅ ̅. So 
if wl̅̅ ̅ + m(cm) ≥ u holds, the second constraint can hold as well.  Thus, m(cm) ≥ u − wl̅̅ ̅ ≥ 0. 
Because wl̅̅ ̅ ≥ u, the condition that  m(cm) ≥ 0 dominates. The last inequality derived in the 
preceding paragraph holds, which is 0 ≤ cm ≤ min(𝛾,𝑚
−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅)). 
 The firm’s profit maximization problem can then be modified as follows.  
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𝐦𝐚𝐱
cm
 e −
wh̅̅ ̅̅
1 − t
∫ f(c)dc + δ∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
−∫ (
wh̅̅ ̅̅ − m(cm)
1 − t
+ αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
cm
0
 
s.t.: 
0 ≤ cm ≤ min(𝛾,𝑚
−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅)) 
 The upper bound of the integration interval remains unaffected by the imposition of 
restrictions on the upper bound of cm. The objective function can be expanded and re-written 
as  
𝐦𝐚𝐱
cm
 e −
wh̅̅ ̅̅
1 − t
+ δ∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
+∫ (
m(cm)
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
 
where the first two terms are constants. This problem is similar to the one presented in Section 
4.2. and is pretty straightforward to solve. 
4.2.3. Equilibrium 
 Differentiating the aforesaid objective function with respect to cm, given the constraints 
on cm, yields the the following first order conditions: 
(−δ + αcm
∗ −
m(cm
∗ )
1 − t
) f(cm
∗ ) +
m′(cm
∗ )
1 − t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )){
≤ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cm
∗ = 0                                                
= 0, if 0 < cm
∗ < min(𝛾,𝑚−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅))
≥ 0, 𝑖𝑓 cm
∗ = min(𝛾,𝑚−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅))       
 
 The first order condition implicitly determines cm
∗ . The productivity differential δ  is 
present in the first order condition so it affects the optimal cut-off level cm
∗  (in the same way at it 
does in the models presented in Chapter 3). Note that the reservation constraint does not affect 
the condition for the existence of a high-end pooling because the two reservation wages do not 
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enter the first order condition for cm
∗ = 0. Hence, there is no difference between this model and 
any of the models presented earlier when cm
∗ = 0. The difference between this and any of those 
presented in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3 is that cm
∗  may have a narrower range if 𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅ is small. 
But if min(𝛾,𝑚−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅)) = 𝛾, then there is no difference between this model and the one 
presented in Section 3.4. This implies that 𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅  is too large and the constraint on the lower 
bound of the wage for insured workers may not be binding. Suppose 𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅ is not too large so 
min(𝛾,𝑚−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅)) = 𝑚
−1(𝑤ℎ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑤𝑙̅̅ ̅) < 𝛾. Then an immediate conclusion can be drawn that 
at least some workers would choose to be insured. The reason is that when insured workers are 
guaranteed a reservation wage that is not too far below the level for uninsured ones, some 
workers would always choose to be insured. However, on the lower bound there is not much 
difference between this model and the ones analyzed in Section 3.4 of Chapter.  
 An evident difference between this model and the one-plan model presented in Section 
3.4 of Chapter 3 lies in the distribution of rents when the equilibrium is low-end pooling, where 
no workers are insured. In the low-end pooling equilibrium for the model analyzed in Section 3.4, 
the firm extracts all rents and workers receive no rents. In this model, however, all workers, 
including the lowest-cost ones, may receive rents even if the equilibrium is low-end pooling 
because their reservation wage is above their reservation utility. When the equilibrium is 
separating or when it is high-end pooling where all workers are insured, all workers, except for 
the lowest-cost ones, receive rents. Whether the firm obtains rents depends not only on the type 
of an equilibrium, but also on whether the average benefit of the insurance plan the uninsured 
workers would obtain if they chose to be enrolled in the plan exceeds their reservation wage. If 
the equilibrium is low-end pooling where all workers are uninsured or if it is separating, the firms 
would extract rents from uninsured workers, provided that the average benefit of the insurance 
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plan that would be obtained if such workers chose to be insured exceeds their reservation wage. 
The total amount of rents equals the difference between the average benefit uninsured workers 
receive from the health insurance plan and the reservation wage multiplied by the number of 
uninsured workers who would be enrolled in the plan. If the equilibrium is high-end pooling in 
which all workers are insured, all rents would accrue to the workers. 
4.3. Conclusions  
 The model presented in this chapter shares some similarities with models presented 
earlier in that all are within the broad, general framework. Notwithstanding the similarities, there 
is a critical difference in terms of rents distribution when the equilibrium is pooling in which 
workers are uninsured or when the equilibrium is separating; in either case, the firm extract rents 
from uninsured workers, whereas in the Miller case, the firm extracts no rents in the 
corresponding equilibrium. The model studied in this chapter has an equilibrium outcome in 
which every worker receives some rents because the worker’s required reservation wage is above 
his or her reservation utility. Another important benefit of assuming workers require a reservation 
wage is that it overcomes the problem that the one-plan model presented in Chapter 3 faces: 
uninsured workers live at the bare minimum reservation utility level. 
 Workers demand for reservation wages for a variety of reasons, including liquidity or 
credit constraints or other practical considerations. In this model, workers receive rents, whatever 
the type of the equilibrium is. Whether the firm extracts rents depends on the type of the 
equilibrium and whether the average benefit of the insurance plan that the uninsured workers 
would receive if they chose to be enrolled in the plan exceeds their reservation wage.  
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CHAPTER V
ANALYTICAL DATA 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 This chapter presents the analytical dataset for the empirical work that follows. The data 
are drawn from the Household Component (HC) of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), 
a large overlapping panel of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population. The MEPS-HC is 
designed so that each person is interviewed for five rounds over two consecutive calendar years. 
The MEPS-HC was initiated in 1996 with a new panel recruited each year from the previous year’s 
respondents to the National Health Interview Survey. The MEPS-HC contains detailed information 
on demographic characteristics, health status, health insurance coverage, and labor market 
participation. Demographic characteristics include age, sex, race, marital status, and education 
measured by years of schooling. Health status includes disability days and self-reported (physical) 
health status and mental health status. Health insurance coverage data includes whether an 
individual was insured, whether the employer of the person offered insurance, and whether the 
individual was insured through his or her employer or union. Labor market participation includes 
employment status at the time the survey was conducted, hourly wages the individual earned, 
the size of the firm or location that employed the individual at the time of the survey, the industry 
the firm belonged to, and the individual’s occupation. 
 While the MEPS-HC began in 1996, I only use data starting from 2002 because the 
categorization of industries and occupations changed in 2002; the data ends in 2014 as this is the 
latest data available. I observe most people for two years, except for people who were recruited 
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into the MEPS in 2001 and those who were recruited in 2014. In the former case I only observe 
their second year of data and in the latter the first year. Moreover, the MEPS-HC only includes 
information on people living the household. The survey design ensures that each individual person 
appears only once in a year for at most two consecutive years. The spouse, if present in the 
household, appears in both years, though the spouse may not be the same person because a 
person might be married during the initial round of survey, get divorced in the second round, and 
then remarry in the third round; if a person changed his or her spouse, this change would be 
reflected in the information collected each round, but only the spousal information as of 
December 31 of the survey year will be used for the analysis in this part. The MEPS-HC also 
contains spousal information for married people. The information about the spouse of an 
individual was collected at the same time when the information on that individual was collected, 
provided that the spouse was living in the household (spouses may live apart for a variety of 
reasons, including military deployment, different locations of employment, expatriation, etc.). If 
a person changed marital status across rounds of survey, this information would be indicated in 
rounds; however, only the year-end status would be used for the purpose of analysis in this 
dissertation.  
 Statistics show that the extent that the data used in the analysis represent the national 
population is very similar to the extent represented by information from other sources. For 
example, the insurance offer rate (simply the proportion of the number of people offered health 
insurance through their employer or unions to the total number of people in the sample) is close 
to 69%, compared with the national average of around 72% over the years as reported in the 
Employer Health Benefits Survey.   
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 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
cleaning and selection process. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics and cross-tabs for certain 
variables believed to be endogenous. Section 4 briefs the implications of the available information 
for identifying strategies. Section 5 discusses the advantages and limitations of the data and 
concludes the chapter.  
5.2. Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
5.2.1. Sample Selection Process 
 Figure 5.1 illustrates the data cleaning and sample selection process. A final analytical 
dataset (Sample 1) is obtained in the end. The defined sample indicators can be used to extract 
the required datasets for various analytical purposes. The Sample Construction CONSORT 
Diagram is Figure 5.1. 
 In Figure 5.1, each box represents a step; for example, the first box represents the first 
step (Step 1), etc.. Each arrow represents a transition from one step to the next. Parallel arrows 
represent independent transitions that may happen simultaneously. A box located at the start of 
an arrow precedes the step represented by a box to which the arrow points. A star * represents 
an action and a diamond represents a condition. The procedures for creating the analytic dataset 
are as follows. 
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Figure 5.1. Sample Construction CONSORT Diagram 
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5.2.1.1. Step 1: Obtaining Source Data Files and Create an Identifier  
 Data files for years 2002 through 2014 and Panels 6 through 19 were extracted from the 
MEPS raw data files available at AHRQ’s (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality) website. 
The variable Year should have a value between 2002 and 2014, inclusive, whereas the variable 
Panel should have a value between 6 and 19, inclusive. Any observation that does not have a value 
falling within the range for the two variables are excluded. In the meantime, a unique identifier 
that consists of the individual’s identifier (a variable already available in the source data files that 
consists of the dwelling identifier and the person identifier), Year, and Panel was created by 
concatenating these variables. This unique identifier variable (called IDKey in the diagram) was 
used in subsequent steps to obtain unique observations for each combination of year and panel. 
“Unique observation” as used here means that an individual appears only once in each 
combination of year and panel; it does not mean that an individual appears only once in the entire 
combined data file. 
5.2.1.2. Step 2: Stacking Data Files 
 The data files obtained in Step 1 were then stacked by vertically concatenating these data 
files. The resulting combined data file contains 455,714 observations, which equals the sum of the 
number of observations in all data files obtained in Step 1.  
5.2.1.3. Step 3:  Creating Data File without Duplicates and with Non-institutionalized Persons Who 
Were Eligible for and In Scope of MEPS Data Collection 
 The combined data file created in step 2 was screened using the inclusion criteria that the 
person was in the household (not full-time active in military), eligible for inclusion in MEPS data 
collection, and in the scope of data collection. Moreover, the data file was also screened for 
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duplicate observations using the unique identifier (IDKey) created in Step 1 to obtain a data file 
that does not contain duplicates. As a consequence of this step, a total of 18,635 observations 
were excluded and the resulting data file contains 437,079 unique observations. 
5.2.1.4. Step 4: Creating Own Data File with Spousal Match Key 
 A copy of the data file created in Step 3 was saved as a separate data file. This data file 
was then used to create a match Key (spKey in Diagram 5.1) that consists of the individual’s 
dwelling identifier, spousal identifier, own person identifier, family identifier, year, and panel. The 
match key will be used to merge the own data file and the spousal data file that is to be created 
later. A data file indicator that equals 1 for this file was created for the data file created in Step 3.  
5.2.1.4’. Step 4’: Creating Spousal Data File with Spousal Match Key 
 The data file created in Step 3 was used to create the spousal data file by renaming certain 
variables as the spousal variables. Moreover, a spousal match key (spKey in Diagram 5.1) and a 
spousal data file indicator (called Samp0s in Diagram 5.1) were also created. The spousal match 
key consists of the individual’s dwelling identifier, own person identifier, spousal identifier, year, 
and panel. The spKey created in the spousal data file is not exactly the same the IDKEY created 
earlier. Only the renamed spousal variables, the spousal data file indicator, and the spousal match 
key created in this step were kept in this data file.  
5.2.1.5. Step 5: Creating Data File for Married People whose Spouses Were in Household 
 Persons who were not married or persons who were married but whose spouses were 
not in the household should be excluded from the spousal data file created in Step 4’ and only 
married people whose spouses were in the household should be included in the data file. Based 
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on these criteria, a total of 278,671 observations were excluded, and the resulting data file 
contains 158,408 observations.    
5.2.1.6. Step 6: Merging Own Data file and Spousal Data File  
 The own data file created obtained in Step 4 and the spousal data file created in Step 4’ 
were merged by the match Key. The resulting combined data file has 439,875 observations. A 
spousal sample indicator was created, which equals 1 if the own data file indicator created in Step 
4 and the spousal data file indicator both equal 1 and equals 0 otherwise.  
5.2.1.7. Step 7: Excluding Persons without Matching Spouses 
 Observations from the spousal data file that do not have matching spouses are excluded 
from the merged data file created in Step 6 by setting Samp0 = 1. Based on this criterion, a total 
of 2,696 observations were excluded and the resulting data file has 437,079 observations. This 
data file contains not only all the observations contained in the own data file created in Step 4, 
but also the observations contained in the spousal data file with matched spouses. The (only) 
difference between this merged data file and the one created in Step 3 is that the newly merged 
data file contains spousal variables, whereas the data file created in Step 3 does not. Certain 
sample indicators were created using the own and spousal data files created within this Step. 
5.2.1.8. Step 8: Creating the Analytical Data File  
 The combined dataset has two components: the original data, which contains the original 
variables, and the spousal data, which contain spousal variables. Observations that are 
appropriate for the analytical purposes include individuals who worked full-time and were at least 
18 but younger than 65 years of age. Imposing these restrictions yields a data file, labeled Sample1, 
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which contains 198,690 observations. This is the analytical data file from which various modeling 
samples can be obtained by applying relevant sample indicators.   
 The data selection process ensures that the data file does not have duplicates because 
the merge key (a combination of the dwelling-unit-person identifier, year, and Panel) uniquely 
identifies each individual. In addition, the missing values generated (in the spousal data, persons 
who do not have spousal identifiers and whose spousal identifiers are inconsistent do not have 
matches) can be easily identified by using the appropriately defined indicators. 
5.2.2. Construction of Variables  
 Variables were constructed during the data extraction and selection process. Because 
most variables in the source data files are either round- or year-specific, variables with names 
common to all data files were created. Since the survey was conducted over five rounds, certain 
information changed from round to round, either because of changes in economic or other 
circumstances, or because the variable is cumulative in nature. In addition, the MEPS-HC 
specifically asked about year-end values (e.g. employment status and health insurance coverage) 
for some variables. 
 For most (non-cumulative) variables, the year-end values were used whenever possible, 
and if that was not possible, then the next most recent value was used. For variables whose values 
are cumulative, the sum of the values for that year over the rounds is used, except in 2002 (the 
starting period of the data) when the round 3 survey was conducted across years, some data for 
this round pertain to current year and the remaining part to the previous or the following year: 
Round 5/3 was conducted across years 2001 and 2002 (Panel 6) and Round 1/3 was conducted 
across years 2002 and 2003 (Panel 7). The proportion for each year was not assigned and left to 
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the analyst to determine. I split the data for round 3 equally between the two years to calculate 
the number of disability days. For all subsequent years, the data collected each round pertain to 
the current year because there was a change in the questionnaire in 2003. Another variable that 
receives special treatment is the variable measuring levels of education. This variable was numeric 
in some years and categorical in other years. To make the variable consistent and suitable for the 
analysis, I re-define it as numerical if the original one is categorical by assigning a number 
measuring years of education to each category. This number is determined according to the US 
education system. 
 Certain spousal variables are also defined, including Spouse Offered, Spousal firm size, 
and spousal union status. Spouse Offered is a binary variable indicating whether the spouse was 
offered health insurance through his/her own employer or union. Spousal firm size is redefined 
as a binary variable that equals 1 if the number of workers the firm hired is at least 100 and 0 
otherwise. There are two reasons for using 100 as the cutoff. First, firms with 100 or more 
employees consistently differ from those with fewer than 100 workers in terms of offer rates (the 
ratio of the number of firms offering health insurance to the total number of firms) (Kaiser 
Employer Health Benefits Survey 2015). Second, using this number as a cutoff can separate the 
sample into two reasonably sized parts. Spousal Union Status is a binary variable indicating 
whether the spouse was unionized or not.  
5.2.3. Exclusion/Inclusion Decisions 
 Exclusion/inclusion decisions depend on the variables involved, and were made as the 
data selection process went on. The goal is to include as many observations as possible so that as 
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little information is lost as possible, while at the same time a sample that works well enough can 
be obtained. To attain this goal, a number of exclusion/inclusion criteria were imposed.  
 First, only married people with their spouses in the household are included in the data 
file because certain spousal variables are needed as instruments for the identification of the 
econometric models to be analyzed in subsequent chapters.  
 Second, only full-time employed persons (self-employed individuals are automatically 
excluded when certain exclusion criteria such as positive hourly wage are applied because for self-
employed persons, the question on hourly wage was not asked so the information on wage is 
missing), including their spouses, are included in the sample. While full-time employment is not 
required for spouses because their variables will be used as instruments only, it is desirable to 
impose the full-time employment restriction as an exclusion/inclusion criterion, since doing so 
will result in a cleaner dataset that has fewer missing values for the instrumental variables (simply 
imposing the full-time employment restriction may not eliminate all missing values for the 
instrumental variables).   
 Third, observations with missing values for many of these variables are excluded. Such 
variables include demographics such as sex, age, race, employment-related variables such as firm 
size, industry and occupation codes, union status, and insurance-related variables such as 
insurance status (insured or not), insurance category (public insurance, private insurance, or no 
insurance), employer-sponsored insurance status indicator, and disability days variables.  
 Last, the (nominal) hourly wage was restricted to be at least 2.00 dollars per hour. 
Admittedly, the 2-dollar per hour threshold is arbitrary (Olson (2002) also used 2 dollars per hour 
as an inclusion criterion), but it seems to be reasonable. Real wage is also defined by deflating the 
nominal wage using the consumer price index (CPI) for the period. 
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 Applying these inclusion criteria to Sample1 yields a sample that will be used throughout 
this and the next two chapters (henceforth the modeling sample). A number of other sample 
indicators have also been created by applying other inclusion criteria.  
5.3. Summary Statistics  
 The variables of interest include but are not limited to hourly wage, disability days 
variables (including the number of days missed work due to sickness and the number of days 
missed work to care for others), demographic variables, firm characteristics, and insurance-
related variables. The firm size is re-defined as a binary dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm 
has at least 100 employees and 0 otherwise. The insurance offer indicator (called Offered in the 
tables) is a dummy variable that equal 1 if the person was offered health insurance by his or her 
employer or union and 0 otherwise. Insurance-related variables include insurance offer indicator, 
insurance status indicator, and insured-via-firm indicator. The insurance status indicator (Insured) 
is a binary dummy variable that equals 1 if the person was insured and 0 otherwise. The insured-
via-firm variable (Insured-via-firm) is a binary dummy variable that equals 1 if the person was 
insured through his or her own employer and 0 otherwise.  
 Other variables such as industry codes, occupation codes, region dummies, and year 
dummies are also relevant for the analysis but are not included in the summary statistics tables 
because these variables are categorical and have too many attributes, and these attributes are 
not important to the analysis. The variables are grouped into the following categories: Dependent 
variables, Demographics (which may also be the independent variables), Independent Variables, 
and Instruments, as shown in tables that follow.  
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Table 5.1.     Summary Statistics for the Full Sample  
 
Peron-
years Mean Std. Dev 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Dependent Variables       
Hourly Wage (Real) 59,442 17.29 11.45 1.52** 76.96* 
#Days Missed Work Due to 
Sickness 
59,442 2.80 6.64 0.00 32.00* 
#Days Missed Work for Other 
Reasons 
59,442 0.85 2.66 0.00 30.00* 
Demographics      
Age 59,442 42.17 10.53 18.00 64.00 
Years of Education 59,442 13.45 2.81 0.00 17.00 
Male  59,442 0.482 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Race 59,442 - - - - 
White  41,978 0.706 - - - 
Black  10,618 0.179 - - - 
Other  6,846 0.115 - - - 
Independent Variables      
Offered Insurance 59,442 0.692 0.462 0.00 1.00 
Insured  59,442 0.886 0.317 0.00 1.00 
Insured via firm  59,442 0.559 0.496 0.00 1.00 
Firm with >= 100 Employees  59,442 0.404 0.491 0.00 1.00 
Unionized  59,442 0.133 0.340 0.00 1.00 
Instruments 59,442     
Spouse Offered Insurance 59,442 0.627 0.483 0.00 1.00 
Spousal Firm with >= 100 
Employees  
59,442 0.367 0.482 0.00 1.00 
Spouse Unionized  59,442 0.121 0.326 0.00 1.00 
Note: 1) Data: Sample where both the persons and their spouses were employed full-time and all the  
              variables (except for the spousal variables) have non-missing values.  
          2) *Top-coded.  
          3) **Nominal is floored at 2 and CPI for some years is greater than 100% so the minimum real  
              wage is smaller than 2. 
 Table 5.1 shows summary statistics for the entire sample (modeling sample). The statistics 
presented in the table show that people in the sample earn about 17.29 dollars per hour on 
average. The average number of days missed work due to illness or injury is 2.80, with a standard 
deviation 6.6 and the average number of days missed work for other reasons is 0.85, with a 
standard deviation of 2.66. Note that these two variables are top-coded at the 98.5 percentile. 
The average age of the persons in the sample is 42 years, with a standard deviation of 10 years.  
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On average, people in the sample have 13.4 years of schooling. 69.2% of the persons were offered 
health insurance; in contrast, the offer rate for the spouses is 62.7%. 88.6% of the workers were 
insured, and 55.9% of the insured workers were insured through their employers or unions. 
Roughly 40% of the persons worked in firms with at least 100 employees. The unionization rates 
for both the persons and the spouses are 13.3% and 12.1%, respectively, which are above the 
national average of 11% (BLS).  
 Statistics presented in Table 5.2 are for the Husband and Wife samples, each of which is 
a subset of the sample used for Table 5.1. Panel A presents statistics for the Husband sample and 
Panel 2B for the Wife sample. Husbands earned 19.29 dollars per hour and the wives earned 15.43 
dollars. About 63.4% of the Husbands and 48.9% of the wives were health-insured through their 
employers or unions. The unionization rates for Husbands and Wives are 15.3% and 11.5%, 
respectively. 
Table 5.2.    Summary Statistics for Husband & Wife Samples  
 Person-
years Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Husband      
Dependent Variables      
Hourly Wage 28,673 19.29 12.24 1.52 76.96* 
#Days Missed Work Due to 
Sickness 
28,673 2.22 5.81 0.00 32.00* 
#Days Missed Work for Other 
Reasons 
28,673 0.68 2.33 0.00 30.00* 
Demographics      
Age 28,673 42.89 10.48 18.00 64.00 
Years of Education 28,673 13.30 2.85 0.00 17.00 
Race 28,673 - - - - 
White  20,173 0.703 - - - 
Black  5,296 0.185 - - - 
Other 3,204 0.112 - - - 
Independent Variables      
Offered (=1) 28,673 0.746 0.435 0.00 1.00 
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Insured  28,673 0.879 0.326 0.00 1.00 
Insured via firm  28,673 0.634 0.482 0.00 1.00 
Firm with >= 100 Employees
  
28,673 0.421 0.494 0.00 1.00 
Unionized 28,673 0.153 0.360 0.00 1.00 
Instruments      
Spouse Offered Insurance 28,673 0.588 0.492 0.00 1.00 
Spousal Firm with >=100 
Employees  
28,673 0.363 0.481 0.00 1.00 
Spouse Unionized 28,673 0.106 0.308 0.00 1.00 
Panel B: Wife      
Dependent Variables      
Hourly Wage 30,769 15.43 10.32 1.52 76.96 
#Days Missed Work Due to 
Sickness 
30,769 3.33 7.28  0.00 32.00 
#Days Missed Work for Other 
Reasons 
30,769 1.02 2.92 0.00 30.00 
Demographics      
Age 30,769 41.51 10.53 18.00 64.00 
Years of Education 30,769 13.58 2.77 0.00 17.00 
Race 30,769 - - - - 
White  21,805 0.719  - - 
Black  5,322 0.173  - - 
Other 3,642 0.118 - - - 
Independent Variables      
Offered Insurance 30,769 0.642 0.479 0.00 1.00 
Insured  30,769 0.893 0.309 0.00 1.00 
Insured via firm  30,769 0.489 0.500 0.00 1.00 
Firm with >=100 Employees 30,769 0.387 0.487 0.00 1.00 
Unionized  30,769 0.115 0.319 0.00 1.00 
Instruments      
Spouse Offered Insurance 30,769 0.665 0.472 0.00 1.00 
Spousal Firm with >= 100 
Employees 
30,769 0.370 0.483 0.00 1.00 
Spouse Unionized  30,769 0.135 0.342 0.00 1.000 
Note: 1) * Top-coded.   
          2) Only the real wage is presented. 
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 These statistics demonstrate that Husbands earned 25% more per hour than wives, were 
more likely to be insured through their own employers, more likely to become union members, 
but less likely to be insured in general than Wives. Note that the statistics for Husbands and for 
Wives are not symmetric; for example, in the Husband data, 42.1% of the persons and 36.3% of 
their spouses worked in firms with at least 100 employees, but in the Wife data, the corresponding 
numbers are 38.7% and 37.0%, respectively. This asymmetry does not constitute an issue in and 
of itself because the samples are subsets of the entire dataset and some husbands may have been 
excluded from the samples because they are 65 years or older, but the wives are generally 
younger than their husbands and so they may still be included in the sample. In addition, sample 
sizes differ. 
5.4. Correlations between Endogenous Variables and Instruments 
 The endogenous variables of interest include a through-firm insurance offer dummy and 
a through-firm insurance status indicator. The insurance offer indicator shows whether the person 
was offered health insurance through his or her employer or union (henceforth Offered). The 
through-firm insurance status indicator shows whether the person was insured through his or her 
employer or union (henceforth Insured via Firm). Variables that can potentially serve as 
instruments for the endogenous variables include a binary variable indicating whether the spouse 
was offered health insurance through his or her job, an indicator showing whether he or she 
worked at a firm with at least 100 employees, and a dummy indicating whether the spouse was 
unionized.  
 The spousal insurance offer variable can be used as an instrument because a person 
would become less likely to be insured through his or her own firm if his or spouse is employed at 
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a firm that offers health insurance. Spousal firm size is a potential instrument because large firms 
are more likely than small firms to offer health insurance. The reason for using spousal union 
status as an instrument candidate is that ‘the greater eight is given to intra-marginal worker in 
the union firm relative to non-union firm which produces a greater preference among unionized 
workers for fringe benefits compared to wages” (Olson 2002). There is a reason for including the 
spousal insurance offer variable as an instrument even if the other variables are included: some 
firms (e.g., small firms) may offer individual insurance plans but some other firms (e.g., large firms) 
may offer family plans. So spousal firm size does not capture this but the spousal insurance offer 
variable does.  
 While it is arguable as to whether the above spousal variables are exogenous, using these 
variables as instruments can yield estimates that bound the true value of coefficient of interest. 
Olson 2002 suggests that using spousal firm size and union status generates an estimate that 
bounds the true value from below (lower bound) and using the spousal health insurance indicator 
generates an upper bound for the true value.  
 To find out whether the spousal variables can be used as instruments for the endogenous 
variables, I have created crosstabs using the data set used to generate the summary statistics 
tables above. In these crosstabs, the own variables are displayed on the rows, labeled as X’s, and 
the spousal variables are presented on the columns, labeled as Z’s. Since X is binary, the 
conditional expected value of X given Z, E[X|Z], is the conditional probability of X given Z, and the 
difference between the conditional probabilities of X given Z, E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0], is the variation 
induced by Z in the probabilities of X, which measures the impact of shifting Z from 0 to 1 on the 
probability of X given Z. The Chi-square statistic, which measures the significance of association 
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between two variables, and the Phi coefficient, which measures the degree of association 
between two binary variables, are also presented.   
 Table 5.3 provides statistics on the relationship between the variable indicating whether 
the person was offered health insurance through his or her job and the variable indicating 
whether their spouses was offered health insurance. The small Chi-Square statistic and the large 
corresponding probability (0.711) indicate that the relationship between the two variables 
Offered and Spouse Offered is insignificant. The Phi coefficient is also small and negative, implying 
a numerically tiny inverse relationship between the two variables.  
Table 5.3.     Person Offered Insurance vs Spouse Offered Insurance  
Count (%) Spouse Offered (Z) 
Offered (X) No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
No (=0) 6,792 
11.43 
11,495 
19.34 
18,287 
30.76 
Yes (=1) 15,351 
25.83 
25,804 
43.41 
41,155 
69.24 
Total 22,143 
37.25 
37,299 
62.75 
59,442 
100.00 
E[X|Z] 0.693 0.691 0.692 
E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0] -0.002 - 
Chi-Square (1) 0.138 Prob.=0.711 
Phi Coefficient -0.002 - 
 The probability that the person was offered health insurance is 0.691 if the spouse was 
also offered health insurance and is 0.693 otherwise. The difference of -0.002 between the two 
probabilities represents the variation induced by the variable Spouse Offered. This small number 
confirms the conclusion drawn in the preceding paragraph. Hence, whether the spouse was 
offered health insurance does not provide much information about whether the person was 
offered health insurance. Thus the Spouse Offered variable may not be a good instrument for the 
endogenous variable Offered.   
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Table 5.4.     Person Offered Insurance vs Spousal Firm Size  
Count (%) Spousal Firm Size >=100 (Z) 
Offered (X) No (=0)  Yes (=1)  Total 
No (=0) 11,717 
19.71 
6,570 
11.05 
18,287 
30.76 
Yes (=1) 25,925 
43.61 
15,230 
25.62 
41,155 
69.24 
Total 37,642 
63.33 
21,800 
36.67 
59,442 
100.00 
E[X|Z] 0.689 0.699 0.692 
E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0] 0.010 - 
Chi-Square (1) 6.350 Prob.=0.012 
Phi Coefficient 0.010 - 
 Table 5.4 displays statistics about the relationship between the variable indicating 
whether the person was offered health insurance through his or her employer or union and a 
spousal firm size dummy indicating whether the spouse worked at firm with at least 100 
employees.  The large Chi-Square statistic (or the small p-value) and a significant Phi coefficient of 
0.010 tell that there is a small, positive, yet significant association between the two variables. The 
probability that the person was offered health insurance is 0.699 if the spouse worked at a firm 
with at least 100 employees and is 0.689 otherwise. The variation induced or explained by the 
Spousal Firm Size dummy in the probabilities that the person was offered health insurance is of 
the same magnitude as the Phi coefficient, which is 0.010. 
 Table 5.5 presents information on the relationship between the Offered variable and the 
spousal union status indicator. The statistics show a numerically small but statistically significant 
relationship between the two variables. The probability that the persons were offered health 
insurance by their firms or unions is 0.675 if their spouses were unionized and is 0.693 when they 
were not. The -0.020 difference reflects the variation induced or explained by the variable Spouse 
Unionized variable in the probabilities that the persons were offered health insurance. 
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Table 5.5.     Person Offered Insurance vs Spousal Union Status  
Count (%) Spouse Unionized (Z) 
Offered (X) No (=0)  Yes (=1)  Total 
No (=0) 15,945 
26.82 
2,342 
3.94 
18,287 
30.76 
Yes (=1) 36,300 
61.07 
4,855 
8.17 
41,155 
69.24 
Total 52,245 
87.89 
7197 
12.11 
59,442 
100.00 
E[X|Z] 0.695 0.675 0.692 
E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0] -0.020 - 
Chi-Square (1) 12.137 Prob.=0.0005 
Phi Coefficient -0.014 - 
  
 
Table 5.6.    Person Insured via Firm vs Spouse Offered Insurance 
Count (%) Spouse Offered (Z) 
Insured via Firm (X) No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
No (=0) 8,168 
13.74 
18,038 
30.35 
26,206 
44.09 
Yes (=1) 13,975 
23.51 
19,261 
32.40 
33,236 
55.91 
Total 22,143 
37.25 
37,299 
62.75 
59,442 
100.00 
E[X|Z] 0.631 0.516 0.559 
E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0] -0.115 - 
Chi-Square 741.950 Prob.=0.0001 
Phi Coefficient -0.112 - 
 Table 5.6 provides statistics on the relationship between the variable indicating whether 
the person was insured through his or her job and the dummy indicator showing whether the 
spouse was offered health insurance from his or her own employer. The Chi-Square statistic, with 
a probability of 0.0001, indicates a significant association between the two variables. The Phi 
coefficient (-0.112) indicates that the relationship is inverse and reasonably sizable. When the 
spouse was offered health insurance through his or her employer or union, the probability that 
the person was insured through his or her own job is about 51.6%; otherwise the probability is 
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63.1%. The difference of -0.115 reflects the variation induced by the variable Spouse Offered. The 
information shows that the correlation is sizable and significant, implying that the variable Spouse 
Offered may be a good instrument for the endogenous variable Insured via Firm.  
 Table 5.7 displays statistics on the association between the variable indicating whether 
the person was insured through his or her job and dummy showing whether the spouse worked 
at a firm with at least 100 employees. The probability that the person was insured through his or 
her own employer or union is 52.8% when the spouse was unionized and is 57.8% otherwise. Thus 
spousal unionization induces a -0.049 variation in the probability that the person was insured 
through his or her own job. Phi Coefficient is of similar magnitude. The Chi-Square statistic 
indicates a significant negative association between the Insured via Firm indicator and the Spousal 
firm size dummy. Though numerically the correlation is not large, its statistical significance may 
be a good reason for using the spousal variable as an instrument. 
Table 5.7.     Person Insured via Firm vs Spousal Firm Size  
Count (%) Spousal Firm Size>=100 (Z) 
Insured via Firm (X) No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
No (=0) 15,914 
26.77 
10,292 
17.31 
26,206 
44.09 
Yes (=1) 21,728 
36.55 
11,508 
19.36 
33,236 
55.91 
Total 37,642 
63.33 
21,800 
36.67 
59,442 
100.00 
E[X|Z] 0.578 0.528 0.559 
E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0] -0.049 - 
Chi-Square (1) 136.323 Prob.=0.0001 
Phi Coefficient -0.048 - 
 Table 5.8 presents statistics on the relationship between whether the persons were 
insured through their employers or unions and whether their spouses were unionized. Statistics 
show that 47.6% of the persons whose spouses were unionized and 57.0% of those whose spouses 
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were not unionized were insured through their own employers or unions and. This shows that the 
persons were less likely to be insured through their employers if their spouses were unionized 
than if they were not. The difference is the variation in the probabilities that is induced by the 
spousal status indicator is -0.094. 
Table 5.8.     Person Insured via Firm vs Spousal Union Status  
Count (%) Spouse Unionized (Z) 
Insured via Firm (X) No (=0) Yes (=1) Total 
No (=0) 22,440 
37.75 
3,766 
6.34 
26,206 
44.09 
Yes (=1) 29,805 
50.14 
3,431 
5.77 
33,236 
55.91 
Total 52,245 
87.89 
7197 
12.11 
59,442 
100.00 
E[X|Z] 0.570 0.476 0.559 
E[X|Z=1]-E[X|Z=0] -0.094 - 
Chi-Square (1) 225.682 Prob.=0.0001 
Phi Coefficient -0.062 - 
 The Chi-Square statistic, together with the corresponding probability, indicates that there 
is a significant relationship between the two variables Insured via Firm and Spouse unionized. The 
Phi coefficient is -0.062, which implies the relationship is inverse. The significant (inverse) 
relationship tells that the variable Spouse Unionized can also be used as an instrument for the 
endogenous variable.   
5.5. Implications for Identifying Strategies 
 For the empirical models that will be analyzed in subsequent chapters, the dependent 
variables of interest include (real) hourly wage, the number of days missed work due to 
illness/injury, and the number of days missed work to care for others. The explanatory variable(s) 
of interest include the binary variable indicating whether the person was insured through his or 
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her employer or union. This explanatory variable is likely to be endogenous because of selection. 
First, unhealthy people are more likely than others to accept job offers from firms that provide 
health insurance and thus are more likely to be insured through the firms (or unions). Second, 
unhealthy people are also more likely than others to become sick and thus miss work for more 
days due to illness and more likely to choose to be insured (via the firms). Third, wages and 
insurance policy tend to be offered together to persons with certain characteristics. The existence 
of endogeneity in the explanatory variable will not only bias the estimator; more damagingly, it 
may establish incorrect causal connections and thus lead to erroneous inference. Instrumental 
variables can be used to address this endogeneity issue.       
 The general idea about finding instruments is to look at spousal variables. Classic 
econometric theory dictates that the instruments meet three criteria. Conditional on the control 
variables, the instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variable(s) to be 
instrumented and must be orthogonal to the error terms. In addition, they should have a 
monotone relationship with the endogenous variable(s) (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996) when 
other controls are also present. Preliminary investigation seems to provide evidence that the 
spousal variables meet the first criterion. The intuition is that spouses make decisions jointly 
and/or they share something in common: people tend to marry those who possess characteristics 
similar to their own. Whether they also meet the second criterion requires further examination. 
However, the third criterion, monotonicity, may not be testable 7 . Because the potentially 
endogenous variable Insured-through-Firm is both employment- and health insurance-related, 
the strategy is to identify such employment and insurance related spousal variables. Thanks to 
                                                          
7A violation of monotonicity here would mean, for example, that because one’s spouse is in a union, that 
one looks for a job with health insurance or takes up an offer of health insurance. 
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Olson (2002) that uses Husband’s insurance coverage through his job, Husband’s firm size, and 
Husband’s union status as instruments for his wife’s health insurance through her own employer, 
a few spousal variables that can serve as instruments have been found, including the binary 
variable indicating whether the spouse was offered health insurance through his or her own 
employer or union (Spouse Offered), the spousal firm size dummy showing whether the spouse 
worked at a firm with 100 or more employees (Spousal firm size), and the spousal union status 
indicator showing whether the spouse was a union member. In this section, the three variables 
have already been analyzed and discussed to certain extent. In the next chapter, they will be 
further investigated and validated. 
5.6. Comments and Conclusions 
 The MEPS data files contain useful information for testing the relationship between 
insurance coverage and absenteeism, which I interpret as a marker of productivity. However, a 
lot of important information is still lacking; there is no complete information about total insurance 
premiums because employer contributions are not available, nor is there information on 
deductibles and on co-pay rates. Another limitation of the data is that some important variables 
have missing values and so some observations have to be excluded, thus reducing the sample size 
substantially. Despite these limitations, the MEPS data can meet the overall objectives of the 
research. 
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CHAPTER VI
VALIDATION OF INSTRUMENTS THROUGH THE WAGE REGRESSION 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 In the preceding chapter, several instruments were proposed for the potentially 
endogenous explanatory variable of interest. These instruments include a binary variable 
indicating whether the spouse was offered health insurance through his or her employer or union, 
a binary firm size dummy that equals 1 if the firm the spouse worked for has at least 100 
employees and 0 otherwise, and a binary variable indicating whether the spouse was unionized. 
This chapter presents a wage regression model, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
hourly wage and the explanatory variable of particular interest is a binary indicator telling whether 
the individuals was insured through his or her employer or union. In this regression equation, the 
explanatory variable is likely to be endogenous because of selection: firms with certain 
characteristics tend to offer wage and insurance packages to people with certain characteristics. 
For example, firm characteristics may include firm size and the industry in which they are 
operating and individual characteristics may include education, gender, and personality. 
Unobserved heterogeneity in the firms and in workers drives the firm-worker matching and 
selection process. Thus, this wage regression model can be used to validate the proposed 
instruments.  
 The reason for doing this validation exercise is to check whether the instruments work 
well in this model; if the instruments work well in the sense that they can yield estimates that are 
different than the OLS estimates but are consistent with results obtained by other researchers, 
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then these instruments are likely to work in the disability days models to be presented in Chapter 
VII. On the other hand, if these instruments do not work well in the sense that the resulting 
estimates have signs that are not different from the signs of the OLS estimates, then they will not 
work in the models to be presented in the next Chapter. Moreover, if the instruments work well 
as expected, this would support the assumption that the instruments are valid; otherwise the 
assumption would not be supported.  
 Classic econometric theory dictates that valid instruments should be correlated with the 
instrumented variable but uncorrelated with the error term and that they should have a 
monotone relationship with the instrumented variable. Empirically, valid instruments should have 
some degree of strength as measured by both statistical significance and numerical magnitude of 
their coefficients, and should pass relevant statistical tests including but not limited to the 
specification tests.  
 These variables may be reasonably good instruments because they may be correlated 
with the instrumented variable, given that spouses normally make decisions jointly. In the 
preceding chapter, some preliminary statistical analysis has shown that each of the three 
potential instruments, including the spousal health insurance offer indicator, the spousal firm size 
dummy, and the spousal union status indicator, is to some extent correlated with the endogenous 
variable to be instrumented. However, whether these variables are correlated with the error term 
is yet to be investigated.  
 The theoretical justification for using the insurance and employment related spousal 
variables as instruments is detailed as follows. First, whether the individuals’ spouses are offered 
health insurance affects the likelihood that the individuals would be insured through their own 
employers because the individuals’ employers expect their employees to be insured through their 
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spouses’ employers (Dranove, Spier, and Baker 2000). Thus, either the employers would structure 
the compensation packages in such a way that their employees would become less likely to take 
the health insurance offered to them or the employers would become less likely to offer health 
insurance. Moreover, if the individuals’ spouses are offered health insurance, then the individuals 
themselves would have a chance to obtain insurance as part of the family plans through their 
spouses’ employers, thus becoming less likely to take up insurance offered through their own 
employers or unions. Whatever the specific causes are, the end result is that the individuals 
should become less likely to be insured through their own employers or unions if the spouses are 
offered health insurance, but would become more likely to be insured through their own 
employers or unions if the spouses are not.  
 Second, the spouse’s firm size is likely to be correlated with the variable indicating 
whether the person is insured through their own jobs because firm size is associated with the 
likelihood that the firm offers health insurance. Generally speaking, small firms are less likely to 
offer health insurance than are larger firms (Brown, Hamilton, and Medoff 1996; Currie and 
Madrian 1999; Olson 2002). Hence, if the individuals’ spouses are working in small firms, they are 
less likely to obtain health insurance through their own employers. On the other hand, if the 
individuals’ spouses are working in large firms, they are more likely to be insured through their 
jobs. Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between firm size and the likelihood that the 
person is insured through his or her employer or union.  The reason why small firms are less likely 
than large ones to offer health insurance may be that handling insurance provision and related 
issues requires a fixed investment (Cutler and Madrian 1998) and so the per worker average cost 
for small firms is larger than the per worker average cost for large firms.  
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 Third, the spouse’s union status should also be associated with the whether the person is 
insured through his or her own job because if the individual’s spouse is a union member, they are 
more likely to have insurance through their jobs (or unions) as greater weight is given to the infra-
marginal workers in firms with unions relative to workers in firms without unions and thus 
produces a greater preference among unionized workers for health benefits compared to wages 
(Olson 2002; Goldstein and Pauly 1976). As a consequence, unionized workers are more likely 
than non-union workers to be insured through their employers. This hypothesis suggests that 
there is an inverse relationship between the spousal union status variable and the through-firm 
insurance indicator. However, there might be other mechanism that drives the relationship 
between these two variables because the spousal union status variable seems to have a positive 
correlation with the through-firm insurance status indicator.  
 Job market selection as described above may affect the resulting estimates. For example, 
if an individual takes a job with health insurance, his or her spouse will likely take a job without 
health insurance, or vice versa. For any given individual, a job without health insurance should 
generally pay a higher wage than a job without health insurance. Thus, the selection would 
somehow affects the results negatively (biases the estimates away from zero).  
 While the relationship between the through-firm insurance status variable and one of the 
three spousal variables is inverse, the positive assortative mating theory, on the other hand, 
suggests that the correlation should be positive because of selection. Thus, positive assortative 
mating theory implies that using the spousal variables as instruments would bias the estimates 
toward zero. The overall net effect may be an empirical issue and entirely depends on the data 
used. The results from the first-stage regressions using each of the three instruments while 
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controlling for all other factors that impact wages show that the correlation is negative for each 
of the spousal insurance offer indicator and the spousal firm size. 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies the econometric 
models. Section 3 briefly describes the data used for the regression. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results obtained by using various approaches, including the ordinary least square 
regression, the two-stage least square regression, and the generalized methods of moments. 
Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2. Econometric Models 
 This section presents an econometric model that regresses the logarithm of hourly wage 
on a binary variable that equals 1 if the individual was insured through his or her own employer 
or union and 0 otherwise, as well as control variables such as demographics, region dummies, firm 
size, union status indicator, and the year dummies, whichever are appropriate. Demographic 
variables include gender, race, (own) education, potential experience, quadratic form of potential 
experience. Compensating wage theory suggests that workers who are insured through their 
employers should be paid lower wages than comparable workers who stay uninsured, holding 
human capital and other variables affecting wages constant (Olson 2002).  
 The wage regression model is first estimated using the ordinary least square regression 
(OLS). While the OLS estimate is expected to be biased upward (and positive) because of the 
endogeneity in the explanatory variable of interest that arises from selection in the labor market, 
it can serve as a benchmark with which results by using other methodologies can be compared. 
The OLS model simply takes the form of equation (6.2.1).  
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 The two-stage least square (2SLS) method is then used to identify the model so that the 
true causal relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variable(s) of 
interest can be established. It is an econometric technique widely used to analyze structural 
equations.  It consists of two stages (hence its name). In the first stage, the endogenous variable 
is regressed on the all the instruments, including the exogenous variables in the original OLS 
regression equation and the instruments not in the original OLS equation. In the second stage, 
the dependent variable of the original OLS regression equation is regressed on the fitted values 
of the endogenous variable and all other exogenous variables obtained using the estimated values 
for the parameters in the first stage. The 2SLS consists of equations (6.2.1) and (6.2.2). 
 The use of the fitted value of the endogenous variable distinguishes the 2SLS method 
from certain other approaches. This methodology has advantages over the OLS method in that it 
can identify models where at least one of the explanatory variables is endogenous while the OLS 
method is unable to do so. Compared to other approaches such as the (generic) generalized 
method of moments, the 2SLS method is efficient and has a transparent, explicit structure. When 
compared with instrumental variable (IV) method, it has the advantage that it does not require 
the number of orthogonality conditions be equal to the number of parameters to be estimated, 
while the IV approach does. Moreover, going through the two stage procedure can make it clear 
whether the instruments are valid or not.  
 The wage regression model using the ordinary least square regression (OLS) can be 
written as follows. 
 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖 = ϕ0 + 𝜙1𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 + 𝑿𝒊𝝓𝟐 + 𝑖                                                                                    (6.2.1) 
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 The dependent variable 𝒍𝒏𝑊𝑖  is the logarithm of Hourly Wage for individual 𝑖. 𝜙0 is a 
constant and  𝜙1  is the parameter of interest. 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖  is a binary variable that equals 1 if the 
individual was insured through his or her employer or union and 0 otherwise. 𝑿𝒊 is a vector of 
control variables, which, in the current context, include sex, potential experience, race, marital 
status, spousal education, region dummies, firm size, year dummies, and union status indicator. 
𝝓𝟐 is a (column) vector of parameters. The OLS estimate of 𝜙1 will be biased upward since HIE is 
endogenous. HIE is endogenous because: 1) more capable or better skilled workers receive better 
compensation packages that include health insurance and higher wages, while less capable or less 
skilled ones are paid lower wages and given no health insurance, and 2) the variables in 𝑿𝒊 cannot 
fully capture the effect of the abilities or skills on compensation because these variables are 
inadequate or incomplete measures of abilities or skills. Some constituents of abilities or skills 
may be observable to employers but not to other outsiders such as data collectors because these 
constituents cannot be well-proxied or well-measured, and are thus not well-documented. 
Whatever is not captured by the independent variables is left in the error term 𝑖, causing the 
variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 to be correlated with the error term, and so 𝑬[(𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖) 𝑖] ≠ 𝟎. As a consequence, 
the estimate obtained from ordinary least square regression is not unbiased and even not 
consistent. 
 6.2.1. Identification   
 Endogeneity in the explanatory variable make the OLS estimator inconsistent and may, 
more damagingly, lead to erroneous inference. Resolving the issue arising from endogeneity 
requires the use of instrumental variables (henceforth instruments). For the instruments to work 
well, they should meet the following criteria. First, they are orthogonal to the error terms. Second, 
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they are correlated with the endogenous variable. The relationship between the endogenous 
variable and the instruments can be established as follows. 
 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 = 0 + 𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊𝜽𝟏 +𝑿𝒄,𝒊𝜽𝟐 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                   (6.2.2) 
where 𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊 is a (row) vector of the (excluded) variables used as instruments for the endogenous 
variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖, 𝜽𝒌 (where 𝑘 = 1,2) is a column vector, and the set of control variables in 𝑿𝒄,𝒊 is the 
same as in Equation (6.2.1). Econometrically, the first criterion for valid instruments as stated in 
the preceding paragraph requires that 
𝑬[𝒁𝒊,𝒋
′
𝑖] = 0 and 𝑬[𝒁𝒊,𝒋
′ 𝑢𝑖] = 0                                                                                                 (6.2.3) 
where  𝒁𝒊,𝒋
′ = (
𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊,𝒋
′
𝑿𝒄,𝒊,𝒋
′ ) and j indicates the jth element. Because 𝑿𝒄,𝒊,𝒋 is assumed to be exogenous, 
these two conditions can be equivalently expressed as 𝑬[𝑍𝑒𝑥,𝑖,𝑗
′
𝑖] = 0  and 𝑬[𝑍𝑒𝑥,𝑖,𝑗
′ 𝑢𝑖] = 0 , 
respectively, which state that each instrument has to be exogenous. The second criterion states 
that 
  𝑪𝑶𝑽[𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊
′ , 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖] ≠ 𝟎                                                                                                          (6.2.4) 
Or equivalently, 𝜽𝟏 ≠ 𝟎, where 𝟎 is a zero column vector with the same number of elements as 
in 𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊
′ .  
 To further elaborate on the criteria for determining valid instruments, define 𝑫 = 𝑯𝑰𝑬 
and 𝒁𝒊
′ = (
𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊
′
𝑿𝒄,𝒊
′ ). Further, let 𝒀 = (
𝒚𝟏
⋯
𝒚𝑵
), 𝒁𝒆𝒙 = (
𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝟏
⋯
𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝑵
),  and 𝒁 = (
𝒁𝟏
⋯
𝒁𝑵
). Note that the set of 
instruments for the endogenous variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸 enters Equation (6.2.2) and does not enter the 
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main equation, Equation (6.2.1) . This fact, coupled with the condition that the correlation 
between  𝒁𝒆𝒙 and 𝜺 is zero, captures the notion of excludability, which can be more rigorously 
defined, in the spirit of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), as follows.  
 The first is the exclusion criterion. The set of instruments 𝒁𝒆𝒙 is excludable if 
 𝒀(𝑫, 𝒁𝒆𝒙) = 𝒀(𝑫, 𝒁𝒆𝒙
′′ )     ∀ 𝑫 and ∀ 𝒁𝒆𝒙, 𝒁𝒆𝒙
′′ , 
where 𝑫 contains the endogenous variable and 𝒁𝒆𝒙
′′  contains the same set of instruments as, but 
takes a different set of values than, does 𝒁𝒆𝒙. Suppose 𝒁𝒆𝒙 has only one element and so is a single 
instrument; suppose further it takes only two values, 0 and 1. Then this definition implies  
𝒀(𝑫, 1) = 𝒀(𝑫, 0). This states that the instruments have no direct effect on the outcome variable. 
Therefore, 𝒀 can be defined as a function of 𝐷 alone: 
 𝒀(𝑫) = 𝒀(𝑫, 𝒁𝒆𝒙) = 𝒀(𝑫,𝒁𝒆𝒙
′′ )    ∀ 𝑫 and ∀ 𝒁𝒆𝒙, 𝒁𝒆𝒙
′′ . 
 An instrument must meet this criterion in order to be valid, for otherwise the model 
represented by Equation (6.2.1) may not be fully identifiable because of the impact of the 
instruments on the outcome variable.  
 The second is the nonzero correlation criterion. This is simply what is stated earlier. A 
stronger version is that the set of instruments has a nonzero causal effect on the endogenous 
variable. This condition is nice to have but is not necessary because of the orthogonality or 
exclusion condition. The requirement that the instruments be orthogonal to the error terms rules 
out reverse causality whatsoever, for otherwise there would be endogeneity in Equation (6.2.2).   
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 The exclusion condition, plus the nonzero correlation restriction, captures the notion that 
any effect of instrumental variables on the outcome variable must be through its effect on the 
endogenous variable instrumented by them. 
 While monotonicity is hard to define in econometric terms, Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 
(1996), among others, have provided a way to do this.  
 The third is the monotonicity criterion. The endogenous variable is monotone in any of 
the instruments if   
  𝐷𝑖(𝑍𝑒𝑥,𝑖,𝑗, 𝑿𝒄,𝒊) ≥ 𝐷𝑖(𝑍𝑒𝑥,𝑘,𝑗, 𝑿𝒄,𝒊) for 𝑍𝑒𝑥,𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 𝑍𝑒𝑥,𝑘,𝑗 and for all 𝑖, 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝑁. 
 Monotonicity is well defined only for a single variable; this means all other variables 
should be held constant. Strong monotonicity requires the condition to hold with inequality. It is 
necessary to have strong monotonicity for at least some observations. If each of the instruments 
takes values 0 and 1, then the above condition is equivalent to  
 𝐷𝑖(1) ≥ 𝐷𝑖(0) ∀ 𝑖 
 The last but not yet explicitly stated requirement for the instruments to be valid is stable 
unit treatment value assumption (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996), which essentially states that 
the choices by individuals do not interact with one another. 
 As proposed in the preceding chapter, potential variables that can serve as instruments 
for the potentially endogenous variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖  include a binary variable indicating whether the 
spouses were offered insurance through their employers or unions (Spousal Insurance Offer 
Indicator), spousal firm size, and spousal union status. An important purpose of running this wage 
regression is to assess whether these potential instruments are valid and how strong they are.  
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 The statistics presented in Chapter 5 show that the correlation between the through-firm 
insurance status indicator and any of the three spousal variables is negative. However, a positive 
correlation is not necessarily surprising because there might be other mechanism that drives the 
relationship between these two variables. For example, the positive assortative mating theory 
suggests that the correlation should be positive because people tend to marry those with similar 
characteristics and thus share similar preferences; this implies that they both may demand health 
insurance through their respective employers. The overall net effect may be an empirical issue 
and entirely depends on the data used.  
 If employer-sponsored health insurance does not alter worker productivity, then the 
estimate of the coefficient of the instrumented variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 should reflect a compensating wage 
differential: since the OLS estimate is normally positive, then the estimate obtained from the 
regression using the instruments will be smaller in magnitude if it is still positive, or it will even be 
negative. Some prior studies on the impact of employer-provided health insurance on wage have 
found evidence of wage offsets. Using CPS and BLS data, Gruber and Krueger (1991) find that a 
substantial portion of the cost of workers’ compensation insurance is shifted to employees in the 
form of lower wages. Working with CPS and SIPP data, Cutler and Madrian (1998) find that 
employer-provided health insurance lowers wages, Olson (2002) found evidence that women 
with health insurance provided by their own employers accept a wage around 20% lower than 
they would while working full time in jobs without such benefits. Baicker and Chandra (2005) 
estimate that a 10 percent increase in health insurance premiums reduces wages by 2.3 percent. 
In all these cases, the coefficient of the through-firm insurance indicator is negative.   
 There are, however, instances where employer-sponsored health insurance does not 
affect wages paid to workers who accept such insurance coverage. Using CEX and MEPS data and 
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regressing changes in wages on changes in health insurance, Levy and Feldman (2001) failed to 
find evidence confirming wage offsets: their estimates for the coefficients are either insignificant 
or wrong-signed, though they interpret the results not as evidence against what theory would 
predict, but rather as evidence that changes in health insurance are not exogenous. There are, of 
course, other reasons that the estimate is non-negative. One such reason is that employers do 
not necessarily lower wages for workers who accept employer-sponsored health insurance 
because they can lower other benefits if they offer such benefits. Another such reason is they can 
shift the premium costs to workers by increasing work intensity. Still another reason is that 
employer-sponsored health insurance may improve worker productivity. In all these three cases, 
a non-negative value does not necessarily invalidate the instruments used, because the estimate 
of the coefficient of the instrumented variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 could be positive or close to zero even if the 
instruments are truly valid and strong. But conversely, if the coefficient is close to zero or positive, 
it is not clear whether this is because the instruments are not good enough or because employer-
sponsored health insurance improves productivity or because of other reasons. 
 Although a non-negative estimate for the health insurance variable is explainable, this 
dissertation favors the wage offsets hypothesis; that is, employer-sponsored health insurance 
tends to reduce wages paid to workers who accept employer-provided insurance. The resulting 
estimates obtained from the model presented in this chapter are unambiguously negative.  
 There may be potential issues with the spousal variables to be used as instruments. The 
argument by Olson (2002) suggests that positive assortative mating between spouses would 
generate a positive correlation between 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 and 𝑖, and thus may also cause spousal firm size 
or spousal union status to be correlated with 𝑖. Thus, positive assortative mating will generate 
an IV estimate of 𝜙1 that is biased away from zero. For example, individuals with low unobserved 
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ability are likely to have spouses with low unobserved ability; thus both the husbands and the 
wives are likely to work for smaller or nonunion firms that pay lower wages and do not offer health 
insurance. On the other hand, the substitution effect of spousal variables on the through-firm 
insurance status variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖  works in the opposite direction. So the net effect on 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖  is 
ambiguous.  
6.2.2. Hypotheses  
 The standard compensating wage theory predicts that the coefficient of the through-firm 
insurance status indicator is negative. On the basis of the analyses conducted in the preceding 
paragraphs, a natural hypothesis can be proposed that employer-sponsored health insurance 
does not affect wage. Expressed in other words, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient of the 
variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸 is not significantly different from zero and the alternative hypothesis is that the 
coefficient of the variable is not zero, or symbolically, 
  𝐻0: 𝜙1 = 0 VS 𝐻1: 𝜙1 ≠ 0.  
 While the alternative hypothesis says that the coefficient may be positive or negative, a 
negative coefficient is desired because of the existence of wage offsets. Results will be presented 
in Section 4. 
6.3. Data  
 The MEPS data will be used for the wage regression. The sample is obtained by imposing 
the restrictions that individuals worked full time and were at least 18 years old but younger than 
65 years and that all variables of interest except for the spousal ones, have no missing values. The 
resulting sample contains 59,442 observations. The variables of interest include ones that will be 
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used as the dependent, independent, and instrumental variables in the wage regression model. 
The dependent variable to be used in the wage regression equation is the logarithm of the (real) 
hourly wage. For details, see the summary statistics tables in Chapter 5. 
6.4. Model Results 
 Each combination of the instruments is checked to see how it would work. Tables that 
follow show the results using each such combination. The OLS and 2SLS estimates (including first 
stage and second stage results) are displayed in the same table. Table 6.1 shows results for the 
wage regression models with one excluded instrument, Table 6.2 lists results obtained by using 
two excluded instruments, and results for models with all three excluded instruments are 
presented in Table A6.3. To further check how well the instruments would work for different data 
sets, the sample is then separated into two sub-sets, one for Husbands and the other for Wives.  
The results are shown in Table 6.3. The GMM results are listed in tables in the Appendix and will 
not be discussed in detail because they are almost identical to the 2SLS estimates.  
 The OLS estimate of the coefficient of the variable indicating the persons were insured 
through their own employers or unions is statistically significant and positive. This states that 
workers who were insured through their employers or unions were paid a higher wage on average. 
But standard compensating wage theory predicts that having health insurance through firms 
would result in an offsetting decrease in wages since normally firms would ‘pay’ part of its costs 
by reducing the wages supposed to be paid to its workers who have employer-sponsored health 
insurance. Hence, the coefficient should be negative. If the theory is applicable here, then this 
estimate is biased upward. The analysis in Section 6.2 tells that this biased estimate is a result of 
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endogeneity in the variable. Using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method can potentially 
resolve this issue.  
Table 6.1.      Results from the Wage Regression Model with One Excluded Instrument  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES OLS 
RSE 
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 
        
Insured via firm 0.227*** - -0.115*** - -0.179*** - -0.050 
 (0.005) - (0.033) - (0.040) - (0.041) 
Male  0.207*** 0.124*** 0.253*** 0.132*** 0.261*** 0.128*** 0.244*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Firm with >= 100 
employees 
0.124*** 0.208*** 0.195*** 0.225*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.182*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.00392) (0.009) 
Unionized 0.079*** 0.226*** 0.157*** 0.230*** 0.172*** 0.250*** 0.143*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.00576) (0.011) 
Excl. Instruments - - - - - - - 
Spouse offered 
insurance 
- -
0.128*** 
- - - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - - - 
Spousal Firm w/ >= 
100 employees 
- - - -
0.110*** 
- - - 
 - - - (0.004) - - - 
Spouse unionized - - - - - -
0.152*** 
- 
 - - - - - (0.006) - 
Constant 0.862*** -
0.0363** 
0.830*** -
0.070*** 
0.824*** -
0.082*** 
0.836*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
- 447.83 - 433.41 - 428.22 - 
Sargan - - - - - - - 
 - - - - - - - 
Hausman - - 61.71 - 62.81 - 25.13 
 - - (p=0.0001) - (p=0.0001) - (p=0.0001) 
Observations 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 
R-squared 0.395 0.153 0.325 0.149 0.296 0.148 0.349 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014 
 The first stage estimates in Table 6.1 are all significant at the 1% level. The partial F-
statistic is relatively large for each of the excluded instruments entering the regression equation 
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one at a time, confirming the significance of each instrument. The Hausman statistic for 
endogeneity test is significant as the associated p-value is extremely small, implying that the null 
hypothesis that the variables are exogenous can be rejected at nearly any significance level. These 
results are consistent with those shown in the cross tabulations presented in Tables 5.6 through 
5.8 of Chapter 5.  
 The OLS estimate for the binary variable Insured via firm is 0.227. The second stage 
estimate resulting from using the variable Spouse offered and the spousal firm size dummy is -
0.115 and -0.179, respectively, each statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the estimate 
obtained by using the spousal union status dummy as the (excluded) instrument is -0.050, but not 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  
 The difference between the OLS estimate and the 2SLS result using the spousal firm size 
dummy is the 0.404, which is the largest. This difference reflects the shift caused by the 
instrument Spousal firm size dummy. Using a sample containing wives only, Olson (2002) obtains 
a shift ranging from 0.40 to 0.50, depending on the specifications. The shift obtained from the 
model here is very close to the result in the previous work. However, the OLS estimate in Olson 
(2002) (between 0.1 and 0.2) is much smaller than the result obtained here. One possible 
explanation for the difference is that the previous uses a different sample. Benchmarked against 
results from previous work, the spousal firm size dummy works better as an instrument for the 
endogenous explanatory variable than either of the other two. 
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Table 6.2.     Results from the Wage Regression Model with Two Excluded Instruments  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES OLS 
RSE 
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 
        
Insured via firm 0.227*** - -0.140*** - -0.092*** - -0.121*** 
 (0.005) - (0.029) - (0.028) - (0.031) 
Male  0.207*** 0.125*** 0.256*** 0.121*** 0.249*** 0.128*** 0.253*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Firm with >= 100 
employees 
0.124*** 0.220*** 0.201*** 0.209*** 0.191*** 0.224*** 0.197*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Unionized 0.079*** 0.227*** 0.163*** 0.242*** 0.152*** 0.248*** 0.159*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Excl. Instruments - - - - - - - 
Spouse offered 
insurance 
- -
0.105*** 
- -
0.113*** 
- - - 
 - (0.004) - (0.004) - - - 
Spousal firm w/ >= 100 
employees  
- -
0.079*** 
- - - -
0.097*** 
- 
 - (0.004) - - - (0.004) - 
Spouse unionized - - - -
0.119*** 
- -
0.129*** 
- 
 - - - (0.006) - (0.006) - 
Constant 0.862*** -0.030** 0.828*** -0.033** 0.832*** -
0.063*** 
0.829*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
- 446.86 - 448.69 - 438.26 - 
Sargan  - - 2.28 - 1.83 - 6.08 
 - - (p=0.131) - (p=0.176) - (p=0.014) 
Hausman  - - 95.62 - 74.19 - 74.74 
 - - (p=0.0001) - (p=0.0001) - (p=0.0001) 
Observations 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 
R-squared 0.395 0.158 0.314 0.159 0.334 0.156 0.322 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014 
 Results in Table 6.2 show that the first stage estimate using each pair of the (excluded) 
instruments is negative and significant. The partial F-statistic for each pair of the excluded 
instruments is large enough to be significant. For the first pair (the spouse offered insurance 
indicator and the firm size dummy) or the second (the spouse offered insurance indicator and 
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spousal union status indicator), the Sargan statistic is small (2.28 or 1.83) and thus the 
corresponding p-value is relatively large (0.131 or 0.176), indicating that the orthogonality 
conditions hold in either case at any reasonable significance level (say 10% or less). This attests to 
the validity of each of these two pairs of instruments. However, the Sargan statistic for the last 
(third) pair (the spousal firm size dummy and spousal union status indicator) is large (6.02) and so 
the p-value is small (0.014). This large Sargan statistic indicates that, when these two spousal 
variables are included as instruments, the orthogonality conditions fail to hold and thus raise 
concern.   
 The second stage estimates from models with two excluded instruments are all negative 
and significant. Using the first pair of instruments, the spouse offered insurance indicator and the 
spousal firm size dummy, yields the largest estimate (in absolute term) (-0.140), and dominates 
the other two combinations in terms of test statistics and their effects on the estimate for the 
endogenous variable of interest, though it is smaller in absolute value than the estimate using 
only the Spouse offered insurance variable alone, as shown in Table 6.2. 
 Results presented in Table A6.3 in the Appendix show that the three instruments, if all 
included in the model, fail to pass the specification tests because the Sargan (or Hansen’s J) 
statistic is very large and the associated p-value is small. Thus, the final choice should be made 
between the variable Spousal firm size alone and a combination of the Spouse offered variable 
and the spousal firm size dummy. While the one excluded instrument seems to perform better in 
terms of its ability to shift down the estimate relative to the OLS estimate, it is generally desirable 
to have more than one instrument, even at some cost, because with more excluded instruments 
than the instrumented variable, it is possible to test the over-identifying restrictions and obtain 
test statistic to measure the suitability of the instruments.    
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Table 6.3.     Results from Wage Regression Models Using Husband and Wife Samples. 
h=Husband; w=Wife. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS RSE 
(h) 
1st Stage 
(h) 
2SLS  
(h) 
OLS 
RSE (w) 
1st Stage 
(w) 
2SLS  
(w) 
       
Insured via firm 0.229*** - -0.057 0.224*** - -
0.195*** 
 (0.008) - (0.050) (0.00711) - (0.034) 
Firm with >= 100 employees 0.0953*** 0.219*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.221*** 0.241*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
Unionized 0.059*** 0.224*** 0.123*** 0.098*** 0.230*** 0.195*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered insurance - -0.080*** - - -0.134*** - 
 - (0.005) - - (0.006) - 
Spousal firm w/ >= 100 
employees  
- -0.067*** - - -0.081*** - 
 - (0.006) - - (0.006) - 
Constant 1.104*** 0.075*** 1.112*** 0.810*** -0.014 0.775*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.022) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 207.96 - - 199.81 - 
Sargan  - - 0.588 - - 1.273 
 - - (p=0.443) - - (p=0.260) 
Hausman  - - 17.98 - - 91.77 
Sargan - - (p=0.000) - - (p=0.000) 
Observations 28,673 28,673 28,673 30,769 30,769 30,769 
R-squared 0.353 0.140 0.303 0.392 0.143 0.280 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region           
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014 
 The letter in parenthesis shown in the Table 6.3 indicates the sample used to estimate 
the models, with h=Husband and w=Wife. The first stage estimates for the two excluded 
instruments are negative and significant for both samples. Hausman statistics and the 
corresponding p-values tell that the instrumented variable is endogenous for both the Husband 
and Wife samples. The p-values associated with the Sargan statistics favor the null hypothesis that 
the over-identifying restrictions hold for both samples; thus the joint validity of the two excluded 
instruments is supported. The 2SLS estimates for the endogenous variable differ substantially 
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across these two samples; the Husband sample yields an insignificant result whereas the Wife 
sample yields a significant, negative estimate which is even slightly larger in absolute value than 
the one obtained using spousal firm size alone as an (excluded) instrument. The estimate obtained 
from this model is closer to the results in Olson (2002).  
 However, the difference between the results using the Husband and Wife samples is too 
small to be considered significant. This says that when spouses were offered health insurance 
through their own employers or unions, married men are affected to the same extent by whether 
their spouses are offered insurance as are married women in terms of whether they are covered 
by employer-sponsored health insurance. This may be because married men are just as likely as 
married women to be insured through their spouses’ employers or unions when their spouses are 
offered health insurance. 
6.5. Conclusions 
 The OLS estimate of the through-firm insurance status variable is positive as expected 
because this variable is endogenous. The endogeneity is a result of labor market selection: 
workers with low ability and/or skills tend to end up with low wages and no insurance offers from 
their employers (or unions), whereas workers with higher ability and/or skills are more likely to 
end up with higher pay and insurance offers from their employers or unions. When the through-
firm insurance status variable is instrumented using the spousal insurance offer indicator, spousal 
firm size, and spousal union status, the estimate changes its sign. This result is consistent with 
what standard compensating wage theory predicts; it is also confirmed by results in previous 
studies. The negative sign implies the existence of wage offsets or the substitution between wage 
and employer-sponsored health insurance. While the numerical magnitude of the estimate 
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obtained when the endogenous variable is instrumented is arguably smaller than that presented 
in prior studies, this should not be a major concern because prior researchers might have used 
different samples.  
 The first stage results for each combination of the three excluded instrumental variables 
show that correlation exists between any combination of the spousal variables and the 
endogenous variable. These findings reassure the correlation shown in the cross tabulations 
presented in Chapter 5. Moreover, Hausman (or GMM C) statistics favor these spousal variables 
as instruments for the endogenous variable. Sargan (Hansen’s J) statistics raise some concern 
about the validity of one of the three variables as an instrument, but some combinations of the 
spousal variables seem to be valid instruments.   
 While the spousal firm size dummy alone performs better than does the combination of 
two of the three instruments because the former yields an estimate closer to the one obtained in 
earlier studies such as Olson (2002), using two (or more) instruments in this case is more desirable 
than using a single one because with more instruments than endogenous variables, more 
statistics become available for measuring how good the instruments are. Furthermore, including 
two instruments does not seem to cause additional issues. Therefore, two instruments rather 
than one should be used in the analysis. 
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CHAPTER VII
DISABILITY DAYS REGRESSION 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 The empirical part of the study is intended to explore whether, how, and to what extent 
employer-sponsored health insurance affects worker productivity. But because information on 
productivity or its proxies are not readily available, one alternative is to examine the empirical 
relationship between the disability days variables, especially the number of days a person missed 
work due to sickness, and a binary explanatory variable indicating whether the individuals was 
insured through his or her employer (or union). However, this binary explanatory variable is likely 
to be endogenous because of selection.  
 First, unobservable factors drive individuals both to obtain insurance through their 
employers (or unions) and to take more days off due to disability. For example, people with high 
ability may be able to obtain jobs that offer health insurance and jobs that offer health insurance 
generally pay higher wages; people who are paid high wages demand more health care and thus 
take more days off due to sickness. Hence the issue of selection arises. As a consequence, workers 
insured through their employers would, on average, take more days off due to sickness than 
workers either uninsured or insured through channels other than their employers.  
 For the variable measuring the number of days missed work to care for others, the 
endogeneity issue does not seem to be obvious. A worker does not seem to have an incentive to 
take days off to care for others solely because he or she has been insured through his or her 
employer, nor does a worker seem to possess certain characteristics that drive or enable him or 
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her to end up being insured through his or her employer and to demand days off to care for others. 
If there is any association between how many days the worker would take off to care for others 
and whether he or she has been insured through his or her employer, then either this is 
coincidental or there is a factor other than the person’s own characteristics that connects the two 
decisions. In the former case, the variable measuring the number of days missed work to care for 
others should not be endogenous, but in the latter case, it may be endogenous. For example, if a 
worker has young children who require care from someone else from time to time, then the 
worker may choose a firm that offers health insurance plans for which his or her children are 
eligible; then at some point, the worker takes days off to care for his or her children. This makes 
this variable endogenous.   
 The issue of endogeneity has to be addressed because it makes the estimator inconsistent, 
thus establishing misleading causal connections and leading to erroneous inference. The strategy 
to do so is to identify one or more variables that can serve as instruments for the endogenous 
explanatory variable. The econometric model for regressing the number of days missed work for 
other reasons will be used to do the falsification test on the instruments.  
 In Chapter 6, several instruments were tested and they seem to be promising. In this 
chapter, these instruments will be used to identify the econometric models regressing the 
disability days on the through-firm insurance status indicator. The model of primary interest is the 
one that regresses the number of days missed due to sickness on the employer-sponsored 
insurance status indicator. Multiple specifications and methodologies will be used to analyze the 
relationships between the two variables. The specifications include but are not limited to ordinary 
linear, Probit, and Poisson models, or a combination thereof. While the suitability of a 
specification depends on the distributions of the dependent variable of the econometric models 
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under study, ordinary linear specifications generally have advantages over other forms in the 
sense that they are straightforward and intuitive. Methodologies used to estimate the models 
include the ordinary least square (OLS), the two-stage least square (2SLS), and the generalized 
method of moments (GMM). Each of these methodologies has its own advantages over and 
limitations relative to alternative approaches.  
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 specifies the econometric 
models. Section 3 briefs the data. Section 4 presents and discusses the results, including estimates 
obtained by using the ordinary least square regression, the two-stage least square regression, and 
the generalized methods of moments estimation approaches. Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
7.2. Econometric Models 
 This section presents an econometric model that regresses the variable measuring the 
number of disability days due to sickness or for other reasons on the variable indicating having 
insurance through an employer or union. The model includes independent variables as controls, 
including but not limited to demographics, region, firm size, union status indicator, and the year 
dummy. Other variables may be added to the models as necessary; these variables may include 
the binary dummy indicating whether a person was offered paid sick leave days and the ones that 
measure the number of days the spouses missed work due to sickness or for other reasons.   
Estimation methods include the ordinary least square (OLS) regression, two-stage least square, 
and the generalized methods of moments. The OLS method is the natural one to begin with 
because it can serve as a benchmark to compare results from other specifications.  Specifications 
include linear and Poisson Dependent variables include the numbers of days a person missed work 
due to sickness or for other reasons.  The explanatory variable of interest is a binary indicator that 
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equals 1 if the individual was insured through his or her own employer (or union) and 0 otherwise. 
Other independent variables, which serve as controls, include demographics, region dummies, 
year dummies, etc..  
 The ordinary least square regression models can be written as  
 𝑦𝑖 = β0 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 + 𝑿𝒊𝜷𝟐 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                                          (7.2.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖  is the number of Disability Days (either due to sickness or for other reasons) for individual 
𝑖, 𝛽0 constants, 𝛽1 is the parameter of interest, 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 is the variable indicating whether the person 
is insured through his or her employer or union, just as in Equation (6.2.1) in Chapter 6, that is, 
and 𝑿𝒊 may be different from the corresponding term in Equation (6.2.1).  
 What Equation (7.2.1) is trying to do is to test whether and how having insurance through 
an employer or union affects absenteeism relative to not having insurance through such a channel. 
This, however, does not imply that having insurance through an employer or union has different 
effects on absenteeism than having insurance through from some other source or that having 
insurance from some other source does not affect absenteeism. While having insurance through 
an employer or union may affect absenteeism in the same way and to the same extent as does 
having insurance through other sources affects absenteeism, I choose to focus  on what equation 
(7.2.1) is trying to do. 
 For the model regressing the number of days a person missed work due to sickness or 
injuries, the OLS estimate of 𝛽1 is likely to be biased upward because the variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸 is likely to 
be endogenous. Endogeneity arises because of (adverse) section. First of all, unhealthy workers 
are generally more likely than uninsured ones to have themselves insured against potential 
medical shocks and to demand more medical services. Second, certain workers possess 
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unobservable characteristics that make them more likely than others to end up being insured 
through their employers or unions. Thus, workers insured through their employers will likely take 
more days off than other workers who were either uninsured or insured through channels other 
than their employers or unions. Whatever is not captured by the explanatory variables is left in 
the error term 𝜖𝑖, causing the variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 to be correlated with the error term. Hence, 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 is 
endogenous, or 𝑬[(𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖)𝜖𝑖] ≠ 𝟎. Therefore, the estimate obtained from ordinary least square 
regression is not unbiased and even not consistent.  
 For the model regressing the number of days a person missed work for other reasons (to 
care for others), the major focus of the analysis is on whether the estimate of 𝛽1 obtained by using 
the instruments significantly differ from its OLS estimate. If the variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸 is endogenous, then 
the estimate using the instruments is likely to be different than the estimate without using the 
instruments (OLS estimates); if it is not endogenous, then the estimate using instruments is 
unlikely to differ from the OLS estimate.  
 The first stage equation for the two stage least square regression is similar to Equation 
(6.2.2), which can written as  
𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 = 0 + 𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊𝜽𝟏 + 𝑿𝒊𝜽𝟐 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                       (7.2.2) 
 As mentioned earlier, the control variables in 𝑿𝒊 may not be the same as in Equation 
(6.2.2). If instruments are valid, then 𝜽𝟏 ≠ 𝟎, where 𝟎 is a zero column vector with the same 
number of elements as in 𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊, 𝑬[𝒁𝒊
′
𝑖] = 0 and 𝑬[𝒁𝒊
′𝑢𝑖] = 0, where  𝒁𝒊
′ = (
𝒁𝒆𝒙,𝒊
′
𝑿𝒊
′ ) = 𝟎.  The 
potential instruments are the spousal variables used in Chapter 6.  
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 Equations (7.2.1) and (7.2.2) constitute the structural equations. Replacing the 
endogenous variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 in equation (7.2.1) with the right hand side of equation (7.2.2) yields 
the reduced form. 
𝑦𝑖 = α0 + 𝛼1𝒁𝒔𝒑,𝒊 + 𝑿𝒊𝜶𝟐 + 𝝊𝒊                                                                                            (7.2.3) 
where α0 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜋0, α1 = 𝛽1𝜋1, α2 = 𝛽2+𝛽1𝜋2, and 𝝊𝒊 = 𝜖𝑖+𝛽1𝜉2. An apparent limitation of 
the reduced form regression is that the estimate for the endogenous variable of interest is no 
longer available. Hence, the empirical results of the reduced form model will not be presented. 
7.2.1. Hypotheses 
 There are two hypotheses to be tested, with one for the main model and the other for 
the falsification testing model. For the main model, the hypothesis to be tested is that employer-
sponsored health insurance does not affect the number of days missed work due to sickness. Put 
it differently, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient of the variable 𝐻𝐼𝐸 is not significantly 
different from zero and the alternative hypothesis is that the coefficient of the variable is not zero. 
Symbolically, 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 0 vs 𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 0. 
 Although the coefficient can be negative or otherwise, a negative coefficient is desired 
because such a result is consistent with the theory that employer-provided health insurance 
boosts worker productivity. For the falsification test model, the major purpose is to check whether 
the instruments perform in the same way as they do in the main model; it is desired that the 
estimate of the coefficient of the instrumented variable does not differ from the OLS estimate. 
Results will be presented in Section 4. 
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7.3. Data  
 The dataset used in this chapter is the modeling sample presented in Chapter 5. Many of 
the independent variables used in the wage regression model will be used her and additional 
variables may be included as necessary and if appropriate. The dependent variables of interest 
include the number of days a person missed work due to sickness and the number of days a person 
missed work for other reasons (For details, refer to the summary statistics tables in Chapter 5). 
An additional sample containing only childless working adults will be created later to address the 
potential issue that spousal employment decisions may be endogenous. This sample is obtained 
by imposing an additional restriction that the individuals have no children8 and hence it is a subset 
of the dataset presented in Chapter 5.  
7.4. Model Results 
 Two types of empirical results are presented in this section: main and falsification test. 
Main results refer to results obtained from the model where the dependent variable is the 
number of days a person missed work due to sickness. These results are shown in Table 7.1, Table 
7.2, Table 7.5, and Table A7.1. Falsification test results refer to results obtained from the model 
where the dependent variable is the number of days a person missed work for other reasons (to 
care for others). These results are shown in Table 7.3, Table 7.4, and Table 7.6.  
 Table 7.1 displays main results obtained using the whole sample. The variable of primary 
interest is shown as Insured Via Firm, which is a binary indicator that equals 1 the worker was 
insured through his or her own job and 0 otherwise. The OLS results are shown on Column (1). 
                                                          
8To obtain such a sample, I first include only those individuals who are not explicitly identified as someone 
else’s mother or father; I then restrict the family size to 2 because people who may be someone else’s 
mother or father are put in the same pool as people who have no children.  
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The estimate for the variable of interest is 0.571 (20% of the sample average of 2.8 days) and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This significant positive number tells that a worker who was 
insured through his or her employer took, on average, about 0.6 (roughly 20% of the sample 
average) more day off due to sickness than did one who was not insured through his or her own 
job.  However, the positive OLS estimate may reflect the effects of endogneity in the explanatory 
variable, because the endogeneity arising out of selection and/or moral hazards tend to bias the 
estimate upward.  
 Results for the two stages of the 2SLS are listed on Columns (2) and (2’) in Table 7.1. First 
stage estimates for the two selected (excluded) instruments are -0.105 and -0.079, both 
significant at the 1% level; this provides evidence that these instruments are potentially good in 
this model. The small Sargan (or J in the case of GMM) statistic (and thus large p-value) favors the 
null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions hold and the Hausman statistic falsifies the 
null hypothesis.  
 The estimate for the through-firm insurance status indicator from the second stage of the 
2SLS equals -1.456 and is significant at the 1% level. This means that the workers who were 
insured through their employers or unions took 1.5 fewer day off than those who were not. The 
GMM estimate for this variable is the same. The Poisson GMM estimate is significant and negative 
at -0.479, which means that the number of days is reduced by 1.34 days9 (or 48% of the sample 
average) as a result of having insurance through the firm or union. The Poisson estimate may be 
more accurate than the 2SLS or GMM estimate because the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable of interest may be nonlinear (convex) and the Poisson 
                                                          
9 This number is equal to the average of 2.80 days times the Poisson GMM estimate. 
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model can capture the nonlinearity, whereas the linear models cannot and may lead to 
overestimation. 
Table 7.1.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Work Due to Sickness Using the Full 
Sample  
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM Pois GMM 
      
Insured via firm 0.571***  -1.456*** -1.451*** -0.479*** 
 (0.063)  (0.386) (0.385) (0.123) 
Male  -1.229*** 0.125*** -0.959*** -0.959*** -0.357*** 
 (0.059) (0.004) (0.075) (0.074) (0.026) 
Firm with >=100 employees 0.467*** 0.220*** 0.888*** 0.886*** 0.303*** 
 (0.063) (0.004) (0.098) (0.099) (0.032) 
Unionized 0.817*** 0.227*** 1.282*** 1.282*** 0.421*** 
 (0.102) (0.006) (0.121) (0.127) (0.040) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered insurance - -0.105*** - - - 
  (0.004)    
Spousal firm with >=100  employees  -0.079***    
  (0.004)    
Constant 4.870*** -0.030** 4.682*** 4.681*** 1.638*** 
 (0.228) (0.015) (0.216) (0.217) (0.072) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 446.86 - - - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 0.257 0.252 0.366 
  - (p=0.612) (p=0.616) (p=0.545) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM) - - 14.39 29.08 - 
 - - (p=0.0001) (p=0.0001) - 
Observations 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 
R-squared 0.016 0.158 - - - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 These negative values seem to suggest that employer-sponsored health insurance helped 
reduce absenteeism overall. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that employer-provided 
health insurance improves worker productivity. 
122 
 
Table 7.2 shows results obtained using Husband and Wife Samples, where h=Husband and 
w=Wife. The dependent variable is again the number of days a worker missed due to sickness. 
The OLS estimate using the Husband sample (Columns with h) is numerically small at 0.099 and 
insignificant even at the 10% level. In contrast, the estimate obtained using the Wife sample 
(Columns with w in Table 7.2) is 0.977 and significant at the 1% level. The positive estimates reflect 
the effects of endogeneity. 
Table 7.2.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Due to Sickness Using Husband and Wife 
Samples. h=Husband; w=Wife  
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) (4’) 
Variables OLS RSE 
(h) 
1st Stage (h) 2SLS (h) OLS RSE 
(w) 
1st Stage (w) 2SLS (w) 
       
Insured via firm 0.099  -1.405** 0.977***  -1.385*** 
 (0.080)  (0.604) (0.094)  (0.499) 
Firm with >=100 
employees  
0.237*** 0.219*** 0.548*** 0.703*** 0.221*** 1.194*** 
 (0.080) (0.006) (0.144) (0.097) (0.006) (0.135) 
Unionized 1.003*** 0.224*** 1.340*** 0.607*** 0.230*** 1.159*** 
 (0.130) (0.008) (0.167) (0.159) (0.009) (0.178) 
Excl. Instruments        
Spouse offered  -0.080***   -0.134***  
  (0.006)   (0.006)  
Spousal Firm 
w/ >=100 employees 
 -0.067***   -0.081***  
  (0.006)   (0.006)  
Constant 2.398*** 0.075*** 2.439*** 5.665*** -0.014 5.470*** 
 (0.281) (0.021) (0.270) (0.341) (0.021) (0.325) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
- 199.81 - - 207.96 - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J 
(GMM) 
- - 0.297 - - 0.904 
  - (p=0.586)   (p=0.342) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C 
(GMM) 
- - 3.19 - - 11.85 
  - (p=0.041)   (p=0.0001) 
Observations 28,673 28,673 28,673 30,769 30,769 30,769 
R-squared 0.012 0.138 - 0.017 0.140 - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies,  and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
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 The instruments pass the over-identifying test and the endogeneity test using both the 
Husband and the Wife samples. This is evidence that the instruments are valid (or evidence 
against the contrary). The second stage estimate for the through-firm insurance status variable 
that is obtained by using the Husband sample is -1.405 (50% of the sample average of 2.8) and 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Compared with the OLS estimate, this represents 
a 1.4 day reduction. The estimate using the Wife sample is -1.385 (49% of the sample average) 
and significant at the 1% level. The estimates for both samples are similar in magnitude and so 
the difference does not seem to be significant.  
 Results from the model regressing the number of Days Missed Work for Other Reasons 
on the Insured via firm variable using the whole sample are displayed in Table 7.3. The OLS 
estimate is positive at 0.175 (20% of the sample average) and statistically significant. When the 
variable is instrumented, the coefficient becomes negative (at around -0.6 or 70% of the sample 
average of 0.85), and significant at the 1% level, as shown by 2SLS results listed in Column (2’). 
The change from the positive OLS to the negative 2SLS estimate may imply that the explanatory 
variable through-firm insurance status indicator used in this model is endogenous. Column (3) and 
(4) list the GMM and the Poisson GMM results, respectively. Suppose that the instruments are 
valid and so are the estimates using instruments. Then the 2SLS estimate says having insurance 
through the firm would reduce the number days off work to care others by 0.6 day (roughly 70% 
of the sample average of 0.85) (the Poisson estimate implies 62% or a 0.52 day reduction). 
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Table 7.3.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Work for Other Reasons Using the Full 
Sample  
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM Pois GMM 
      
Insured via firm  0.175*** - -0.592*** -0.601*** -0.616*** 
 (0.025) - (0.154) (0.153) (0.148) 
Male  -0.344*** 0.125 -0.241*** -0.239*** -0.292*** 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) 
Firm with >=100 employees  0.0595** 0.220*** 0.219*** 0.223*** 0.235*** 
 (0.025) (0.004) (0.0393) (0.039) (0.039) 
Unionized 0.138*** 0.227*** 0.313*** 0.318*** 0.342*** 
 (0.039) (0.006) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered - -0.108*** - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - 
Spousal firm with  >=100 employees - -0.074*** - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - 
Constant 0.570*** -0.030** 0.498*** 0.493*** -0.872*** 
 (0.082) (0.015) (0.086) (0.079) (0.103) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 446.86 - - - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 7.43 7.27 5.74 
 - - (0.006) (P=0.007) (p=0.017) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM) - - 12.84 26.77 - 
 - - (p=0.0001) (p=0.0001) - 
Observations 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 
R-squared 0.014 0.158 - - - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies,  and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 However, the Sargan (Hansen’s J in the case of GMM) statistic is too large (so the 
associated p-value is too small). This raises issues with the instruments: the endogeneity problem 
is not completely solved by using the instruments. 
 Table 7.4 displays results obtained using the Husband and Wife samples. For both the 
Husband and wife samples, the OLS estimates are positive and significant: having health insurance 
through firms or unions encourages the insurance holders to take days off to care for others. The 
2SLS results are also significant but negative for both samples: after the selection issue has been 
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addressed, having health insurance through firms or unions actually discourages the insurance 
holders to take days off to care for others.  
Table 7.4.     Results from Regression #Days Missed Work for Other Reasons Using Husband 
and Wife Samples. h=Husband; w=Wife 
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) (4’) 
Variables OLS RSE 
(h) 
1st Stage  
(h) 
2SLS  
(h) 
OLS RSE 
(w) 
1st Stage 
(w) 
2SLS  
(w) 
       
Insured via firm 
(yes=1) 
0.158*** - -0.711*** 0.194*** - -0.518*** 
 (0.030) - (0.243) (0.038) - (0.200) 
Firm with >=100 
employees  
0.114*** 0.219*** 0.294*** 0.007 0.228*** 0.155*** 
 (0.032) (0.006) (0.058) (0.0384) (0.006) (0.054) 
Unionized 0.100** 0.224*** 0.295*** 0.196*** 0.234*** 0.362*** 
 (0.048) (0.008) (0.067) (0.064) (0.009) (0.071) 
Excl. Instruments        
Spouse offered - -0.0804*** - - -0.081*** - 
 - (0.006) - - (0.006) - 
Spousal Firm  >=100 
employees 
- -0.067*** - - -0.134*** - 
 - (0.006) - - (0.006) - 
Constant 0.583*** 0.075*** 0.606*** 0.347*** -0.059*** 0.288** 
 (0.101) (0.021) (0.109) (0.126) (0.021) (0.130) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
 199.81  - 207.96 - 
Sargan  - - 3.29 - 4.21 - 
 - - (p=0.074) - (p=0.040) - 
Hausman - - 6.66 - 6.64 - 
 - - (p=0.001) - (p=0.013) - 
Observations 28,673 28,673 28,673 30,769 30,769 30,769 
R-squared 0.016 0.157 - 0.010 0.140 - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies,  and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 But again, the Sargan statistics for the two samples suggest that the instruments do not 
pass the over-identifying restrictions at the 10% level and so they may not be valid in these models. 
Hence, the estimates using the instruments may not be accurate. If the significance level is limited 
126 
 
at 5%, the instruments can pass the test for the over-identifying restrictions when the Husband 
sample is used, but cannot when the wife sample is used. 
7.4.1.  Further Testing Using A Sample with Childless Adults 
 The relatively large Sargan (or Hansen’s J) statistics presented in Table 7.3 show that the 
model fails to pass the over-identifying restrictions. A possible cause for this failure is that the 
employment decisions by people with children are endogenous. To get around this problem, the 
analysis presented below utilizes a sample containing married individuals without children. 
Results obtained using this sample are shown in the tables below.  
 Table 7.5 presents results from the model where the dependent variable is the number 
of days a person missed work due to illness or injuries. The OLS estimate for the employer-
provided health insurance variable is still positive but no longer significant. This means that, for 
married people who do not have children, insuring through firms or unions does not affect the 
number of days they would take due to sickness or injuries. The 2SLS and GMM estimates tell that 
married workers without children would take 3 fewer days off if insured through firms or unions 
than otherwise. Given an average of 2.80 days off, the Poisson GMM estimate of -0.898 implies a 
slightly 2.50 fewer days ((89.8% of the sample average of 2.80). As before, the test statistics such 
as Sargan (or Hansen’s J), Hausman, and the first stage estimates show that there are no problems 
with the instruments.  Compared with the results shown in Table 7.1, these estimates seem to be 
a bit too large. One possible explanation is that childless people are a special group and may not 
be the same as people who have children. 
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Table 7.5.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Work Due to Sickness Using Sample 
Containing Childless Married Adults  
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM Pois GMM 
      
Insured via firm  0.157  -2.968*** -2.954*** -0.898*** 
 (0.133)  (1.062) (1.068) (0.324) 
Male  -0.911*** 0.090*** -0.629*** -0.636*** -0.228*** 
 (0.136) (0.009) (0.157) (0.162) (0.055) 
Firm with >=100 employees  0.613*** 0.208*** 1.228*** 1.208*** 0.400*** 
 (0.132) (0.008) (0.241) (0.244) (0.079) 
Unionized 1.161*** 0.247*** 1.941*** 1.958*** 0.630*** 
 (0.225) (0.012) (0.317) (0.326) (0.112) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered - -0.065*** - - - 
 - (0.009) - - - 
Spousal firm with  >=100 
employees 
- -0.080*** - - - 
 - (0.009) - - - 
Constant 4.351*** 0.168*** 4.696*** 4.662*** 1.464*** 
 (0.537) (0.034) (0.500) (0.511) (0.161) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 69.77 - - - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 1.79 1.70 1.84 
 - - (0.181) (P=0.192) (p=0.147) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM) - - 4.61   9.03   - 
 - - (p=0.010) (p=0.011) - 
Observations 12,161 12,161 12,161 12,161 12,161 
R-squared 0.022 0.128 - - - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region 
Dummies,    
              and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 Table 7.6 displays results from the model where the dependent variable is the number of 
days a person missed work for other reasons. Most notably, the OLS, 2SLS, GMM, and Poisson 
GMM estimates are all statistically insignificant! The Sargan (and Hansen’s J) statistic shows that 
the instruments pass the test for the over-identifying restrictions. The Hausman (or C) statistic is 
small; this can be interpreted as saying that the instrumental variables estimate is consistent with 
the OLS estimate.  
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Table 7.6.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Work for Other Reasons Using Sample 
Containing Childless Married Adults  
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM Pois GMM 
      
Insured via firm  0.071  -0.123 -0.129 -0.211 
 (0.047)  (0.363) (0.368) (0.578) 
Male  -0.213*** 0.090*** -0.196*** -0.193*** -0.344*** 
 (0.049) (0.009) (0.054) (0.058) (0.098) 
Firm with >=100 
employees  
0.036 0.208*** 0.074 0.071 0.123 
 (0.047) (0.008) (0.082) (0.083) (0.139) 
Unionized 0.107 0.247*** 0.156 0.163 0.276 
 (0.073) (0.012) (0.108) (0.113) (0.180) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered - -0.065*** - - - 
 - (0.009) - - - 
Spousal firm 
with  >=100 employees 
- -0.081*** - - - 
 - (0.009) - - - 
Constant -0.165 0.168*** -0.143 -0.130 -2.088*** 
 (0.161) (0.034) (0.171) (0.161) (0.324) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
- 69.77 - - - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 1.29 1.20 1.06 
 - - (0.255) (P=0.273) (p=0.302) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C 
(GMM) 
- - 0.144   0.278   - 
 - - (p=0.866) (p=0.870) - 
Observations 12,161 12,161 12,161 12,161 12,161 
R-squared 0.010 0.126 0.008 0.008 - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region Dummies,    
              and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 It is evident by looking at results in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 that the instruments meet 
these criteria. Alternatively interpreted, the instruments perform as intended. Thus, the 
hypothesis that they work universally (across the two models) has been falsified. Passing this 
falsification test reinforces the belief that the instruments are indeed valid. 
7.4.2. Alternative Specifications 
 Appropriate alternative specifications include the two-part model and the Poisson model. 
The two-part model is appropriate for situations where two types of decisions are involved; one 
129 
 
is a binary decision, which decides whether or not to takes days off, and the other is a quantitative 
decision, which determines how many days to take off. The context involved in taking days off 
does not quite fit the requirements for the two-part model, but the distribution of the disability 
days variables is very similar to the distribution require by the two-part model. In this sense, the 
two-part model is applicable. To work out the two-part model, define a binary decision variable 
that equals 1 if the worker took days off and 0 otherwise. Conceptually, after this decision has 
been made, the worker would decide to take how many days off. Hence, then the two-part model 
can be written as  
𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 1) = 𝜇0 + 𝜇1𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 + 𝑿𝒊𝝁𝟐 + 𝑖                                                                          (7.2.1′′) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑖|𝐷 = 1) = γ0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝐼𝐸𝑖 +𝑿𝒊𝜸𝟐 + 𝑖                                                              (7.2.1′′′) 
 𝐷 = 1 is equivalent to stating that the number of days the worker took off is greater than 
zero. For the variable measuring the number of days missed work for other reasons, the model 
has a similar form.  According to the distribution of the dependent variable, another suitable 
specification is the zero-inflated generalized Poisson model. Both the first and the second parts 
of these two-part models are estimated using the same instruments as those used to estimate 
the models presented earlier.  
 For the convenience of exposition, the results of the general Poisson (not the two-part) 
models are displayed in the same tables for results from linear specifications.  
 Table A7.1 in the Appendix presents Two-Part Model results for the days missed work due 
to sickness. Results for the variable measuring the number of days a person missed worked for 
other reasons are not presented. The estimate for the Insured via Firm variable from the first part 
of the ordinary Probit model is positive (the corresponding result obtained from the first part of 
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the IV Probit model is for reference only because the IV Probit procedure is not appropriate for 
the model with a binary endogenous variable). For the bivariate model (Bi Prob.), the estimate for 
the Insured via Firm variable is negative and significant. This result says that having health 
insurance through the firm or union decreases the likelihood a worker would take days off due to 
sickness. However, for all other models, including OLS, 2SLS, GMM and Poisson GMM, none of 
the results for the second part are significant. These results (excluding the OLS estimate which 
does not tell the true causal relationship) together state that having insurance through firms or 
unions only make workers less likely than otherwise to take days off but does not affect how many 
days the person would take once the decision has been made. In the present framework where 
having insurance through firms or unions is assumed to affect productivity, these results say that 
having health insurance through firms or unions influences productivity only by making workers 
less likely than otherwise to take sick leave.   
7.5. Conclusions 
 The nonnegative OLS estimate of the coefficient of the Through-firm insurance status 
indicator is consistent with the assumption that this explanatory variable is endogenous. The 
negative 2SLS and GMM results show that employer-sponsored health insurance actually reduces 
the number of days a person missed work due to sickness. This result is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that employer-sponsored health insurance may enhance worker 
productivity because reducing the number of days a person missed work due to sickness is 
equivalent to increasing productivity, everything else held constant. This conclusion is reinforced 
by the result from the falsification test that employer-sponsored health insurance also reduces 
the number of days a person missed work to care for others. These results provide evidence that 
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employer-sponsored health insurance tends to reduce absenteeism in the workplace that would 
happen either because workers are sick or because they want to take care of others.  An important 
implication of the results from the Husband and Wife samples is that married men do not utilize 
employer-provided health insurance as much as married women do or, alternatively, men may 
internalize health benefits to a much larger extent than women. 
 However, the above conclusions rest on the assumptions that the instruments are valid 
in the models. The first stage estimates for the instruments and test statistics from the second 
stage seem to provide evidence that the instruments are valid in certain cases. The first stage 
estimates for the two instrumental variables are all negative and significant, confirming the 
theoretical prediction of an inverse relationship. Moreover, the instruments pass the specification 
tests for some of the specifications. These results provide evidence that the instruments are valid. 
 The falsification test results using the main sample fail to falsify the assumptions about 
the instruments because when the two instruments are used in the regression for the variable 
measuring the number of days a worker missed work for other reasons, the estimate for the target 
variable differs from the OLS estimate. However, failure to falsify does not invalidate the 
instruments either, because it is not quite certain whether or not the instrumented variable is 
endogenous in this equation. Therefore, the instruments and the results obtained using them may 
still be valid. Further investigation using a sample with childless working adults shows that the 
instruments perform well in the main model where the dependent variable is the number of days 
a person missed work due to sickness, but does not do so in the model where the dependent 
variable is the number of days a person missed work for other reasons. This provides additional 
evidence for the validity of the instruments.   
  
132 
 
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
8.1. A Brief Review 
 In Chapter 1, I provided some basic facts about employer-sponsored health insurance in 
the United States. I then raised the questions of why firms offer health insurance, how firms’ 
insurance offering behavior affects the choice of their employees, and what are the fundamental 
forces behind firms’ behavior. The desire to answer these questions motivates this dissertation. 
Specifically, I put forward the productivity effect hypothesis as an alternative explanation about 
why firms offer health insurance.  In Chapter2, I reviewed prior theoretical work on this topic; this 
is the fundamental framework in which the models presented in later chapters are built. I also 
explored the technical conditions necessary for the desired equilibrium outcomes through 
numerical analysis. Finally, I pointed out the limitations of this theoretical framework and 
proposed potential extensions. In Chapter 3, I first built two models within the framework of prior 
research to study how productivity affects the firm’s decision, and then modified this framework 
to allow workers to remain uninsured. In Chapter 4, I constructed an alternative model to study 
cases where people face credit constraints.  
 In the empirical part of the dissertation, I showed in Chapter 5 how the data is constructed 
and proposed and examined possible instruments for health insurance coverage through one’s 
employer. In Chapter 6, I reviewed prior studies on instrumental variables, validated the proposed 
instruments through the wage regression, and selected the instrumental variables according to 
classic criteria. In Chapter 7, I first tested the main models without using instruments and obtained 
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OLS estimates for the variable representing employer-provided health insurance. Then I included 
the instruments in the model and obtained results that are different than those obtained without 
using instruments. I also split the data into the Husband and Wife samples and used these two 
samples to test the models. Finally, I explored alternative specifications such the two-part model.  
8.2. Theory 
 The theory part of the dissertation has attempted to provide (alternative) answers or at 
least partial answers to the questions why firms offer health insurance to their employees, why 
firms of different sizes offer different types or numbers of insurance plans, and why insurance 
offer rates and/or take-up rates vary across industries and/or occupations. If health insurance is 
just a cost to the firm or the firm merely serves as a pass-through, then the firm would not have 
enough incentive to take the trouble of offering health insurance in the first place, let alone the 
variety of types of insurance plans.  
 Prior studies, including Miller (2005), have provided explanations. One such explanation 
is that health insurance premiums are tax-deductible and therefore encourage firms to offer 
insurance and pay part of the premiums thereof, rather than pay higher wages to those 
employees who are willing to accept the insurance offers as long as they are not thus made worse 
off than they otherwise would. There are other explanations as well. For example, the issue 
associated with informational asymmetry is made less severe if insurance applications are 
handled through employers than directly by the insurance companies themselves and so an 
insurer can extract some information rent and share it with the firm; on the other hand, there 
would be an efficiency gain if the firm handles the insurance application process for all its 
employees who take up health insurance offered through the firm, rather than let each of these 
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employees do the same individually, and this efficiency gain can somehow be shared between the 
firm and its employees. While such explanations are reasonable and, theoretically speaking, 
cannot be refuted entirely, they do not seem to be adequate, because there is still variability in 
firms’ insurance offering behavior even after effects of the aforesaid factors have been accounted 
for.  
 The theory presented in the dissertation proposes an alternative explanation. It does so 
by assuming that health insurance influences worker productivity. This productivity impact 
hypothesis explains firm’s behavior for the part other factors may fail to explain: a firm may enroll 
more employees than old theories suggest. However, this theory is not intended to refute 
previous hypotheses, nor should it be interpreted as such. Rather, it is intended to address the 
same issue from a different, alternative perspective and to complement previous theories. 
Despite their differences, this theory and others generate consistent predictions, however.  
 To explore how health insurance may affect productivity, the dissertation proposes two 
models, as discussed in chapter 3. The first model is one where worker productivity depends on 
the type of health insurance only and does not change with the number of workers covered under 
each type of health insurance. The second assumes that worker productivity changes with one of 
the two insurance types and with the number of workers covered under that type, holding the 
productivity of the other insurance type fixed. The first can be loosely interpreted as depicting 
situations where health insurance alters individual worker productivity only. In contrast, the 
second is more about team productivity than it is about individual productivity. Nevertheless, 
their similarities outweigh their disparities when each is benchmarked against the base model, 
that is, Miller’s.  
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 In both the two models, the firm’s behavior is examined and equilibrium conditions are 
analyzed. In the first model, productivity plays the role of shifting the extra benefit function (or 
equivalently, shifting the premium cost curve in the opposite direction) relative to the case 
without productivity, thus changing the equilibrium outcome. In the second model, on the other 
hand, productivity not only shifts the extra benefit curve, but also tilts it; yet the equilibrium 
outcome is affected more by the shifting than by the tilting. As a consequence of the productivity 
effect, more (fewer) workers would be enrolled in the generous plan than the base model predicts 
if the effect is positive (negative) and if the resulting equilibrium is separating. Moreover, positive 
(negative) productivity effect may also increase the likelihood of a high-end (low-end) pooling if 
the base model equilibrium is separating.  
 Despite their advantages, all the models, including Miller’s, presumes one thing: all 
workers end up choosing either this or that health insurance plan and thus no one is uninsured. 
Assuming that every worker is insured is sometimes desirable, but not always so; nor is this 
assumption realistic. Realizing the inadequacy of these models, the dissertation moves one step 
forward to relax such a restriction, and proposes an alternative model where workers can choose 
to be uninsured to study the take-up decisions of workers. What differentiates this model from 
either of the models described earlier is not the number of plans the firm offers, but the choice 
that certain (risk-averse) workers may make to remain uninsured. Allowing for the possibility that 
individuals stay uninsured makes the model more closely mimic the real world; but this is not 
because people do not like health insurance, but rather because the profit-maximizing decision 
by the firm pushes them to the point where they would rather leave themselves unprotected 
against potential risk than be exploited by the firm. This suggests that the welfare distribution 
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may not be desirable, because for risk averse individuals, facing risk is a hard choice, especially 
when an alternative is available.  
 The productivity effect that health insurance may bring about and the possibility that 
people choose to stay uninsured even given an alternative choice are all studied in the framework 
where wages and health benefits are treated as equivalents for any given type of people. But 
realistically speaking, they may not always be equivalents. To explore the situations where wage 
benefits and health benefits are not equivalents, at least to some extent, the dissertation 
proposes a somewhat different modeling framework where workers are assumed to prefer wage 
benefits to some degree by requiring a reservation wage. This same framework can, not 
accidentally, be used to study the case where people face credit or liquidity constraints, for wages 
can be used to meet alternative needs but health benefits cannot. When the reservation wage 
constraints are imposed, the equilibrium conditions and so optimal outcomes potentially change; 
because optimality requires the firm to strike a tradeoff between wage and health insurance 
offers and because wage offer is bounded by the reservation wage from below, the health 
insurance offer has to be bounded from above. Hence, the optimal choice for the cutoff level of 
worker type is bounded above. However, the fundamental results remain the same that 
productivity effect shifts the optimal decision. 
 The dissertation has also analyzed the distribution of rents. In the two-plan models, the 
information rents accrue to workers except for the lowest-cost ones in all types of equilibria, be 
it separating, low-end pooling, or high-end pooling; so the firm extracts no rents. But efficiency 
differs between pooling and separating equilibria; any pooling equilibrium, either low-end or high-
end, is Pareto-efficient, whereas a separating one is not. A pooling equilibrium is Pareto-efficient 
because there is no (informational) distortion or no deadweight loss in the allocation process; 
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when the equilibrium is pooling, the only difference between the full-information and the 
asymmetric-information cases is in the distribution of rents: the firm would extract all rents and 
so workers get nothing if information is symmetric or perfect, and the opposite would be true if 
information is asymmetric. A separating equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient because “separating” or 
“cutting in the middle” involves a deadweight loss, which results from informational distortion: 
when the equilibrium is separating, the firm has to pay something similar to a “transfer” cost, 
which no one receives.  
 In the one-plan model without reservation constraint, all workers except the lowest-cost 
ones would take all information rents if the equilibrium is high-end pooling (where all workers are 
covered) and so the firm extracts nothing; the firm would extract all rents if the equilibrium is low-
end pooling, but if the equilibrium is separating, the firm and workers with health cost above the 
cutoff level would receive rents and all other workers wouldn’t. In the model with reservation 
wage constraint, workers would receive rents even if the equilibrium is low-end pooling because 
their reservation wage is above their reservation utility, but there is no difference regarding 
distribution of rents for other types of equilibria. As for efficiency, there is no difference between 
the one-plan models and the two-plan ones: any pooling equilibrium is Pareto-efficient and any 
separating is not.  
 The dissertation also briefly explains how health insurance can improve productivity. It 
does so by citing arguments and evidence from prior research. First, health insurance may 
somehow help improve human capital and thus enhance productivity; second, having health 
insurance ultimately enhances a worker’s well-being and morale, thus boosting productivity. Third, 
having health insurance is associated with improving worker rights and thus, through some 
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mechanism, enhances productivity. Prior empirical studies imply that health insurance has a 
(dynamic) positive effect on worker productivity. 
 In the appendices, the dissertation presents an efficiency model to analyze how the firm’s 
optimal decision would be affected and what the equilibrium outcomes would become when 
wage influences worker productivity. In addition, the dissertation also presents another one-plan 
model to examine the firm’s alternative decision making mechanism. In this model, the firm is 
assumed to manipulate the proportion of premium cost it bears, rather than wage, to affect the 
choice of its employees. This model provides a simple but different way to look at firm’s decision 
and to investigate the technical requirements for the benefit function of health insurance. Such 
technical requirements include but are not limited to the convexity and slope of the health benefit 
curve. Sensible equilibrium outcomes require that the convexity and slope meet certain 
conditions. Furthermore, numerical analyses for the Miller model and for the one-plan model as 
presented in the appendixes have shown that equilibrium outcomes depend on the specific forms 
of the (excess) benefit of the (generous) insurance plan and on the distribution functions for the 
worker type. 
8.3. Empirics 
 If health insurance affects productivity, how does it do so empirically? The dissertation 
has, in its empirics part, provided an answer to this question by using absenteeism at the 
workplace as a proxy for (negative) productivity. If health insurance influences productivity, it can 
do so by affecting absenteeism. If it improves productivity, then it would discourage absenteeism; 
the opposite would hold true if it hinders productivity. Alternatively, if it does have any impact on 
productivity, then its association with absenteeism would be weak or even nonexistent. While 
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this variable is not a perfect measure of productivity, it should serve the purpose to a considerable 
extent, for otherwise firms wouldn’t care about or would even encourage absenteeism. But then, 
if health insurance can manifest its impact on productivity in data by influencing absenteeism at 
the workplace, what does the data tell about their relationship? Finding an answer to this 
question is the major task of the empirics part of the dissertation. 
 The dissertation utilizes the MEPS data for its empirical analysis. Why MEPS? First and 
foremost, this data contains the necessary information for analyzing the empirical relationship 
between absenteeism at the workplace and employer-sponsored health insurance, but any other 
publicly available data does not have all the required information. Second, the MEPS data is 
readily available. Like most other public data sources, the MEPS does not require authorization or 
approval and so is easy to access at any time.  Third, the data is rather clean and well structured, 
and so does not require much additional work.   
 To identify the causal relationship between the productivity proxy variable and the 
employer-sponsored health insurance variable, I have taken advantage of a few relevant spousal 
variables as instruments for the potentially endogenous variable representing employer-
sponsored health insurance. To get a sense of whether and how well each spousal variable can 
serve as an instrument, the dissertation has, in its data chapter, shown the statistical association 
between each pair of the relevant variables and relevant statistics that measure the strength of 
such association. Then, by using a more rigorous method, the dissertation has investigated the 
validity and strength of instruments by looking at relevant statistics.  It turns out that two of the 
three instruments are valid and the strongest. These two instruments include the variable 
indicating whether the spouse was offered health insurance through his or her own employer and 
the variable measuring the size of the firm the spouse worked. 
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 With instruments chosen, the dissertation moves forward to analyze the model testing 
the relationship between the productivity proxy variable absenteeism and the variable 
representing employer-sponsored health insurance. But before jumping to the analysis using 
instrumental variables, the dissertation has first examined the association between the 
absenteeism due to sickness or injury and the variable representing employer-sponsored health 
insurance, with all controls included but without the instruments. The result shows a positive 
association, as expected. This implies that employer-sponsored health insurance harms 
productivity. However, this positive number may result from labor market selection or moral 
hazard or both. Labor market selection means that people with certain unobservable 
characteristics are more likely both to choose jobs offered with health insurance and to take sick 
days off. Moral hazard means that once insured through their employers, workers will over-utilize 
the insurance. Each of the two factors pushes up the measure of the association between the two 
variables and makes it positive in the end.  
 Then, by utilizing instruments with advanced econometric techniques, the dissertation 
has found that the measure of the association between absenteeism due to sickness or injury and 
the employer-provided insurance status indicator variable becomes negative but is still significant. 
This result supports the hypothesis that employer-sponsored health insurance improves worker 
productivity because the relationship between absenteeism due to sickness or injury and 
productivity is negative. By using different specifications and different data sets, the dissertation 
has shown that this negative relationship is robust. However, results obtained from the two-part 
model seem to suggest that employer-provided health insurance only affects the decision about 
whether to take days off or not, and does not influence the decision about how many days to take. 
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This, however weird it may seem, is coincidentally or otherwise consistent with one of the 
theoretical assumptions that health insurance shifts productivity.  
 Separately using the Husband and the Wife data, the dissertation has found another 
couple of several results. First health insurance does not seem to affect absenteeism due to 
sickness or injury for married male workers, but deteriorates it for married female workers before 
selection or moral hazard effect is removed. Second, health insurance reduces absenteeism due 
to sickness or injury for both married men and married women after selection or moral hazard 
effect is purged. Third, the overall impact of health insurance on absenteeism due to sickness or 
injury is more or less the same for both married men and married women. To further check the 
validity of the instruments, the dissertation has conducted a “falsification” test on the instruments 
by checking whether using the instruments changes the relationship between the variable 
absenteeism for other reasons and the same endogenous variable representing employer-
sponsored health insurance relative to the relationship without using the instruments. The 
dissertation has found that, when a sample containing individuals both with and without children 
is used, using the instruments does not significantly change the association between the two 
variables relative, but when a sample containing only childless people, using the instruments does 
change the association. While causing a significant change in the association does not disprove 
the validity of the instruments, an insignificant change is expected so that the instruments can be 
falsified as invalid in this case. 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER II 
 
 
A2.1. Tables 
 
 
Table A2.1.     Values of Model Parameters 
Parameters Values Remarks 
   
𝜶 0.75 All cases 
𝜸 100 All cases 
Tax rate t 0.25 All cases 
Table A2.2.     Distributions of Worker Types 
Probability Density Function f(c) Values Remarks 
1
𝑏 − 𝑎
 
𝑏 = 𝛾; 𝑏 = 0 Uniform  
𝐴𝑒𝐵𝑐
1 − 𝑒𝐵𝛾
 
𝐴 = 0.1; 𝐵 = −0.1 Truncated Exponential 
𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2) 𝜇 = 25,50,75; 𝜎 = 20 Truncated Normal 
 
  
147 
 
Table A2.3.    Excess Benefit Functions, Distributions, and Equilibria 
g(c) f(c) cg
∗ Equilibrium Remarks 
 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.04𝑐)
− 𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.02𝑐) 
1
𝛾 − 0
 
89.90 Separating Increasing, Convex 
𝑔′(0) < 1 − 𝛼 
𝑔(𝛾) > (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 0.1𝑒−0.1𝑐
1 − 𝑒−0.1𝛾
 
84.90 Separating 
𝑁(25, 202) 74.70 Separating 
𝑁(50, 202) 76.90 Separating 
𝑁(75, 202) 83.30 Separating 
 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.0375𝑐)
− 𝑒𝑥𝑝(0.0350𝑐) 
1
𝛾 − 0
 
100 Low-end Pooling Increasing, Convex 
𝑔′(0) < 1 − 𝛼 
𝑔(𝛾) < (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 0.1𝑒−0.1𝑐
1 − 𝑒−0.1𝛾
 
100 Low-end Pooling 
𝑁(25, 202) 100 Low-end Pooling 
𝑁(50, 202)   
𝑁(75, 202) 100 Low-end Pooling 
 
0.5𝑐2 + 0.8𝑐 
1
𝛾 − 0
 
66.50 Separating Increasing, Convex 
𝑔′(0) > 1 − 𝛼 
𝑔(𝛾) < (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 0.1𝑒−0.1𝑐
1 − 𝑒−0.1𝛾
 
19.60 Separating 
𝑁(25, 202) 34.80 Separating 
𝑁(50, 202) 43.80 Separating 
𝑁(75, 202) 65.20 Separating 
 
 
8 + 0.05𝑐 
1
𝛾 − 0
 
100 Low-end Pooling  
Increasing, Concave 
𝑔′(0) < 1 − 𝛼 
𝑔(𝛾) > (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 
 
0.1𝑒−0.1𝑐
1 − 𝑒−0.1𝛾
 
0 High-end Pooling 
𝑁(25, 202) 0 High-end Pooling 
𝑁(50, 202) 36.10 Separating 
𝑁(75, 202) 100 Low-end Pooling 
 
 
4ln (1 + 0.15𝑐) 
1
𝑟 − 0
 
100 Low-end Pooling  
Increasing, Concave 
𝑔′(0) > 1 − 𝛼 
𝑔(𝛾) > (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 
 
0.1𝑒−0.1𝑐
1 − 𝑒−0.1𝛾
 
14.40 Separating 
𝑁(25, 202) 25.30 Separating 
𝑁(50, 202) 100 Low-end Pooling 
𝑁(75, 202) 100 Low-end Pooling 
10 − 0.05𝑐 1
𝑟 − 0
 
27.80 Reversed 
Separating 
Decreasing, 
Concave 
𝑔′(0) < 0 
𝑔(𝛾) < (1 − 𝛼)𝛾 
 
0.1𝑒−0.1𝑐
1 − 𝑒−0.1𝛾
 
21.10 Reversed 
Separating 
𝑁(25, 202) 29.70 Reversed 
Separating 
𝑁(50, 202) 32.70 Reversed 
Separating 
𝑁(75, 202) 33.20 Reversed 
Separating 
Note: 1) (𝜇, 202) represents a (truncated) normal density with mean 𝜇 and standard deviation of 20. 
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 Table A2.3 shows the relationships among the excess benefit functions, the distributions 
of worker types, and the resulting equilibria. It can be concluded from the results listed in the 
table that when the excess benefit functions are increasing and convex, the types of equilibria are 
robust to the distributional assumptions, but when the excess benefit functions are increasing 
and concave, the types of equilibria may change with the distributions. Another noticeable point 
is that when the excess benefit function is decreasing and concave, the separating equilibrium is 
reversed: workers with costs higher than the cut-off level are enrolled in the moderate plan, 
whereas those with costs lower than the cut-off level are covered under the generous plan. 
A2.2. Matlab Codes 
See A3.2.1. Matlab Code Excluduing the Part for the Productivity Model 
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APPENDIX B 
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER III 
 
 
A3.1. Graphical Analysis of Productivity Effects on Wages and Equilibria  
 This graphical analysis has two major purposes. The first IS to show how the productivity 
effect of health insurance affects the wage associated with the insuranc eplan; the second is to 
illustrate how hthe productivity effect of health insurance affects a equilibirum. For simplicity, the 
one-plan model is used. For the examples below, the firm is assumed to bear 75% of the expected 
health insurance cost (α = 0.75), the tax rate is 25% (t = 0.25, and) and  𝛾 is equal to 100. 
 Let wmK =
wm
1−t
=
wu
1−t
− δ[1 − F(c)] −
m(cm)
1−t
[1 − F(c)] denote the pre-tax wage paid to 
insured workers given productivity differential δ, where K indicates whether  δ is positive, zero, 
or negative. Suppose the health benefit funciton m(c)  used here takes a quadratic form as 
follows: 
m(c) = Ac2 + Bc 
where A ≥ 0 and B ≥ 0. The coefficients affect the decisions of the firm. “Wage”, “Wage-“, and 
“Wage+“, as shown in Figure A3.1 and Figure A3.3, represent the equilbirum wages paid to 
insured workers in the cases where employer-provided health insurance has no productivity, 
negative productivity and positive productivity effects, respectively. It is evident that when health 
insurance has an effect on producitivty, the wage required for all insured workers except the most 
risky ones  is lower than otherwise. Moreover, the wage curves decline intially and rise after they 
reach a minimum lelel; the three curves converge at the terminal 𝒄 = γ = 100.  
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 Figure  A3.1.     Wages Paid to Insured Workers when 𝐦(𝐜) = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝐜𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝐜 
 
 Figure A3.2 and Figure A3.4 illustrate the profit curves under the three scenarios, where 
“p+” representsthe profit with positive productivity effect, “p” the profit with no productivity 
effect, and “p-“ the profit with negative productivity effect. 
 Figure  A3.2.     Profits Earned by Firm when 𝐦(𝐜) = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝐜𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏𝐜 
 
 In Figure 3.2, the profit curve under any of the three scenarios reaches its maximum 
before the limit of the expected health insurance cost c (𝒄 = γ = 100)  is reached. Hence a 
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separating equilibrium eixsts where the optimal cut-off satisfies 0 < 𝒄 < 𝛾 = 100. This illustrates 
that, even if health insurance has a postive effect on worker productivty, the nature of the 
equilibirum does not change, though the equilibrium (optimal cut-off) point is shifted leftward, 
increasing the number of insured workers. 
 Figure  A3.3.     Wages Paid to Insured Workers for 𝐦(𝐜) = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓𝐜𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓𝐜 
 
 Figure A3.4 illustrates a case where the euilibrium low-end pooling under the scenario 
where health insurance does not have an effect on worker productivity: the profit curve under 
this scenario always rise and reach its maximum at the terminal where 𝒄 = γ = 100. Under the 
scenario where health boosts productivty, profit function, the profit curve reaches its maximum 
at 𝑐 = 93.5, so the equlibrium is separating. This shows that positive productivrty effect may 
change the equilibirum from low-end pooling to separating. The negativ productivity does not 
change the nature of the equilibirum, though it raises the optimal cutoff, thereby redducing the 
numbe rof insured workers. 
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 Figure A3.4. Profits Earned by Firm when 𝐦(𝐜) = 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓𝐜𝟐 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟎𝟓𝐜 
   
 The above figures illustrate that the productivity of health insurance and the health 
benefit functions affect wages paid to insured workers as well the nature of equilibrium.  
The following table summarizes the effects of worker productivity resulting from employer-
provided health insurance on the type of equilibrium. 
 Table A3.1. Effects of Worker Productivity of Health Insurance on Equilibria 
m(c) f(c) 𝛿 cm
∗  Equilibrium Remarks 
0.01𝑐2 + 0.01𝑐 1
𝛾 − 0
 
0 85.4 Separating Nature of equilibrium is not affected 
20 79.1 Separating 
-5 86. Separating 
 
0.005𝑐2 + 0.005𝑐 
1
𝛾 − 0
 
 
0 100 Low-end pooling Nature of equilibrium is affected 
20 93.5 Separating 
-5 100 Low-end pooling 
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A3.2. Matlab Codes 
A3.2.1. Matlab Code for Section 3.2 and Section 3.3  
clear 
gamma=100; 
alpha=0.75; 
delta0=0; 
deltap=2.25; 
%deltan=-5; 
e=20; 
t=0.25; 
Wm=15; 
syms x c  
 
%Define a uniform pdf; 
 
fc=unifpdf(c,0,gamma); 
F =int(fc,0,c); %CDF; 
gc=exp(0.035*c)-exp(0.018*c);  
dgc=diff(gc,c,1);  
gcc=gc-dgc*(1-F)/fc;  
dgcf=dgc*(1-F)/fc; 
ic=(1-alpha)*c; 
delta=deltap+0.00035*c^2; 
delta2=0+sqrt((1-F)/fc/gamma)+0.5*1/((1-F)/fc/gamma)*(1-
c/gamma)+0.00035*c^2; %productivity changes with c; 
 
cg=0:0.1:gamma; %define and assign values to cg; 
gc_=subs(gc,c,cg); % replace c with cg;  
dgc_=subs(dgc,c,cg);  
dgcf_=subs(dgcf,c,cg);  
ic_=subs(ic,c,cg);  
gcc_=subs(gcc,c,cg);  
delta_=subs(delta,c,cg);  
delta2_=subs(delta2,c,cg);  
gct=gc_/(1-t);;  
gcta=gcc_/(1-t);  
gctap=gcc_/(1-t)+delta_;  
gctap2=gcc_/(1-t)+delta2_;  
hc=gcta; %redefine a new function; 
hold on 
  
figure 
plot(cg,ic_,'r',cg,gc_,'g','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
ylim([-10 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('function of c'); 
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title('Figure 2.1') 
text(101,25,'(1-a)c','FontSize',10) %add text to the graph 
text(101,28,'g(c)','FontSize',10)  
text(97,23.5,'A','FontSize',10) 
  
figure 
plot(cg,ic_,'r',cg,gc_,'g',cg,gct,'b','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
ylim([-10 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('function of c'); 
title('Figure 2.2') 
text(101,25,'(1-a)c','FontSize',10)  
text(101,28,'g(c)','FontSize',10)  
text(84,34,'g(c)/(1-t)','FontSize',10) 
text(97,23.5,'A','FontSize',10) 
text(85,23,'B','FontSize',10) 
  
figure 
plot(cg,ic_,'r',cg,gc_,'g',cg,gct,'b',cg,gcta,'k','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
ylim([-10 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('function of c'); 
title('Figure 2.3') 
text(101,25,'(1-a)c','FontSize',10)  
text(101,28,'g(c)','FontSize',10)  
text(84,34,'g(c)/(1-t)','FontSize',10) 
text(101,34,'h(c)','FontSize',10) 
text(97,23.5,'A','FontSize',10) 
text(85,23,'B','FontSize',10) 
text(92,25,'C','FontSize',10) 
  
%Productivity model 
figure 
plot(cg,ic_,'r',cg,gcta,'k','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
ylim([-10 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('function of c'); 
 
title('Figure 3.1') 
text(101,25,'(1-a)c','FontSize',10)  
text(101,34,'h(c)','FontSize',10) 
text(95.5,23,'C','FontSize',10) 
  
figure 
plot(cg,ic_,'r',cg,gcta,'k',cg,gctap,'m','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
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ylim([-10 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('function of c'); 
title('Figure 3.2') 
text(101,25,'(1-a)c','FontSize',10)  
text(101,34,'h(c)','FontSize',10) 
text(90,34,'p(c)','FontSize',10) 
text(95.5,23,'C','FontSize',10) 
text(89,24,'D','FontSize',10) 
  
figure 
plot(cg,ic_,'r',cg,gcta,'k',cg,gctap2,'m','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
ylim([-10 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('function of c'); 
title('Figure 3.3') 
text(101,25,'(1-a)c','FontSize',10)  
text(101,34,'h(c)','FontSize',10) 
text(90,34,'q(c)','FontSize',10) 
text(95.5,23,'C','FontSize',10) 
text(90,24.25,'E','FontSize',10) 
  
hold off 
  
A3.2.2.  Matlab Code for Appendix A3.1 
 
clear 
gamma=100; 
alpha=0.75; 
delta0=0; 
deltap=20; 
deltan=-5; 
e=60; 
MaxIter=50; 
t=0.25; 
Wu=15; 
syms x  
c=0:0.1:gamma; 
[rc,dimc]=size(c); 
    cm=0:0.1:gamma; 
    mc=zeros(rc,dimc)+NaN;  
    Wm0=zeros(rc,dimc)+NaN; 
    Wmp=zeros(rc,dimc)+NaN; 
    Wmn=zeros(rc,dimc)+NaN; 
    ic=zeros(rc,dimc)+NaN; 
    %Define a uniform pdf; 
    p = unifcdf(cm,0,gamma); 
 
for ik=1:dimc 
    mc(:,ik)=0.01*(cm(:,ik)^2+0.01*cm(:,ik));  
    %mc(:,ik) =0.005*(cm(:,ik)^2+0.005*cm(:,ik));  
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    Wm0(:,ik)=Wu/(1-t)-(1-p(:,ik))*delta0-(1-p(:,ik))*mc(:,ik)/(1-t); 
    Wmp(:,ik)=Wu/(1-t)-(1-p(:,ik))*deltap-(1-p(:,ik))*mc(:,ik)/(1-t); 
    Wmn(:,ik)=Wu/(1-t)-(1-p(:,ik))*deltan-(1-p(:,ik))*mc(:,ik)/(1-t); 
end; 
  
profit0=e-Wm0-ic; 
profitp=e-Wmp-ic; 
profitn=e-Wmn-ic; 
  
hold on 
 
figure 
plot(cm,Wm0,cm,Wmp,cm,Wmn,'LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
ylim([-5 40]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('Wage'); 
title('Figure A3.1'); 
text(20,23,'Wage-','FontSize',10)  
text(20,15,'Wage','FontSize',10)  
text(20,3.75,'Wage+','FontSize',10)  
  
figure 
plot(cm,profit0,'k',cm,profitp,'g',cm,profitn,'r','LineWidth',1.0); 
box off 
xlim([0 110]); 
%ylim([-5 50]); 
xlabel('c'); 
ylabel('Profit'); 
title('Figure A3.2') 
text(20,24,'p+','FontSize',10)  
text(20,9,'p','FontSize',10)  
text(20,1,'p-','FontSize',10) 
  
hold off 
 
%maximize profit function with no productivity; 
[maxpi0,index]=max(profit0); 
maxpi_0=double(maxpi0) 
display('Maximizing cm_0'); 
display(cm(index)) 
%maximize profit function with positive productivity; 
[maxpip,index]=max(profitp); 
maxpi_p=double(maxpip) 
display('Maximizing cm_p'); 
display(cm(index)) 
%maximize profit function with negative productivity; 
[maxpin,index]=max(profitn); 
maxpi_p=double(maxpin) 
display('Maximizing cm_n'); 
display(cm(index)) 
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A3.3. Calculation of Profits for the One-plan Model 
 The total profit function is 
e −
wu
1 − t
+ δ∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
− α∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
+
m(cm
∗ )
1 − t
∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
 
which can be expressed as 
e −
wu
1 − t
+ δ(1 − F(cm
∗ )) − α∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
+
m(cm
∗ )
1 − t
(1 − F(cm
∗ )) 
 The term ∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗  can be calculated through integration by parts as follows: 
∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= [c2f(c)]cm∗
γ
−∫ cd[cf(c)
γ
cm
∗
] 
∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= [c2f(c)]cm∗
γ
−∫ c[f(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
+ cdf(c)] 
∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= [c2f(c)]cm∗
γ
−∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
−∫ cdf(c)
γ
cm
∗
 
2∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= [c2f(c)]cm∗
γ
−∫ cdf(c)
γ
cm
∗
 
2∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= [c2f(c)]cm∗
γ
− [cf(c)]cm∗
γ
+∫ f(c)d
γ
cm
∗
c 
2∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= [c2f(c)]cm∗
γ
− [cf(c)]cm∗
γ
+ [F(c)]cm∗
γ
 
2∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= γ2f(γ) − 𝑐m
∗2f(cm
∗ ) − [γf(γ) − cm
∗ f(cm
∗ )] + [1 − F(cm
∗ )] 
2∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= (γ − 1)γf(γ) − (cm
∗ − 1)cm
∗ f(cm
∗ ) + [1 − F(cm
∗ )] 
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Hence, 
∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
=
1
2
{(γ − 1)γf(γ) − (cm
∗ − 1)cm
∗ f(cm
∗ ) + [1 − F(cm
∗ )]} 
A3.4. An Efficiency Wage Model 
 Suppose productivity changes continuously with the wages offered to workers, rather 
than varies with health insurance plans. Specifically, assume worker productivity is an increasing, 
continuous function of wages. Let 𝑒(𝑤𝑘)(where 𝑘 = 𝑚, 𝑔) denote the productivity as a function 
of the relevant wage, and assume 𝑒′(𝑤𝑘) > 0. Informational asymmetry or anti-discriminatory 
policy forces the firm to offer an equal wage to all workers who choose the same health insurance. 
Then, using the same notations and functions as before, the firm’s problem can be expressed as 
follows.   
 max
0≤𝑤𝑚,0≤𝑤𝑔 
∫ (𝑒(𝑤𝑚) −
𝑤𝑚
1−𝑡
− 𝛼𝑐) 𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐 + ∫ (𝑒(𝑤𝑔) −
𝑤𝑔
1−𝑡
− 𝑐)𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
𝑐𝑔
𝑐𝑔
0
 
𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐) ≥ 𝑢 
𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐𝑔) + 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) ≥ 𝑢 
𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐𝑔) + 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐𝑔) 
 The first is the participation constraint for workers who would elect the moderate plan, 
the second is the participation constraint for those who would choose the generous plan, and the 
third is the incentive-compatibility constraint. These constraints do not need to hold 
simultaneously. The first is required only if at least some workers are to be enrolled in the 
moderate plan and the second is needed only if at least some workers choose the generous plan. 
If the first holds, then the second constraint is redundant because it is implied by the first and the 
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last. But if the second holds, the first does not necessarily hold. Suppose the first holds now. So 
the second is redundant and can be removed. If the first constraint holds for all workers then it 
must hold for the lowest-cost ones, who have zero cost. On the other hand, as long as it holds for 
the lowest-cost workers, it must hold for all, because 𝑚(𝑐)  is non-decreasing in c. The last 
constraint can be written as 𝑤𝑔 + 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) ≥ 𝑤𝑚. Hence the firm’s problem can be re-written as 
 max
0≤𝑤𝑚,0≤𝑤𝑔 
∫ (𝑒(𝑤𝑚) −
𝑤𝑚
1−𝑡
− 𝛼𝑐) 𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐 + ∫ (𝑒(𝑤𝑔) −
𝑤𝑔
1−𝑡
− 𝑐)𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
𝑐𝑔
𝑐𝑔
0
 
𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) ≥ 𝑢 
𝑤𝑔 + 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) ≥ 𝑤𝑚 
 The difference between this model and the any of the two plan models presented in 
Chapter 3 is that the optimal wage associated with the generous plan may not be lower than the 
optimal wage associated with the moderate plan, because here wage boosts productivity whereas 
in the models presented earlier, wage does not.  
 By continuity, there exists a smallest 𝑐  that can make the incentive-compatibility 
constraint hold with equality, i.e., 𝑤𝑔 +𝑚(𝑐𝑔) + 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) = 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐𝑔). This implies 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) =
𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔, so 𝑐𝑔 = 𝑔
−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔). Hence the firm’s problem can be re-written as  
max
0≤𝑤𝑔<𝑤𝑚 
∫ (𝑒(𝑤𝑚) −
𝑤𝑚
1−𝑡
− 𝛼𝑐) 𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐 + ∫ (𝑒(𝑤𝑔) −
𝑤𝑔
1−𝑡
− 𝑐)𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔)
𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔)
0
  
𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) ≥ 𝑢 
It is important to note that both the two wage variables are endogenous. Moreover, the 
(participation) constraint may or may not be both binding.   
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 Suppose first that the constraint is binding (for lowest-cost workers), i.e., 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(0) =
𝑢 , so 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0), which says  𝑤𝑚  is fixed; given 𝑔(𝑐𝑔) = 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔  and 𝑤𝑚  is constant, 
there is one to one mapping between 𝑐𝑔 and 𝑤𝑔.The problem is therefore the same as what is 
presented in Chapter 3 but the optimality conditions are the same as well. There are three 
possible equilibria, including high-end pooling, in which case 𝑐𝑔 = 0, so 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑤𝑔 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0); 
low-end pooling, in which case 𝑐𝑔 = 𝛾, so 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 ≥ 𝑔(𝛾), and 𝑤𝑚 = 𝑢 −𝑚(0); and separating, 
in which case 0 < 𝑐𝑔 < 𝛾, so 0 < 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 < 𝑔(𝛾). The profit that the firm would obtain under 
each type of equilibrium can be respectively calculated as follows. 
𝜋ℎ𝑝(𝑤𝑚=𝑢−𝑚(0)) = 𝑒(𝑢 −𝑚(0)) −
𝑢 −𝑚(0)
1 − 𝑡
− ∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
0
 
𝜋𝑙𝑝(𝑤𝑚=𝑢−𝑚(0)) = 𝑒(𝑢 −𝑚(0)) −
𝑢 −𝑚(0)
1 − 𝑡
− 𝛼∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
0
 
𝜋𝑠𝑝(𝑤𝑚=𝑢−𝑚(0)) = 
[𝑒(𝑢 − 𝑚(0)) −
𝑢−𝑚(0)
1−𝑡
] 𝐹(𝑐𝑔) − 𝛼 ∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝑐𝑔
0
+ [𝑒(𝑤𝑔) −
𝑤𝑔
1−𝑡
] [1 − 𝐹(𝑐𝑔)] − ∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
𝑐𝑔
.  
where ℎ𝑝 stands for high-end pooling, 𝑙𝑝 for low-end pooling, and 𝑠𝑝 for separating equilibrium.  
Comparing the three profit expressions pairwise reveals that, while it is not certain whether the 
profit under separating equilibrium is greater than the profit under high-end pooling equilibrium, 
it is obvious that the profit under low-end pooling equilibrium exceeds the profit under any of the 
other two equilibria, given that the productivity function is rising in wage. Therefore, the firm’s 
optimal decision is to set the wage for the moderate plan at 𝑢 −𝑚(0) and the wage for the 
generous plan as low as  𝑢 −𝑚(0) − 𝑔(𝛾) or even lower, thus pooling all its workers into the 
moderate plan. 
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 The above analysis assumes the participation constraint is binding, but that does not need 
to be the case.  
 Suppose, alternatively, the constraint is not binding, i.e., 𝑤𝑚 +𝑚(𝑐) > 𝑢 . Then the 
problem becomes one of unconstrained maximization. The first order conditions (FOC) can 
therefore be derived as 
(𝑒′(𝑤𝑚) −
1
1−𝑡
)𝐹 (𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔)) + (𝑒(𝑤𝑚) −
𝑤𝑚
1−𝑡
− 𝛼𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔))
𝑓(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔)
𝑔′(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔) 
−
(𝑒(𝑤𝑔) −
𝑤𝑔
1−𝑡
− 𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔))
𝑓(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔)
𝑔′(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔) 
≤ 0                                  (1) 
(𝑒′(𝑤𝑔) −
1
1−𝑡
) (1 − 𝐹 (𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔))) + (𝑒(𝑤𝑔) −
𝑤𝑔
1−𝑡
− 𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −
𝑤𝑔))
𝑓(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔)
𝑔′(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔) 
− (𝑒(𝑤𝑚) −
𝑤𝑚
1−𝑡
− 𝛼𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔))
𝑓(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔)
𝑔′(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔) 
≤ 0             (2) 
 The inequalities hold if and only if the respective wage is zero and the equalities hold if 
and only the respective wage is positive.  
 Adding the two inequalities and simplifying yields  
(𝑒′(𝑤𝑚) − 𝑒′(𝑤𝑔)) 𝐹(𝑐𝑔) + (𝑒′(𝑤𝑔) −
1
1 − 𝑡
) ≤ 0                                                           (3) 
where 𝑐𝑔 = 𝑔
−1(𝑤𝑚 − 𝑤𝑔). Note that if 𝑐𝑔 = 0, then equation (3) becomes 𝑒′(𝑤𝑔) −
1
1−𝑡
≤ 0, 
and if 𝑐𝑔 = 𝛾, it becomes 𝑒′(𝑤𝑚) −
1
1−𝑡
≤ 0. Under reasonable assumptions, under reasonable 
assumptions about the reservation utility and the health benefit of the moderate plan for the 
lowest-cost workers, because the participation constraint would be violated; even if no such 
assumptions are made, the solution still is trivial and is not worth analyzing, the solution 𝑤𝑚 =
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𝑤𝑔 = 0 can be ruled out. Therefore, equations (1), (2) and (3) hold with equalities. Equation (3) 
holding with equality can be solved for special cases.  
(1) If 𝑤𝑚 ≤ 𝑤𝑔, then 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 ≤ 0, so 𝑔
−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔) ≤ 𝑔
−1(0); hence 𝑐𝑔 = 0 because 𝑐𝑔 = 0 
is the smallest value 𝑐𝑔 that can take. This means the resulting equilibrium outcome is high-end 
pooling. Then, because 𝐹 (𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔)) = 𝐹(0) = 0  and because equation (3) therefore 
becomes (assuming a positive wage) 
𝑒′(𝑤𝑔) −
1
1 − 𝑡
= 0 
 The condition above has to hold with equality because it is assumed that 0 < 𝑤𝑚 < 𝑤𝑔. 
Optimal wage for the generous plan is determined by the above equation. The firm’s profit is 
therefore 
𝜋ℎ𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0)) = 𝑒(𝑤𝑔
∗) −
𝑤𝑔
∗
1 − 𝑡
− ∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
0
 
where ∫ cf(c)dc
γ
0
=
1
2
{(γ − 1)γf(γ) + 1} and ℎ𝑝 stands for high-end pooling because 𝑐𝑔 = 0.  
(2) If 𝑤𝑚 > 𝑤𝑔 , then there are two possibilities: 1) 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 ≥ 𝑔(𝛾); and 2) 0 < 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 <
𝑔(𝛾).  
1) If 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 ≥ 𝑔(𝛾) , then 𝑐𝑔 = 𝛾 , and so the equilibrium is low-end pooling. Moreover, 
because 𝐹 (𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 − 𝑤𝑔)) = 𝐹(𝛾) = 1, Equation (3) can be simplified as (assuming a positive 
wage) 
𝑒′(𝑤𝑚) −
1
1 − 𝑡
= 0 
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The optimal wage is determined by the above equation, and is the same as in (1). The profit is 
𝜋𝑙𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0)) = 𝑒(𝑤𝑔
∗) −
𝑤𝑔
∗
1 − 𝑡
− 𝛼∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
0
 
 Obviously, 𝜋𝑙𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0)) > 𝜋ℎ𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0))because wage is the same in both cases. 
This tells that the low-end pooling equilibrium is superior to the high-end pooling one when 
wage boosts productivity.  
2) If 0 < 𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔 < 𝑔(𝛾) , then 𝑔
−1(0) < 𝑔−1(𝑤𝑚 −𝑤𝑔) < 𝑔
−1(𝛾)  so 0 < 𝑐𝑔 < 𝛾 . The 
potential equilibrium is separating. The optimal solutions can be derived by solving (1) and (2), 
assuming they hold with equalities. The profit is therefore  
𝜋𝑠𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0)) = (𝑒( 𝑤𝑚
∗ ) −
 𝑤𝑚
∗
1−𝑡
)𝐹(𝑐𝑔
∗) − 𝛼 ∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝑐𝑔
∗
0
+ (𝑒(𝑤𝑔
∗) −
𝑤𝑔
∗
1−𝑡
) (1 −
𝐹(𝑐𝑔
∗)) − ∫ 𝑐𝑓(𝑐)𝑑𝑐
𝛾
𝑐𝑔
∗   
where ∫ cf(c)dc
𝑐2
𝑐1
=
1
2
{(𝑐2 − 1)𝑐2f(𝑐2) − (𝑐1 − 1)𝑐1f(𝑐1) + [F(𝑐2) − F(𝑐1)]}. 
 It is not clear whether 𝜋𝑙𝑝(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔≥𝑔(𝛾)) ≥ 𝜋𝑠𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0))  or 𝜋𝑙𝑝(𝑤𝑚−𝑤𝑔≥𝑔(𝛾)) <
𝜋𝑠𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0)). Hence, the firm chooses the maximum of the two.  
𝜋𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max (𝜋𝑙𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0)), 𝜋𝑠𝑝(𝑤𝑚>𝑢−𝑚(0))) 
 Then the firm decides the corresponding optimal scheme, which leads to either a low-end 
pooing or a separating equilibrium.   
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Conclusions 
 When wage boosts productivity, high-end pooling equilibrium is no longer possible 
because it is dominated by the low-pooling equilibrium from the firm’s perspective: pooling leads 
to the same optimal wage, but given the same wage, enrolling all workers in the moderate plan 
generates the same amount of output but incurs less expenses than enrolling them all in the 
generous plan. But it is not quite clear whether low-end pooling is super to separating equilibrium.  
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APPENDIX C 
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER IV 
 
 
A4.1. A Model in Which the Employer Pays a Variable Share of the Premium 
 The model presented in Section 3.4 of Chapter assumes that the firm bears a fixed portion 
of the expected health insurance cost and attains its goal of profit maximization by manipulating 
wages. However, there may be firms that use something other than wages as instruments to 
affect its employees’ insurance choice decisions. This section presents a model where the firm 
utilizes such an alternative tool to induce its employees to either accept or decline the insurance 
policy.  
 In principle, the firm can utilize two wages and one insurance cost sharing tool as 
instruments to influence the decisions of its workers. However, if the firm is assumed to offer two 
wages, the model would be different from the one presented in the previous section. Thus, it is 
reasonable and desirable to assume that the firm offers only one wage. The wage is primarily used 
to recruit and retain workers, and the cost-sharing tool is used to induce workers to take up or 
turn down the insurance policy offer. If workers accept the insurance plan, they would receive a 
compensation package comprising a wage and the health insurance policy. Otherwise, they will 
receive a package consisting of the wage only.   
 Let α denote the proportion of the expected health insurance cost to be borne by the firm. 
So the cost that the firm would need to assume is αc if a worker of type 𝑐 chooses to be insured, 
and the portion of the expected health insurance cost worker would need to bear is 1 − α.  Let w 
denote the wage offered to workers. If a worker is enrolled in the plan, his total utility is w+
𝑚(c ) − (1 − α)c; otherwise, his total utility is simply the wage w. 
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 Assume productivity differs between insured and uninsured workers. If a worker is 
uninsured, his productivity would be e. If the worker is insured, his productivity would be 𝑒 + δ. 
Under the distributional assumption about worker types (or workers’ expected health care cost) 
made earlier, the profit the firm obtains from insured worker ∫ (e + δ −
w
1−t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
 and 
the profit from each uninsured worker is ∫ (e −
w
1−t
) f(c)dc
cm
0
. The firm’s objective is to maximize 
its expected profit, given that the compensation packages are acceptable to the workers. 
Mathematically, the firm’s problem can be written as 
𝐦𝐚𝐱
0≤w,𝟎≤α≤1
∫ (e −
w
1 − t
) f(c)dc + ∫ (e + δ −
w
1 − t
− αc) f(c)dc
γ
cm
cm
0
 
s.t.:  
w ≥ u 
w+m(c) − (1 − α)c ≥ u 
m(c) ≥ (1 − α)c 
 The constraints are not required to hold simultaneously. Only if the firm would like to 
separate its workers into insured and uninsured groups (separating equilibrium) are all the three 
constraints necessary. Otherwise, only the first constraint or the last two are needed. The last one 
is the incentive compatibility constraint, which always holds with equality for c = 0. This means 
there might be situations where only the lowest cost-workers choose to be insured. To prevent 
this kind of situations from happening, a restriction has to be imposed: if only one type of workers 
chooses to be insured and that type is indifferent between insured and uninsured, then insurance 
will not be offered. The case where w < u is not considered, because the firm can use the other 
tool to achieve the same goal. 
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 Optimality requires w = u. So the second (participation) constraint holds with equality 
for c = 0. In situations where m(c) ≥ (1 − α)c for all α ∈ [0,1] and for all c ∈ [0, γ]. For example, 
if  m(c) > 𝑐  for c ∈ (0, γ), then all workers self-select to be insured regardless of the firm’s 
decisions on α. Therefore, the firm would not have enough instruments to induce workers’ choice 
and thus only one possible type of equilibrium exists: pooling into the insurance plan. To avoid 
this kind of situations, it is necessary to impose restrictions on the function m(c). So assume  
m′(0) < 1                                                                                                                                     (𝐴1) 
 With this assumption, the firm can choose α to affect workers’ decisions, because then 
m(c) < 𝑐 for some c and thus by adjusting α, the firm can have m(c) ≥ (1 − α)c for its desired 
level of c.  
 For the last two constraints in the firm’s profit-maximization problem, there exists cm ∈
[0, γ]  such that they both are binding, i.e., w+m(cm) − (1 − α)cm = u  and m(cm) − (1 −
α)cm = 0. Hence only one of the last two constraints is necessary. If some workers choose to be 
insured, then the lowest-cost workers who opt to be insured are indifferent between insured and 
uninsured. With  m(c) ≥ (1 − α)c and 𝑤 = u, the firm’s objective function can be re-written as 
𝐦𝐚𝐱
𝟎≤α≤1
 e −
u
1 − t
+∫ (δ − αc)f(c)dc
γ
cm
 
s.t.: 
m(c) ≥ (1 − α)c 
  If m(c) < 𝑐, there exists cm ∈ [0, γ] such that the incentive compatibility constraint can 
be made binding, i.e.,  m(cm) = (1 − α)cm, which  implies αcm = cm −m(cm). Solving for α in 
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terms of cm yields α = 1 −
m(cm)
cm
. There is a one-to-one mapping between α and cm. But 𝟎 ≤
α ≤ 1 implies 0 ≤
m(cm)
cm
≤ 1, or 0 ≤ m(cm) ≤ cm. This may not always be the case, because it is 
possible that m(cm) > cm; to accommodate this possibility, let’s define α = max (1 −
m(cm)
cm
, 0).  
In addition, using l'Hôpital's rule, I define 
m(cm→0)
cm→0
=
m′(0)
1
= m′(0). Moreover, w = u  at the 
optimum. The firm’s problem then becomes  
𝐦𝐚𝐱
cm∈[0,γ]
 δ∫ f(c)dc
γ
cm
−𝑚𝑎𝑥 (1 −
m(cm)
cm
, 0) cm∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
 
s.t.: 
m(cm) ≥ (1 −𝑚𝑎𝑥 (1 −
m(cm)
cm
, 0)) cm 
 The Langrangian is skipped. The way to find the solution to the firm’s profit maximization 
problem is write down the Langrangian and then differentiate the Langrangian with respect to cm. 
A simpler way to solve the problem is to take advantage of the relationship between cm and the 
function m(cm) : if m(cm) ≥ cm , then 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (1 −
m(cm)
cm
, 0) = 0 . So the constraint becomes 
m(cm) ≥ cm, which is consistent with the assumption. Thus, only the first term is left in the 
objective function. If m(cm) < cm, then 𝑚𝑎𝑥 (1 −
m(cm)
cm
, 0)=1 −
m(cm)
cm
. The constraint becomes 
m(cm) ≥ m(cm), which still holds but is not constraining and so can be disregarded, and the 
objective function is simplified. In either case, the problem is easy to solve. 
 Solving the problem using the approach stated at the end of the last paragraph yields the 
following first order conditions, which are presented as Proposition A4.1. 
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 Proposition A4.1. The Equilibrium is characterized by the first order conditions for the 
firm’s profit maximization problem: 
1
f(cm
∗ )
(
m(cm
∗ )
𝑐m
∗2 −
m′(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ ) IA∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
+max (cm
∗ −m(cm
∗ ), 0) {
< 𝛿, 𝑖𝑓 m(cm
∗ ) ≥ cm
∗ ≥ 0 
= δ, if m(cm
∗ ) < cm
∗ < 𝛾   
> 𝛿, 𝑖𝑓 m(γ) < cm
∗ = γ    
 
where IA = Im(cm∗ )<cm∗ {
= 1 if m(cm
∗ ) < cm
∗
= 0 otherwise        
. 
 Proof. Differentiating the firm’s objective function with respect to  cm
∗  yields the results. 
See Appendix for the derivation.   
 The term ∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗  can be computed using integration by parts as follows (see the 
Appendix for the derivation) 
∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
=
1
2
{(γ − 1)γf(γ) − (cm
∗ − 1)cm
∗ f(cm
∗ ) + 1 − F(cm
∗ )} 
The firm’s decisions depend on productivity differential δ. Suppose δ is non-positive. Then if 
m(cm
∗ ) ≥ cm
∗ ≥ 0, the first order conditions would be violated. In this case, 𝛼∗ = 0, which is the 
only instrument under the firm’s control (the wage instrument is for induce workers to join the 
firm only).  
 In other situations, firm’s desired optimal solutions to the problem would be 𝛼∗ = 0 and 
cm
∗ = γ. However, the firm can only make choices on wages and the share of insurance cost to 
induce its workers to choose to be insured or uninsured and cannot directly make decisions for 
its workers. Hence the optimal solutions are w = u and α = 0. Then the decision on whether or 
not to be insured is up to the workers.  
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 Workers’ decisions rest entirely on the insurance benefit function m(c). If m(c) < 𝑐 
holds for all c ∈ (0, γ], then all workers would choose to stay uninsured because the incentive 
compatibility constraint is violated. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this conclusion 
to hold is as follows. If the marginal benefit of health insurance is lower than its marginal cost or  
m′(c) < 1 for all c ∈ [0, γ], because in this case the benefit from insurance is always lower than 
its cost.  If, on the other hand, m(c) ≥ 𝑐 holds for all c ∈ [0, γ] (or more restrictively, the marginal 
benefit of health insurance is greater than its marginal cost or  m′(c) > 1 for all c ∈ [0, γ]), then 
all workers would choose to be insured, since the benefit from health insurance always outweighs 
its cost. In the case where insurance has adverse effects on worker productivity, the firm may 
suffer because it is unable to prevent its workers from being insured if they choose to do so. This 
is negative externality of health insurance.  If there exists some c ∈ (0, γ) such that m(c) ≥ c, 
then there must exists c ∈ (0, γ) , denoted as cm, that satisfies the condition m(cm) = cm. Hence, 
some workers would opt to be insured and others to be uninsured. These results are summarized 
below. 
 Proposition A4.2. Suppose 𝑚′(𝑐) > 0, 𝑚′′(c ) > 0, and 𝑚(𝑐) = 0 for 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾]; suppose 
further that the health insurance does not boost worker productivity. Then a separating 
equilibrium exists if and only if the insurance benefit function  𝑚(𝑐) has one and only one fixed 
point, i.e., 𝑚(cf) = cf  for cf ∈ (0, 𝛾).  
 Proof. Let cf ∈ (0, γ) denote the fixed point. So m(cf ) = cf. This implies m(cf ) − cf = 0. 
Moreover, since health insurance does not boost worker productivity, the productivity differential 
between potentially insured and uninsured workers is non-positive, or  δ ≤ 0. Hence, the profit-
maximizing firm optimally sets w = u  and α = 0 . Let cm = cf . Then  m(cf ) − cf = 0   implies 
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m(cm) − cm = 0, which, together with α = 0, implies m(cm) − (1 − α)cm = 0 for cm ∈ (0, γ). 
Let h(c) = m(c) − c. Then according to the mean-value theorem, there exists c ∈ (0, cf) such 
that h(cf) − h(0) =  h
′(c)(cf − 0) , implying  h
′(c) = 0 ;  h′′(c) = m′′(c) > 0 , which implies 
h′(cf) > h
′(c) = 0  for c ∈ (0, cf) ,and h
′(c) > ℎ′(cf) > 0  for c ∈ (cf, γ) ; Thus either  h(c) =
m(c) − c ≥ h(cf) = h(cm) = m(cm) − cm = 0  for c ∈ (cm, γ) . Therefore, workers with 
expected health care cost that is equal to or greater than cm = cf would choose to be insured and 
workers whose expected health care cost is less than cm = cf would opt to be uninsured. 
 Conversely, the existence of a separating equilibrium implies there is c ∈ (0, γ)  that 
makes the incentive compatibility constraint m(c) − (1 − α)c ≥ 0 holds; then for the lowest-cost 
workers, this constraint is binding, i.e., m(cm) − (1 − α)cm = 0. Because α = 0, m(cm) − cm =
0,or  m(cm) = cm. Hence cm is the fixed point. Q.E.D. 
 This separating equilibrium, if it exists, is solely the result of workers’ own choice because 
the firm does not have the incentive to enroll any of its workers but, on the other hand, it is unable 
to induce them to reject the insurance policy offer (withdrawing the policy is not an option in this 
model) since it does not have enough instruments. This may be called the worker-opted 
separating equilibrium, as compared to the firm-induced separating equilibrium that will be 
presented later.  
 If Proposition A4.2. is assumed to hold, except that the second derivative of the insurance 
benefit function is changed to  m′′(c ) < 0 , then there would be a different separating 
equilibrium where workers with expected health care cost that is equal to or less than cm = cf 
would choose to be insured and workers whose expected health care cost is greater than cm = cf 
would opt to be uninsured. This says that workers are risk-loving: they value the insurance 
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coverage less than its cost beyond some point and their utility as a function of their health cost is 
concave.  
 Proposition A4.2 and the analysis in the preceding paragraph show that the type of the 
separating equilibrium depends on the shape of the health benefit function. There could be 
multiple separating equilibria if the insurance benefit function is not monotonic. The existence of 
a fixed point is critical to the existence of a separating equilibrium in the case where insurance 
does not enhance productivity and wage is equal across insured and uninsured workers. If no fixed 
point exists, then only a pooling equilibrium may exist.   
 Now suppose δ > 0. If  m(cm
∗ ) = cm
∗ = 0, define 
m(cm
∗ →0)
(cm
∗ →0)2
=
m′′(0)
2
 and 
m′(cm
∗ →0)
cm
∗ →0
=
m′′(0)
1
. 
Hence max (
m(cm
∗ )
𝑐m
∗2 −
m′(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ , 0) = 0 ; moreover, max (cm
∗ −m(cm
∗ ), 0) = 0 ; the first order 
conditions then becomes 0 < 𝛿; this holds given a positive productivity differential. The solutions 
𝛼∗ = 0.  
 If  m(cm
∗ ) = cm
∗ > 0, then 
m(cm
∗ )
𝑐m
∗2 −
m′(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ =
1
cm
∗ (1 −m
′(cm
∗ )). Recall from discussions in 
the preceding paragraphs on negative productivity differential that m′(cm
∗ ) > 1 at the fixed point 
given m′′(cm
∗ ) > 0 . Thus the left-hand side of the first order condition is 0, or 0 < 𝛿 . This 
condition holds if and only if δ > 0. Note that when cm
∗ = m(cm
∗ ) > 0, 𝛼∗ = 0. This means that if 
there exists a cost type c ∈ (0, γ] that solves the firm profit maximization profit and the insurance 
benefit function m(c) has a fixed point at cm
∗ , then the firm would not bear any share of insurance 
cost for its workers even if insurance coverage boosts worker productivity. This is because workers 
with expected health care at or above the optimal cutoff level would choose to be insured without 
being incentivized by the firm.   
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 If m(cm
∗ ) > 𝑐m
∗ > 0, then 𝛼∗ = 0 and the first order condition becomes 0 < 𝛿. [Note that 
for an increasing convex function m(c) that passes through the origin,  
m(cm
∗ )
𝑐m
∗2 −
m′(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ < 0]. 
In all cases above, including cases where productivity differential is negative, the firm’s (excess) 
profit from insured workers can be generally expressed as ∫ δf(c)dc
γ
cm
= δ(1 − F(cm
∗ )), because 
𝛼∗ = 0. Note that in this case, it is also true that 
m(cm
∗ )
𝑐m
∗2 −
m′(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ < 0. 
  If m(γ) < cm
∗ = γ , the first order condition becomes 
1
f(cm
∗ )
(
m(γ)
γ2
−
m′(γ)
γ
)∫ cf(c)dc
γ
γ
+ 
γ − m(γ) > 𝛿, i.e., 
γ − m(γ) > 𝛿. 
which is possible, and the solution is cm
∗ = γ and 𝛼∗ = 1 −
m(γ)
γ
> 0. In the above two cases, the 
firm’s (excess) profit from insured workers is ∫ δ(1 −
m(γ)
γ
)γf(c)dc
γ
γ
= 0. 
 If m(cm
∗ ) < cm
∗ < 𝛾, then the first order condition can be written as  
1
f(cm
∗ )
(
m(cm
∗ )
𝑐m
∗2 −
m′(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ )∫ cf(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
+ cm
∗ −m(cm
∗ ) = δ 
 This can hold because although the part in the parenthesis is negative, the last two term 
together are positive. The optimal cm
∗  is determined implicitly by this equation. 𝛼∗ = 1 −
m(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ >
0. This is a separating equilibrium that occurs below the 45-degree line since m(cm
∗ ) < cm
∗ . In this 
case, the firm’s (excess) profit obtained from insured workers is  
∫ (δ − (1 −
m(cm
∗ )
cm
∗ ) cm
∗ ) f(c)dc
γ
cm
∗
= (δ − (cm
∗ −m(cm
∗ ))) (1 − F(cm
∗ )) 
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which depends on δ. This constitutes a separating equilibrium, which may be called firm-induced 
separating equilibrium because it results primarily from the firm’s decision. 
The following proposition summaries and generalizes an important result: conditions for the 
existence of a separating equilibrium.  
 Proposition A4.3. Suppose the health benefit function is increasing and convex over the 
domain of its argument. Then an induced separating equilibrium exists if and only if health 
insurance boosts productivity and m′(0) < 1. 
 Proof. If m′(0) < 1, then with a small  c > 0 in the neighborhood of zero,  m(c) < 𝑐; with 
0 < 𝛿, the firm can choose α > 0 so that δ ≥ αc,where c can also be chosen in such a way that  
m(c) = (1 − α)c  is satisfied. This α  solves the firm’s profit maximization problem, as shown 
earlier. Conversely, if an induced separating equilibrium exists, then α > 0   and the health 
insurance must boost productivity for otherwise the firm would set α = 0 ; moreover, the 
existence of an induced separating equilibrium also implies  m(c) < 𝑐 for some c, for otherwise 
all workers would choose to be insured and no incentive-compatible scheme the firm may utilize 
to induce worker to act otherwise, and thus the equilibrium would be pooling.  
 If the benefit function has a fixed point, i.e., m(cf) = cf, then m(c) > 𝑐  for  𝑐 > cf, given 
that the function is increasing and convex. Then all workers with a cost higher the fixed point 
would choose to be insured without being incentive by the firm, and because m(c) > (1 − 𝛼)𝑐  
for all 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], there are no incentive-compatible schemes the firm may utilize to induce worker 
opt out of insurance; thus a worker-opted separating equilibrium has to exist. Conversely, if a 
work-opted separating equilibrium, then  m(c) ≥ c  for some 𝑐 ∈ [0, 𝛾]; the minimum level of 𝑐, 
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𝑐𝑚, must satisfy this condition with equality, i.e., m(cm) = cm. Thus a fixed point exists, which is 
cm.  Q.E.D. 
 To sum up, when the firm offers only one insurance plan and it is required to pay equal 
wages to all its workers, then some workers may choose to be insured, even if the firm does not 
share the cost of health insurance. The reason is that some workers value the benefit of the health 
insurance plan more than its cost. In such a case, the firm may suffer a loss in excess of the wage 
cost because insurance has negative externality. However, if the externality of health insurance is 
positive, the firm can benefit from all the health insurance without doing anything under certain 
circumstances. If the workers do not value the health insurance plan as much as it costs, but health 
insurance may lead to higher productivity, then the firm will be willing to share the cost of 
insurance. The important conclusion is that the health insurance benefit function affects the firm’s 
decisions and profitability. It also determines, in many cases, the type of equilibrium. For example, 
if this function rises too fast relative to the cost, then a large portion of workers would choose to 
be insured, even if no particular incentives are provided by the firm. In this situation, the firm 
essentially loses its ability to affect workers’ health insurance decisions, because the instruments 
available to it no longer work. The firm can influence its workers’ choice only when the benefit 
from health insurance is low relative to its cost for a substantial portion of workers. If the one-
wage restriction is relaxed by assuming the firm offers two (potentially) different wages, then the 
problem just described can be solved: the firm can adjust both the wage associated with the 
insurance policy and the share of cost it bears. However, this would be very similar to the one-
plan model analyzed in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3.   
 For rents distribution, the firm extracts all rents when the equilibrium is low-end pooling 
(all workers are uninsured), but receives no workers receive rents because the individual 
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rationality constraint would be binding for all workers. If the equilibrium is separating, then the 
firm extracts rents (only) from uninsured workers who receive no rents, but the insured workers 
receive rents, since in this case, the participation constraint for uninsured workers is binding, 
whereas the participation constraint for the insured ones is not. If the equilibrium is high-end 
pooling, then the firm extracts no rents and all workers except for the lowest-cost ones receive 
rents, because the participation constraint is binding only for the lowest-cost workers but the 
lowest-cost workers have no risk and thus cannot generate rents.  
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APPENDIX D 
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER VI 
 
 
A6.1. Tables 
Table A6.1.     Results from the Wage Regression Model with Two Excluded Instruments  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES OLS 
RSE 
1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 1st Stage 2SLS 
        
Insured via firm 0.235***  -0.278***  -
0.186*** 
 -
0.201*** 
 (0.005)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.033) 
Male 0.285*** 0.148*** 0.364*** 0.145*** 0.350*** 0.151*** 0.352*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
Firm with >= 100 
Employees 
0.130*** 0.218*** 0.235*** 0.207*** 0.216*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) 
Unionized (yes = 1) 0.125*** 0.249*** 0.253*** 0.264*** 0.230*** 0.269*** 0.233*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) 
Spouse offered insurance   -
0.105*** 
 -
0.112*** 
   
  (0.004)  (0.004)    
Spousal Firm w/ >= 100 
employees  
 -
0.072*** 
   -
0.093*** 
 
  (0.004)    (0.004)  
Spouse unionized    -
0.115*** 
 -
0.129*** 
 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  
Constant 2.302*** 0.502*** 2.508*** 0.496*** 2.471*** 0.451*** 2.477*** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
       
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM)   1.794     
   (p=0.181)     
Hausman (2SLS)/C 
(GMM) 
  166.687     
   (p=0.0001)     
Observations 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 
R-squared 0.358 - 0.201 - 0.252 - 0.245 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Occupation, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
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Table A6.2.     Results from Wage Regression Models Using Husband and Wife Samples; 
h=Husband; w=Wife  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS RSE 
(h) 
1st Stage 
(h) 
2SLS  
(h) 
OLS RSE 
(w) 
1st Stage 
(w) 
2SLS  
(w) 
       
Insured via firm 0.273***  0.117** 0.279***  -0.121*** 
 (0.008)  (0.0491) (0.007)  (0.036) 
Firm with >= 100 employees 0.118*** 0.231*** 0.153*** 0.165*** 0.232*** 0.252*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) 
Unionized 0.035*** 0.218*** 0.069*** 0.143*** 0.252*** 0.245*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.0116) (0.009) (0.013) 
Excl. Instruments  -
0.086*** 
  -0.131***  
Spouse offered insurance  (0.006)   (0.006)  
  -
0.069*** 
  -0.084***  
Spousal firm w/ >= 100 
employees  
 (0.006)   (0.006)  
 1.317*** 0.168*** 1.339*** 1.220*** 0.205*** 1.283*** 
Constant (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) 
 0.273***  0.117** 0.279***  -0.121*** 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 176.94 - - 174.10 - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 7.10 - - 0.0009 
 - - (p=0.008) - - (p=0.992) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM) - - 5.28 - - 71.86 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - (p=0.005) - - (p=0.0001) 
Observations 28,568 28,568 28,568 30,590 30,590 30,590 
R-squared 0.286 0.130 0.271 0.319 0.120 0.215 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Spousal Education, Race, Potential Experience, 
Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014 
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Table A6.3.     Results from the Wage Regression Model with Three Excluded Instruments  
     
VARIABLES OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM 
     
Insured via firm 0.227***  -0.116*** -0.114*** 
 (0.005)  (0.026) (0.026) 
Male  0.207*** 0.122*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm with >= 100 employees 0.124*** 0.219*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unionized 0.079*** 0.242*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Excl. Instruments     
Spouse offered insurance  -0.097***   
  (0.004)   
Spousal Firm w/ >= 100 employees  -0.069***   
  (0.004)   
Spouse unionized  -0.106***   
  (0.006)   
Constant 0.862*** -0.028* 0.830*** 0.830*** 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments)     
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM)   6.20 6.39 
   (p=0.045) (p=0.041) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM)   103.53 205.34 
   (p=0.0001) (p=0.0001) 
Observations 59,442 59,442 59,442 59,442 
R-squared 0.395 0.167 0.324 0.325 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 
 
  
180 
 
APPENDIX E 
APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER VII 
 
 
A7.1. Tables  
 
 
Table A7.1.     Results from Two-part Model for #Days Missed Work Due to Sickness Using the 
Full Sample  
 1st part 2nd part 1st eqn. 2nd eqn. 1st part 2nd part 2nd part 2nd part 
VARIABLES Prob. OLS Bi Prob. Bi Prob. IV Prob. 2SLS GMM Pois 
GMM 
         
Insured via 
firm 
0.218*** -0.016  -
0.245*** 
-
0.403*** 
-0.581 -0.564 -0.087 
 (0.011) (0.122)  (0.0618) (0.0695) (0.665) (0.664) (0.101) 
Male  -0.257*** -
1.359*** 
0.358*** -
0.190*** 
-
0.165*** 
-
1.301*** 
-
1.301*** 
-
0.197*** 
 (0.011) (0.115) (0.011) (0.014) (0.0154) (0.133) (0.128) (0.020) 
Firm 
with >=100 
employees 
0.060*** 0.723*** 0.624*** 0.154*** 0.185*** 0.830*** 0.815*** 0.120*** 
 (0.011) (0.117) (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) (0.171) (0.171) (0.026) 
Unionized 0.0747*** 1.409*** 0.715*** 0.178*** 0.212*** 1.531*** 1.539*** 0.219*** 
 (0.016) (0.165) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.217) (0.224) (0.032) 
Spouse 
offered 
insurance  
  -
0.327*** 
     
   (0.012)      
Spousal Firm 
w/ >= 100 
employees
  
  -
0.223*** 
     
   (0.0121)      
Constant -0.159*** 11.90*** -
1.493*** 
-
0.201*** 
-
0.210*** 
11.90*** 11.87*** 2.604*** 
 (0.041) (0.448) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.448) (0.457) (0.063) 
         
Observations 59,442 24,810 59,442 59,442 59,442 24,810 24,810 24,810 
R-squared  0.022 -             0.021 0.021  
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) For the bivariate Probit (Bi Prob.) models, rho=0.285***. 
          3) Control variables not listed in the table include Education, Race, Potential Experience, Region  
              Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          4) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
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Table A7.2.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Work Due to Sickness Using the Full 
Sample, where Spousal Education Replaces Education. 
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM Pois GMM 
      
Insured via firm 0.533*** - -1.498*** -1.494*** -0.496*** 
 (0.062) - (0.384) (0.384) (0.124) 
Male  -1.199*** 0.111*** -0.951*** -0.951*** -0.353*** 
 (0.059) (0.004) (0.072) (0.071) (0.025) 
Firm with >=100 employees 0.453*** 0.231*** 0.898*** 0.897*** 0.307*** 
 (0.063) (0.004) (0.102) (0.102) (0.033) 
Unionized 0.809*** 0.234*** 1.287*** 1.287*** 0.424*** 
 (0.102) (0.006) (0.123) (0.128) (0.041) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered insurance - -0.109*** - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - 
Spousal firm with >=100  employees - -0.077*** - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - 
Constant 4.609*** 0.139*** 4.803*** 4.801*** 1.669*** 
 (0.223) (0.014) (0.211) (0.216) (0.069) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 389.58 - - - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 0.125 0.122 0.201 
  - (p=0.724) (P=0.727) (P=0.653) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM) - - 14.60 29.37 - 
 - - (p=0.0001) (p=0.0001) - 
Observations 59,158 59,158 59,158 59,158 59,158 
R-squared 0.016 0.141 - - - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Spousal Education, Race, Potential Experience,  
              Region Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
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Table A7.3.     Results from Regression of #Days Missed Work for Other Reasons Using the Full 
Sample, where Spousal Education Replaces Education. 
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) 
Variables OLS RSE 1st Stage 2SLS GMM Pois GMM 
      
Insured via firm  0.193*** - -0.545*** -0.552*** -0.576*** 
 (0.025) - (0.154) (0.152) (0.155) 
Male  -0.363*** 0.111*** -0.273*** -0.271*** -0.333*** 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) 
Firm with >=100 employees  0.064** 0.231*** 0.226*** 0.230*** 0.248*** 
 (0.025) (0.004) (0.041) (0.040) (0.042) 
Unionized 0.139*** 0.234*** 0.313*** 0.317*** 0.352*** 
 (0.039) (0.006) (0.049) (0.050) (0.054) 
Excl. Instruments       
Spouse offered - -0.110*** - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - 
Spousal firm with  >=100 
employees 
- -0.076*** - - - 
 - (0.004) - - - 
Constant 0.682*** 0.139*** 0.752*** 0.743*** -0.522*** 
 (0.084) (0.014) (0.085) (0.082) (0.099) 
F-stat (Excl. Instruments) - 446.86 - - - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J (GMM) - - 7.36 7.18 5.74 
 - - (0.007) (P=0.007) (p=0.017) 
Hausman (2SLS)/C (GMM) - - 11.99 25.17 - 
 - - (p=0.0001) (p=0.0001) - 
Observations 59,158 59,158 59,158 59,158 59,158 
R-squared 0.014 0.141 - - - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Spousal Education, Race, Potential Experience,  
              Region Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
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Table A7.4.     Results for Regression of #Days Missed Work for Other Reasons for the Husband 
and Wife Samples, where Spousal Education replaces Own Education. h=Husband, w=Wife. 
    (1) (2) (2’) (3) (4) (4’) 
Variables OLS RSE 
(h) 
1st Stage (h) 2SLS (h) OLS RSE 
(w) 
1st Stage (w) 2SLS (w) 
       
Insured via firm 0.163***  -0.524** 0.218***  -0.568*** 
 (0.030)  (0.233) (0.038)  (0.204) 
Firm with >=100 
employees  
0.116*** 0.231*** 0.266*** 0.013 0.232*** 0.185*** 
 (0.033) (0.006) (0.059) (0.039) (0.006) (0.057) 
Unionized 0.090* 0.218*** 0.241*** 0.217*** 0.252*** 0.417*** 
 (0.048) (0.008) (0.065) (0.065) (0.009) (0.075) 
Excl. Instruments        
Spouse offered - -0.0804*** - - -0.081*** - 
 - (0.006) - - (0.006) - 
Spousal Firm 
w/ >=100 employees 
- -0.067*** - - -0.134*** - 
 - (0.006) - - (0.006) - 
Constant 0.583*** 0.075*** 0.606*** 0.347*** -0.059*** 0.288** 
 (0.101) (0.021) (0.109) (0.126) (0.021) (0.130) 
F-stat (Excl. 
Instruments) 
 176.94  - 174.10 - 
Sargan (2SLS)/J 
(GMM) 
- - 1.98 - 5.14 - 
 - - (p=0.160) - (p=0.023) - 
Hausman (2SLS)/C 
(GMM) 
- - 4.49 - 7.81 - 
 - - (p=0.011) - (p=0.0004) - 
Observations 28,568 28,568 28,568 30,590 30,590 30,590 
R-squared 0.017 0.130 - 0.009 0.120 - 
Note: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
          2) Control variables not listed in the table include Spousal Education, Race, Potential Experience,  
              Region Dummies, and Year Dummies. 
          3) Sample: MEPS 2002-2014. 
 
 
